Below you will find two articles thatI find very informative about the new war that Israel wages on Gaza and Hamas.
In the second article ( Max Blumenthal) you can read that Netanyahu deliberately used the kidnap to arrest Hamas people and to blow up houses. (In short: to increase Palestinian anger even more)
All the time he knew that Hamas did not do it: rogue - not in control of Hamas- Palestinian families did it, and he knew it.
In the second article, from a jewish website in America, we read that even the army does not at all like what is going on.
We read that the smaller rockets were not sent by Hamas, but by smaller jihadist groups.
Hamas started the rocket attacks only after one of their men was killed by Israel, on 29 june.
Still: these rockets are purely symbolic: they show the great anger of Hamas, because Israel routinely picks them out of the air. Not one Israeli was killed so far. But Israel killed already 120 Palestinians, and many will follow I fear.
How Politics and Lies Triggered an Unintended War in Gaza
Kidnap, Crackdown, Mutual Missteps and a Hail of Rockets
( The original article is here )
GETTY IMAGES
By J.J. Goldberg
In the flood of angry words that poured out of Israel and Gaza during a week of spiraling violence, few statements were more blunt, or more telling, than this throwaway line by the chief spokesman of the Israeli military, Brigadier General Moti Almoz, speaking July 8 on Army Radio’s morning show: “We have been instructed by the political echelon to hit Hamas hard.”
That’s unusual language for a military mouthpiece. Typically they spout lines like “We will take all necessary actions” or “The state of Israel will defend its citizens.” You don’t expect to hear: “This is the politicians’ idea. They’re making us do it.”
Admittedly, demurrals on government policy by Israel’s top defense brass, once virtually unthinkable, have become almost routine in the Netanyahu era. Usually, though, there’s some measure of subtlety or discretion. This particular interview was different. Where most disagreements involve policies that might eventually lead to some future unnecessary war, this one was about an unnecessary war they were now stumbling into.
Spokesmen don’t speak for themselves. Almoz was expressing a frustration that was building in the army command for nearly a month, since the June 12 kidnapping of three Israeli yeshiva boys. The crime set off a chain of events in which Israel gradually lost control of the situation, finally ending up on the brink of a war that nobody wanted — not the army, not the government, not even the enemy, Hamas.
The frustration had numerous causes. Once the boys’ disappearance was known, troops began a massive, 18-day search-and-rescue operation, entering thousands of homes, arresting and interrogating hundreds of individuals, racing against the clock. Only on July 1, after the boys’ bodies were found, did the truth come out: The government had known almost from the beginning that the boys were dead. It maintained the fiction that it hoped to find them alive as a pretext to dismantle Hamas’ West Bank operations.
The initial evidence was the recording of victim Gilad Shaer’s desperate cellphone call to Moked 100, Israel’s 911. When the tape reached the security services the next morning — neglected for hours by Moked 100 staff — the teen was heard whispering “They’ve kidnapped me” (“hatfu oti”) followed by shouts of “Heads down,” then gunfire, two groans, more shots, then singing in Arabic. That evening searchers found the kidnappers’ abandoned, torched Hyundai, with eight bullet holes and the boys’ DNA. There was no doubt.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu immediately placed a gag order on the deaths. Journalists who heard rumors were told the Shin Bet wanted the gag order to aid the search. For public consumption, the official word was that Israel was “acting on the assumption that they’re alive.” It was, simply put, a lie.
Moti Almoz, as army spokesman, was in charge of repeating the lie. True, others backed him up, including Defense Minister Moshe Yaalon. But when the truth came out on July 1, Almoz bore the brunt of public derision. Critics said his credibility was shot. He’d only been spokesman since October, after a long career as a blunt-talking field commander with no media experience. Others felt professional frustration. His was personal.
Nor was that the only fib. It was clear from the beginning that the kidnappers weren’t acting on orders from Hamas leadership in Gaza or Damascus. Hamas’ Hebron branch — more a crime family than a clandestine organization — had a history of acting without the leaders’ knowledge, sometimes against their interests. Yet Netanyahu repeatedly insisted Hamas was responsible for the crime and would pay for it.
This put him in a ticklish position. His rhetoric raised expectations that after demolishing Hamas in the West Bank he would proceed to Gaza. Hamas in Gaza began preparing for it. The Israeli right — settler leaders, hardliners in his own party — began demanding it.
But Netanyahu had no such intention. The last attack on Gaza, the eight-day Operation Pillar of Defense in November 2012, targeted Hamas leaders and taught a sobering lesson. Hamas hadn’t fired a single rocket since, and had largely suppressed fire by smaller jihadi groups. Rocket firings, averaging 240 per month in 2007, dropped to five per month in 2013. Neither side had any desire to end the détente. Besides, whatever might replace Hamas in Gaza could only be worse.
The kidnapping and crackdown upset the balance. In Israel, grief and anger over the boys’ disappearance grew steadily as the fabricated mystery stretched into a second and third week. Rallies and prayer meetings were held across the country and in Jewish communities around the world. The mothers were constantly on television. One addressed the United Nations in Geneva to plead for her son’s return. Jews everywhere were in anguish over the unceasing threat of barbaric Arab terror plaguing Israel.
This, too, was misleading. The last seven years have been the most tranquil in Israel’s history. Terror attacks are a fraction of the level during the nightmare intifada years — just six deaths in all of 2013. But few notice. The staged agony of the kidnap search created, probably unintentionally, what amounts to a mass, worldwide attack of post-traumatic stress flashback.
When the bodies were finally found, Israelis’ anger exploded into calls for revenge, street riots and, finally, murder.
Amid the rising tension, cabinet meetings in Jerusalem turned into shouting matches. Ministers on the right demanded the army reoccupy Gaza and destroy Hamas. Netanyahu replied, backed by the army and liberal ministers, that the response must be measured and careful. It was an unaccustomed and plainly uncomfortable role for him. He was caught between his pragmatic and ideological impulses.
In Gaza, leaders went underground. Rocket enforcement squads stopped functioning and jihadi rocket firing spiked. Terror squads began preparing to counterattack Israel through tunnels. One tunnel exploded on June 19 in an apparent work accident, killing five Hamas gunmen, convincing some in Gaza that the Israeli assault had begun while reinforcing Israeli fears that Hamas was plotting terror all along.
On June 29, an Israeli air attack on a rocket squad killed a Hamas operative. Hamas protested. The next day it unleashed a rocket barrage, its first since 2012. The cease-fire was over. Israel was forced to retaliate for the rockets with air raids. Hamas retaliated for the raids with more rockets. And so on. Finally Israel began calling up reserves on July 8 and preparing for what, as Moti Almoz told Army Radio, “the political echelon instructed.”
Later that morning, Israel’s internal security minister Yitzhak Aharonovitch told reporters that the “political echelon has given the army a free hand.” Almoz returned to Army Radio that afternoon and confirmed that the army had “received an absolutely free hand” to act.
And how far, the interviewer asked, will the army go? “To the extent that it’s up to the army,” Almoz said, “the army is determined to restore quiet.” Will simply restoring quiet be enough? “That’s not up to us,” he said. The army will continue the operation as long as it’s told.
The operation’s army code-name, incidentally, is “Protective Edge” in English, but the original Hebrew is more revealing: Tzuk Eitan, or “solid cliff.” That, the army seems to feel, is where Israel is headed.
Contact J.J. Goldberg at goldberg@forward.com
Read more: http://forward.com/articles/201764/how-politics-and-lies-triggered-an-unintended-war/?p=all#ixzz37LiffclU
================
Netanyahu Government Knew Teens Were Dead As It Whipped Up Racist Frenzy
( here is the original article)
By Max Blumenthal
At a right-wing protest in Jerusalem a sign reads “May God avenge their blood” and a youth wears a sticker stating “Kahane was right,” referring to the Brooklyn-born violent settler movement leader, 1 July. (Tali Mayer / ActiveStills)
|
“Cursed be he who says, ‘Avenge!‘ “
—Chaim Bialik, from “On The Slaughter”
July 10, 2014 "ICH"
- "The Electronic Intifada" - From the
moment three Israeli teens were reported missing last month, Israeli Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the country’s
military-intelligence apparatus suppressed the flow of information to the
general public. Through a toxic blend of propaganda, subterfuge and incitement,
they inflamed a precarious situation, manipulating Israelis into supporting
their agenda until they made an utterly avoidable nightmare inevitable.
Israeli police, intelligence officials and Netanyahu
knew within hours of the kidnapping and murder of the three teens that they had
been killed. And they knew who the prime suspects were less than a day after
the kidnapping was reported.
Rather than reveal these details to the public,
Israel’s Shin Bet intelligence agency imposed a gag
order on the national media, barring news outlets from
reporting that the teens had almost certainly been killed, and forbidding them
from revealing the identities of their suspected killers. The Shin Bet even
lied to the parents of the kidnapped teens, deceiving them into believing their
sons were alive.
Instead of mounting a limited action to capture the
suspected perpetrators and retrieve the teens’ bodies, Netanyahu staged an
aggressive international public relations campaign, demanding sympathy and
outrage from world leaders, who were also given the impression that the missing
teens were still alive.
Meanwhile, Israel’s armed forces rampaged throughout
the occupied West Bank and bombarded the Gaza
Strip in a campaign of collective punishment deceptively
marketed to Israelis and the world as a rescue mission.
Critical details that were known all along by Netanyahu
and the military-intelligence apparatus were relayed to the Israeli public only
after the abduction of more than 560 Palestinians, including at least 200 still
held without charges; after the raiding of Palestinian universities and
ransacking of countless homes; after six Palestinian civilians were killed by
Israeli forces; after American-trained Palestinian Authority police assisted
Israeli soldiers attacking Palestinian youths in the center of Ramallah;
after the alleged theft by Israeli troops of $3 million in US
dollars; and after Israel’s international public relations extravaganza had run
its course.
The assault on the West
Bank arrived on the heels of the collapse of the US-led
framework negotiations, for which the US blamed Netanyahu, and immediately
after Hamas’ ratification of a unity deal with
the Fatah-controlled Palestinian Authority. Netanyahu
was still smarting from the US recognition of the unity government when news of the kidnapping
reached him. Never one to miss an opportunity to undermine the Palestinians, he
and his inner circle resolved to milk the kidnapping for maximum propaganda
value.
Weeks after the incident, it is now clear that the
Israeli government, intelligence services and army engaged in a cover-up to provide
themselves with the political space they required for a military campaign that
had little to do with rescuing any kidnapped teens.
The disinformation campaign they waged sent a heavily
indoctrinated, comprehensively militarized population into a tribalistic
frenzy, provoking a wave of high-level incitement, the shocking revenge killing
of an innocent Palestinian teen and rioting across East Jerusalem.
Where the chaos will end and how far it will spread is
unknown. But its origins are increasingly clear.
Gagging the media, lying to teens’
parents
On 12 June, three Jewish Israeli youths, Naftali
Frenkel, Gilad Shaar and Eyal Yifrach, went missing while hitchhiking from Kfar
Etzion, an illegal settlement in the occupied West Bank. At 10:25pm, Shaar placed
a panicked call to Israeli police.
During the eerie call lasting two minutes and nine seconds,
the supposed kidnappers can be heard ordering the youths to keep their heads
down. Israel Radio plays in the background as Shaar repeatedly appeals for
help. Then several gunshots can be heard followed by celebratory singing as the
kidnappers remark, “We got three.” The teens had been killed.
It took until the next morning for the police to
connect the call to a missing persons report filed by the youths’ parents. In a
meeting with Shin Bet officials that day, the teens’ parents listened to a
recording of the phone call.
Bat Galim Shaar, the mother of Gilad Shaar, demanded
investigators explain to her why gunshots can be heard in the background, and
if this meant that her son was dead.
According to Bat Galim Shaar, police claimed the
bullets were “blanks.” When the car used by the alleged kidnappers was
discovered burned by a roadside, the Shin Bet told her no DNA was found. In fact, bullets
and blood were present throughout the interior of the car. The Shin Bet had
lied to the parents of the missing teens in order to stoke false hopes that
their sons were alive.
“When [the Shin Bet] told me finally at 6:00am Friday
that the army was on the job, I felt better — as if we were in good hands,” Bat
Galim Shaar told Israel’s Channel 10. “I was naïve, I told everyone Gilad would
be home before Shabbat.”
Having deceived the victims’ parents, Israel’s
military-intelligence apparatus moved to conceal the truth from the general
public, imposing a gag order that barred the country’s media from reporting on
the sound of gunshots in the recorded call to police.
According to the text of the gag order, which was first published in English at Mondoweiss,
the military had forbidden Israeli reporters from publicizing “All the details
of the investigation” and “All details that might identify the suspect.”
Not only did all involved in the investigation —
Netanyahu, the Shin Bet, the military — know right away that the three missing
teens were almost certainly dead, they had identified the two men they believed
were responsible for the crime little more than a day after it occurred.
To legitimize the military’s wider goals, they
withheld this information as well.
Hiding the suspects
On 17 June, Arabic-language news site Rai Al Youm reported that
Israeli police and Shin Bet agents had raided the homes of Marwan Qawasmeh and
Amer Abu Eishe, the main suspects, near the southern West Bank city of Hebron.
As a Palestinian news outlet based in London, Rai Al Youm was
not subject to the Israeli military’s gag order and was therefore free to
publish the names of the two accused kidnappers.
Citing a report in the Israeli online news outlet
Walla! which was either scrubbed due to the gag order or otherwise rendered
inaccessible, Rai Al Youm summarized an account by the father
of Abu Eishe as follows: “On Saturday at dawn [two days after the alleged
kidnapping was reported], special forces of the Israeli army stormed into the
house and interrogated sons of the family trying to find any information that could
lead them to his whereabouts but they were unsuccessful.”
Abu Eishe’s father added that the Shin Bet had also
arrested his son’s wife to interrogate her about his whereabouts. An uncle of
Qawasmeh remarked that four of his nephew’s brothers and his wife were arrested
the day after the alleged kidnapping and interrogated.
Rai Al Youm added: “several of the military correspondents
in the Hebrew media have reported last Friday on a statement attributed to a
Palestinian security official in which he said that the PA [Palestinian
Authority] is tracking two Hamas personnel who disappeared last Thursday [the
day of the kidnapping] and that the security forces of the PA have given the
information they have to Israel. And now it’s clear that this story was true
and that Israel is looking for them and has charged them with being behind the
kidnapping.”
Allison Deger, a correspondent for Mondoweiss, visited the Qawasmeh home and confirmed that
the army and Shin Bet brought several male members of the families in for
interrogation on 14 June.
In a normal high-profile criminal investigation, the
names of fugitive suspects are widely publicized. Investigators prominently
display posters of the wanted criminals in public spaces while police officials
stage press conferences appealing for help from the public. In this case,
however, Israel’s intelligence services chose to keep their suspects’
identities a closely-held secret for two weeks.
While Netanyahu and his top deputies blamed the entire
membership of Hamas for the kidnapping, the Shin Bet gag order suppressed all
information relating to the identities of the suspects until 26 June. As far as
the Israeli public knew, the kidnappers could have been anywhere in the West
Bank, in any schoolhouse or coffee house or hen house where anyone remotely
affiliated with Hamas congregated.
Having manipulated an exceptionally suggestible
population through the careful management of information, the military had all
the political latitude it needed to rampage through cities far from the scene
of the crime.
During a raid of Birzeit University near Ramallah, Israeli troops seized hundreds of Hamas flags, carting them
away in trucks as though they had obtained valuable
evidence. When the army bombarded the Gaza Strip, the only
justification it needed was that the besieged coastal territory was governed by
Hamas.
A poll released on 2 July revealed that 76 percent of Jewish Israelis approved of
the army’s actions and expressed overwhelming support for the Shin Bet.
In the near term, the gag order had produced its
intended result.
Rogue element
Though Qawasmeh and Abu Eishe were widely identified
as veteran members of Hamas’ military wing, they comprised a rogue element that
likely acted without the knowledge and against the wishes of Hamas leadership.
According to Israeli journalist Shlomi Eldar,
members of the Qawasmeh clan of Hebron have earned a reputation for attacking
Israeli civilian targets during ceasefires between Hamas and Israel.
While an extended family of over 10,000 can hardly be
blamed for the actions of some of its members, it is notable that attacks
carried out by fighters from the family were privately criticized by top Hamas
leaders, as Eldar explains. Hamas leadership regarded the operations as
self-destructive acts of freebooting and often paid for them in the form of
Israeli assassinations. In each case, the violence shattered ceasefires and
inspired renewed bouts of bloodshed.
“The same is true now,” Eldar writes. “Marwan Qawasmeh
and Amer Abu Eishe have taken Hamas to a place where its leadership never
intended to go.”
Hamas leadership has yet to take responsibility for
the kidnapping and likely had no knowledge of its planning. AsHaaretz military
correspondent Amos Harel notes, “So far, there is no evidence
that Hamas’ leadership either in Gaza or abroad was involved in the
kidnapping.” Harel adds that the fallout of the kidnapping “effectively froze
the Fatah-Hamas reconciliation.”
Why would Hamas leadership have authorized an
operation that so clearly threatened to unravel the movement’s political
achievements, wrecking the vaunted unity deal and leaving Abbas without rival
in the West Bank?
The Israeli government’s propaganda blitz drowned out
sobering questions like these. In turn, the gag order obstructed the flow of
information that would have complicated the propaganda.
Determined to reframe the international media’s
narrative around Israel’s plight at the hands of Palestinian terrorism,
Netanyahu went on the offensive.
#BringBackOurBoys
On 17 June, the same day the Israeli army forcibly confiscated CCTV cameras in Beitunia that
captured footage of its soldiers killing two unarmed Palestinian boys during a
Nakba Day protest, Israeli Ambassador to the United Nations Ron
Prosor appeared behind a lectern at the UN Mission in New York
City.
“It has been five days since our boys went missing,”
Prosor thundered, “and I ask the international community, where are you? Where
are you?!”
Referring to the Fatah-Hamas unity government, Prosor
added: “All those in the international community who rushed to bless this
marriage should look into the eyes of the heartbroken parents and have the
courage to take responsibility by condemning the kidnapping. The international
community bought in to a bad deal and Israel is paying for it.”
Beside Prosor stood a large placard displaying the
smiling faces of the three missing teens beneath a hashtag reading
#BringBackOurBoys. Israel’s propaganda blitz was approaching its apex.
For days, leaders of Israel’s trained online
propaganda brigades — from the Israeli army spokesperson’s unit, to theJewish Agency, to the Prime Minister’s Office — flooded social media with the #BringBackOurBoys hashtag.
Mimicking Michelle Obama’s promotion of the #BringBackOurGirls hashtag that
aimed to raise awareness of the kidnapping of Nigerian schoolgirls by Islamist
militants, the Israeli prime minister’s frowning wife, Sara, posted a
portrait of herself on Facebook holding a card that read,
#BringBackOurBoys.
In a normal high-profile criminal investigation, the
names of fugitive suspects are widely publicized. Investigators prominently
display posters of the wanted criminals in public spaces while police officials
stage press conferences appealing for help from the public. In this case,
however, Israel’s intelligence services chose to keep their suspects’
identities a closely-held secret for two weeks.
While Netanyahu and his top deputies blamed the entire
membership of Hamas for the kidnapping, the Shin Bet gag order suppressed all
information relating to the identities of the suspects until 26 June. As far as
the Israeli public knew, the kidnappers could have been anywhere in the West
Bank, in any schoolhouse or coffee house or hen house where anyone remotely
affiliated with Hamas congregated.
Having manipulated an exceptionally suggestible
population through the careful management of information, the military had all
the political latitude it needed to rampage through cities far from the scene
of the crime.
During a raid of Birzeit University near Ramallah, Israeli troops seized hundreds of Hamas flags, carting them
away in trucks as though they had obtained valuable
evidence. When the army bombarded the Gaza Strip, the only
justification it needed was that the besieged coastal territory was governed by
Hamas.
A poll released on 2 July revealed that 76 percent of Jewish Israelis approved of
the army’s actions and expressed overwhelming support for the Shin Bet.
In the near term, the gag order had produced its
intended result.
Rogue element
Though Qawasmeh and Abu Eishe were widely identified
as veteran members of Hamas’ military wing, they comprised a rogue element that
likely acted without the knowledge and against the wishes of Hamas leadership.
According to Israeli journalist Shlomi Eldar,
members of the Qawasmeh clan of Hebron have earned a reputation for attacking
Israeli civilian targets during ceasefires between Hamas and Israel.
While an extended family of over 10,000 can hardly be
blamed for the actions of some of its members, it is notable that attacks
carried out by fighters from the family were privately criticized by top Hamas
leaders, as Eldar explains. Hamas leadership regarded the operations as
self-destructive acts of freebooting and often paid for them in the form of
Israeli assassinations. In each case, the violence shattered ceasefires and
inspired renewed bouts of bloodshed.
“The same is true now,” Eldar writes. “Marwan Qawasmeh
and Amer Abu Eishe have taken Hamas to a place where its leadership never
intended to go.”
Hamas leadership has yet to take responsibility for
the kidnapping and likely had no knowledge of its planning. AsHaaretz military
correspondent Amos Harel notes, “So far, there is no evidence
that Hamas’ leadership either in Gaza or abroad was involved in the
kidnapping.” Harel adds that the fallout of the kidnapping “effectively froze
the Fatah-Hamas reconciliation.”
Why would Hamas leadership have authorized an
operation that so clearly threatened to unravel the movement’s political
achievements, wrecking the vaunted unity deal and leaving Abbas without rival
in the West Bank?
The Israeli government’s propaganda blitz drowned out
sobering questions like these. In turn, the gag order obstructed the flow of
information that would have complicated the propaganda.
Determined to reframe the international media’s
narrative around Israel’s plight at the hands of Palestinian terrorism,
Netanyahu went on the offensive.
#BringBackOurBoys
On 17 June, the same day the Israeli army forcibly confiscated CCTV cameras in
Beitunia that captured footage of its soldiers killing two
unarmed Palestinian boys during a Nakba Day protest, Israeli Ambassador to the
United Nations Ron Prosor appeared behind a lectern at the UN Mission in
New York City.
“It has been five days since our boys went missing,”
Prosor thundered, “and I ask the international community, where are you? Where
are you?!”
Referring to the Fatah-Hamas unity government, Prosor
added: “All those in the international community who rushed to bless this
marriage should look into the eyes of the heartbroken parents and have the
courage to take responsibility by condemning the kidnapping. The international
community bought in to a bad deal and Israel is paying for it.”
Beside Prosor stood a large placard displaying the
smiling faces of the three missing teens beneath a hashtag reading
#BringBackOurBoys. Israel’s propaganda blitz was approaching its apex.
For days, leaders of Israel’s trained online
propaganda brigades — from the Israeli army spokesperson’s unit, to theJewish Agency, to the Prime Minister’s Office — flooded social media with the #BringBackOurBoys hashtag.
Mimicking Michelle Obama’s promotion of the #BringBackOurGirls hashtag that
aimed to raise awareness of the kidnapping of Nigerian schoolgirls by Islamist
militants, the Israeli prime minister’s frowning wife, Sara, posted a
portrait of herself on Facebook holding a card that read,
#BringBackOurBoys.
As they did after the kidnapping of the three Israeli
teens, the Shin Bet imposed a gag order on the investigation, seemingly hoping
to delay the news that Abu Khudair was the victim of Jewish extremism. And as
before, the police flooded Israeli media with disinformation, this time by insinuating the murdered teen had been killed by members
of his own family for being gay.
The Electronic Intifada has obtained CCTV footage showing
the faces of the alleged killers of Abu Khudair just as they abducted him. The
video was concealed for several days from the Israeli public under a new Shin
Bet gag order. When the police finally arrested the suspected killers of Abu
Khudair, they curiously staged a simultaneous press conference about
an unrelated killing a young Jewish woman, suggesting without any clear
evidence that she had been the victim of a Palestinian terrorist.
On 4 July, an autopsy revealed that Abu Khudair’s killers had burned
him alive. Protest and rioting spread from Shuafat across East
Jerusalem and into areas of northern Israel. Meanwhile, Jewish nationalists
took to Facebook to organize more lynch mobs.
Netanyahu surfaced briefly the day before at an
Independence Day ceremony at the US consulate in Jerusalem. With US Ambassador
to Israel Dan Shapiro seated by his side, the Prime Minister was forced to
confront the binge of racism that he helped inspire.
Speaking in English for the consumption of his American
hosts, Netanyahu declared, “Murder, riots, incitement, vigilantism —
they have no place in our democracy. And it is these democratic values that
differentiate us from our neighbors and unite us with the United States.”
Outside, the chaos showed no sign of ebbing.
Editor’s note: This article has been corrected since
original publication to clarify that two popular Facebook pages calling for
revenge were created after the Israeli teens’ disappearance; the article
originally mentioned only one page.
Max Blumenthal is an award winning journalist and
bestselling author. His latest book is Goliath: Life and Loathing in Greater
Israel (2013, Nation Books).
© 2000-2014 electronicIntifada.net
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