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The Yinon Plan
In 1982 Oded Yinon wrote a 15 pages short Plan for Israel: "What must Israel do in order to survive ? " The easy answer is: to stop taking Palestinian land and to stop killing them. But that simple solution (practiced by all other peoples in the world, with good results) is not an option for Yinon.
His answer is: Israel must create internal hostilities in the muslim countries around Israel, and make them split up in many small and powerless states.
His paper has (31) paragraphs.
Here is a summary:
(1-6): This world is very uncertain. Russia plans to conquer the world with atomic bombs. There are not enough raw materials in the world.
(6-15): Yinon explains how internally devided all arab and moslim countries are.
(16). This offers us good opportunities.
(17). We must re-conquer the Sinaï
(20).We must create division in the Egyptian population.
(22). Let Syria, Iraq and Saudie Arabia split up in small parts like in Lebanon.
(23). Iraq is a prime target for Israel. Every inter-arab conflict is good for Israel.
(24). The Arab peninsula should split up.
(25). Lets make Jordania the home of the Palestinians.
(27). Israel may need to go further than the Jordan river.
Here are a few literal quotes from the text:
(20) Breaking Egypt down territorially into distinct
geographical regions is the political aim of Israel
(22) The
dissolution of Syria and Iraq later on into ethnically or religiously unqiue
areas such as in Lebanon, is Israel's primary target
(23) Iraq is guaranteed as a candidate for Israel's
targets.
(24) The entire Arabian peninsula is a natural
candidate for dissolution due to internal and external pressures,
This Plan was translated by Israel Shahak, and published by muslim students in the USA. The introductions of the students and of Shahak are also worth reading.
In a 'conclusion' Shahak explains us why this Plan was published, and not completely secret: the Israeli people must know wher3e the land is going, and besides: almost nobody seems to be interested in real information. People believe myths.
Jan Verheuls comment: I would like to add: the MSM are safely in the hands of Israel's friends, so who will ever hear about it ? Now with the internet there are a few more people who hear about it, but most people have a picture of 'Reality' that was formed during decennia of lies. It is very hard to change people's 'core convictions', even with hard evidence that shows that these convictions are false.( Confirmation bias)
The Yinon Plan was not realised in the eighties, as Yinon hoped. But it is being realised in our days. The active weakening of ones ennemies in order to be safe is such an obvious strategy that one does not have to be a genius to think about it.
But our MSM are controlled by jewish friends of Israel, and these MSM keep telling us that its a genuine people's revolt. It is not, and its in Israel's interest to tell this lie over and over again. The Yinon Plan shows why Iraq was invasded twice, and why Lybia was bombed by Nato with 10.000 'sorties' of bomberplanes, and why all these lies about Assad -artrocities in Houla are not corrected in the Media. It has nothing to do with an Arab Spring. Nothing with the creation of democracy. It has everything yo do with making the world safe for a cruel usurpator like Israel.
Translater Shahak has put the italics in the text.
I have marked some parts yellow and some parts green.
The text was unchanged. Here is the original document.
Jan Verheul.
Translated and edited by
Israel Shahak
The Israel
of Theodore Herzl (1904)
and of Rabbi Fischmann (1947)
and of Rabbi Fischmann (1947)
In his Complete
Diaries, Vol. II. p. 711, Theodore Herzl, the founder of Zionism, says that the
area of the Jewish State stretches: "From the Brook of Egypt to the
Euphrates."
Rabbi Fischmann, member of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, declared in his testimony to the U.N. Special Committee of Enquiry on 9 July 1947: "The Promised Land extends from the River of Egypt up to the Euphrates, it includes parts of Syria and Lebanon."
from
Oded Yinon's
Oded Yinon's
"A Strategy for Israel in the Nineteen Eighties"
Published by the
Association of Arab-American University Graduates, Inc.
Belmont, Massachusetts, 1982
Special Document No. 1
(ISBN 0-937694-56-8)
Association of Arab-American University Graduates, Inc.
Belmont, Massachusetts, 1982
Special Document No. 1
(ISBN 0-937694-56-8)
THE ASSOCIATION OF ARAB-AMERICAN UNIVERSITY GRADUATES finds it compelling to inaugurate its new publication series, Special
Documents, with Oded Yinon's article which appeared in Kivunim
(Directions), the journal of the Department of Information of the World
Zionist Organization. Oded Yinon is an Israeli journalist and was formerly
attached to the Foreign Ministry of Israel. To our knowledge, this document is
the most explicit, detailed and unambiguous statement to date of the Zionist
strategy in the Middle East. Furthermore, it stands as an accurate representation
of the "vision" for the entire Middle East of the presently ruling
Zionist regime of Begin, Sharon and Eitan. Its importance, hence, lies not in
its historical value but in the nightmare which it presents.
The plan
operates on two essential premises. To survive, Israel must 1) become an
imperial regional power, and 2) must effect the division of the whole area into
small states by the dissolution of all existing Arab states. Small here
will depend on the ethnic or sectarian composition of each state. Consequently,
the Zionist hope is that sectarian-based states become Israel's satellites and,
ironically, its source of moral legitimation.
This is
not a new idea, nor does it surface for the first time in Zionist strategic
thinking. Indeed, fragmenting all Arab states into smaller units has been a
recurrent theme. This theme has been documented on a very modest scale in the
AAUG publication, Israel's Sacred
Terrorism (1980), by
Livia Rokach. Based on the memoirs of Moshe Sharett, former Prime Minister of
Israel, Rokach's study documents, in convincing detail, the Zionist plan as it
applies to Lebanon and as it was prepared in the mid-fifties.
The first
massive Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1978 bore this plan out to the minutest
detail. The second and more barbaric and encompassing Israeli invasion of
Lebanon on June 6, 1982, aims to effect certain parts of this plan which hopes
to see not only Lebanon, but Syria and Jordan as well, in fragments. This ought
to make mockery of Israeli public claims regarding their desire for a strong
and independent Lebanese central government. More accurately, they want a
Lebanese central government that sanctions their regional imperialist designs
by signing a peace treaty with them. They also seek acquiescence in their
designs by the Syrian, Iraqi, Jordanian and other Arab governments as well as
by the Palestinian people. What they want and what they are planning for is not
an Arab world, but a world of Arab fragments that is ready to succumb to
Israeli hegemony. Hence, Oded Yinon in his essay, "A Strategy for Israel
in the 1980's," talks about "far-reaching opportunities for the first
time since 1967" that are created by the "very stormy situation
[that] surrounds Israel."
The
Zionist policy of displacing the Palestinians from Palestine is very much an
active policy, but is pursued more forcefully in times of contlict, such as in
the 1947-1948 war and in the 1967 war. An appendix entitled "Israel Talks of
a New Exodus" is included
in this publication to demonstrate past Zionist dispersals of Palestinians from
their homeland and to show, besides the main Zionist document we present, other
Zionist planning for the de-Palestinization of Palestine.
It is
clear from the Kivunim document, published in February, 1982,
that the "far-reaching opportunities" of which Zionist strategists
have been thinking are the same "opportunities" of which they are
trying to convince the world and which they claim were generated by their June,
1982 invasion. It is also clear that the Palestinians were never the sole target
of Zionist plans, but the priority target since their viable
and independent presence as a people negates the essence of the Zionist state.
Every Arab state, however, especially those with cohesive and clear nationalist
directions, is a real target sooner or later.
Contrasted
with the detailed and unambiguous Zionist strategy elucidated in this document,
Arab and Palestinian strategy, unfortunately, suffers from ambiguity and
incoherence. There is no indication that Arab strategists have internalized the
Zionist plan in its full ramifications. Instead, they react with incredulity
and shock whenever a new stage of it unfolds. This is apparent in Arab
reaction, albeit muted, to the Israeli siege of Beirut. The sad fact is that as
long as the Zionist strategy for the Middle East is not taken seriously Arab
reaction to any future siege of other Arab capitals will be the same.
Khalil Nakhleh
July 23, 1982
July 23, 1982
THE FOLLOWING ESSAY represents,
in my opinion, the accurate and detailed plan of the present Zionist regime (of
Sharon and Eitan) for the Middle East which is based on the division of the
whole area into small states, and the dissolution of all the
existing Arab states. I will comment on the military aspect of this plan in a
concluding note. Here I want to draw the attention of the readers to several
important points:
1. The idea that all the Arab states should be broken
down, by Israel, into small units, occurs again and again in Israeli strategic
thinking. For example, Ze'ev Schiff, the military correspondent of Ha'aretz (and
probably the most knowledgeable in Israel, on this topic) writes about the
"best" that can happen for Israeli interests in Iraq: "The
dissolution of Iraq into a Shi'ite state, a Sunni state and the separation of
the Kurdish part" (Ha'aretz 6/2/1982). Actually, this aspect
of the plan is very old.
2. The
strong connection with Neo-Conservative thought in the USA is very prominent,
especially in the author's notes. But, while lip service is
paid to the idea of the "defense of the West" from Soviet power, the
real aim of the author, and of the present Israeli establishment is clear: To
make an Imperial Israel into a world power. In other words, the aim of Sharon
is to deceive the Americans after he has deceived all the rest.
3. It is
obvious that much of the relevant data, both in the notes and in the text, is
garbled or omitted, such as the financial help of the U.S. to Israel.
Much of it is pure fantasy. But, the plan is not to be regarded as
not influential, or as not capable of realization for a short time. The
plan follows faithfully the geopolitical ideas current in Germany of
1890-1933, which were swallowed whole by Hitler and the Nazi movement, anddetermined
their aims for East Europe. Those aims, especially the division of the
existing states, were carried out in 1939-1941, and only an alliance on the
global scale prevented their consolidation for a period of time.
The notes
by the author follow the text. To avoid confusion, I did not add any notes of
my own, but have put the substance of them into this foreward and the
conclusion at the end. I have, however, emphasized some portions of the text.
Israel Shahak
June 13, 1982
June 13, 1982
by Oded Yinon
This essay
originally appeared in Hebrew in KIVUNIM (Directions), A Journal
for Judaism and Zionism; Issue No, 14--Winter, 5742, February 1982, Editor:
Yoram Beck. Editorial Committee: Eli Eyal, Yoram Beck, Amnon Hadari, Yohanan
Manor, Elieser Schweid. Published by the Department of Publicity/The
World Zionist Organization, Jerusalem.
AT THE OUTSET OF THE NINETEEN EIGHTIES the State of Israel is in need of a new perspective as to its place,
its aims and national targets, at home and abroad. This need has become even
more vital due to a number of central processes which the country, the region
and the world are undergoing. We are living today in the early stages of a new
epoch in human history which is not at all similar to its predecessor, and its
characteristics are totally different from what we have hitherto known. That is
why we need an understanding of the central processes which typify this
historical epoch on the one hand, and on the other hand we need a world outlook
and an operational strategy in accordance with the new conditions. The
existence, prosperity and steadfastness of the Jewish state will depend upon
its ability to adopt a new framework for its domestic and foreign affairs.
This epoch
is characterized by several traits which we can already diagnose, and which
symbolize a genuine revolution in our present lifestyle. The dominant process
is the breakdown of the rationalist, humanist outlook as the major cornerstone
supporting the life and achievements of Western civilization since the
Renaissance. The political, social and economic views which have emanated from
this foundation have been based on several "truths" which are
presently disappearing--for example, the view that man as an individual is the
center of the universe and everything exists in order to fulfill his basic
material needs. This position is being invalidated in the present when it has
become clear that the amount of resources in the cosmos does not meet Man's requirements,
his economic needs or his demographic constraints. In a world in which there
are four billion human beings and economic and energy resources which do not
grow proportionally to meet the needs of mankind, it is unrealistic to expect
to fulfill the main requirement of Western Society,1 i.e., the wish and aspiration for boundless consumption. The view
that ethics plays no part in determining the direction Man takes, but rather
his material needs do--that view is becoming prevalent today as we see a world
in which nearly all values are disappearing. We are losing the ability to
assess the simplest things, especially when they concern the simple question of
what is Good and what is Evil.
The vision
of man's limitless aspirations and abilities shrinks in the face of the sad
facts of life, when we witness the break-up of world order around us. The view
which promises liberty and freedom to mankind seems absurd in light of the sad
fact that three fourths of the human race lives under totalitarian regimes. The
views concerning equality and social justice have been transformed by socialism
and especially by Communism into a laughing stock. There is no argument as to
the truth of these two ideas, but it is clear that they have not been put into
practice properly and the majority of mankind has lost the liberty, the freedom
and the opportunity for equality and justice. In this nuclear world in which we
are (still) living in relative peace for thirty years, the concept of peace and
coexistence among nations has no meaning when a superpower like the USSR holds
a military and political doctrine of the sort it has: that not only is a
nuclear war possible and necessary in order to achieve the ends of Marxism, but
that it is possible to survive after it, not to speak of the fact that one can
be victorious in it.2
The
essential concepts of human society, especially those of the West, are
undergoing a change due to political, military and economic transformations.
Thus, the nuclear and conventional might of the USSR has transformed the epoch
that has just ended into the last respite before the great saga that will
demolish a large part of our world in a multi-dimensional global war, in
comparison with which the past world wars will have been mere child's play. The
power of nuclear as well as of conventional weapons, their quantity, their
precision and quality will turn most of our world upside down within a few years,
and we must align ourselves so as to face that in Israel. That is, then, the
main threat to our existence and that of the Western world.3 The war over resources in the world, the Arab monopoly on oil, and
the need of the West to import most of its raw materials from the Third World,
are transforming the world we know, given that one of the major aims of the
USSR is to defeat the West by gaining control over the gigantic resources in
the Persian Gulf and in the southern part of Africa, in which the majority of
world minerals are located. We can imagine the dimensions of the global
confrontation which will face us in the future.
The
Gorshkov doctrine calls for Soviet control of the oceans and mineral rich areas
of the Third World. That together with the present Soviet nuclear doctrine
which holds that it is possible to manage, win and survive a nuclear war, in
the course of which the West's military might well be destroyed and its
inhabitants made slaves in the service of Marxism-Leninism, is the main danger
to world peace and to our own existence. Since 1967, the Soviets have
transformed Clausewitz' dictum into "War is the continuation of policy in
nuclear means," and made it the motto which guides all their policies.
Already today they are busy carrying out their aims in our region and
throughout the world, and the need to face them becomes the major element in
our country's security policy and of course that of the rest of the Free World.
That is our major foreign challenge.4
The Arab
Moslem world, therefore, is not the major strategic problem which we shall face
in the Eighties, despite the fact that it carries the main threat against
Israel, due to its growing military might. This world, with its ethnic
minorities, its factions and internal crises, which is astonishingly
self-destructive, as we can see in Lebanon, in non-Arab Iran and now also in
Syria, is unable to deal successfully with its fundamental problems and does
not therefore constitute a real threat against the State of Israel in the long
run, but only in the short run where its immediate military power has great
import. In the long run, this world will be unable to exist within its present
framework in the areas around us without having to go through genuine
revolutionary changes. The Moslem Arab World is built like a temporary house of
cards put together by foreigners (France and Britain in the Nineteen Twenties),
without the wishes and desires of the inhabitants having been taken into
account. It was arbitrarily divided into 19 states, all made of combinations of
minorites and ethnic groups which are hostile to one another, so that every
Arab Moslem state nowadays faces ethnic social destruction from within, and in
some a civil war is already raging.5 Most of the Arabs, 118 million out of 170 million, live in Africa,
mostly in Egypt (45 million today).
Apart from
Egypt, all the Maghreb states are made up of a mixture of Arabs and non-Arab
Berbers. In Algeria there is already a civil war raging in the Kabile mountains
between the two nations in the country. Morocco and Algeria are at war with
each other over Spanish Sahara, in addition to the internal struggle in each of
them. Militant Islam endangers the integrity of Tunisia and Qaddafi organizes
wars which are destructive from the Arab point of view, from a country which is
sparsely populated and which cannot become a powerful nation. That is why he
has been attempting unifications in the past with states that are more genuine,
like Egypt and Syria. Sudan, the most torn apart state in the Arab Moslem world
today is built upon four groups hostile to each other, an Arab Moslem Sunni
minority which rules over a majority of non-Arab Africans, Pagans, and
Christians. In Egypt there is a Sunni Moslem majority facing a large minority
of Christians which is dominant in upper Egypt: some 7 million of them, so that
even Sadat, in his speech on May 8, expressed the fear that they will want a
state of their own, something like a "second" Christian Lebanon in
Egypt.
All the
Arab States east of Israel are torn apart, broken up and riddled with inner
conflict even more than those of the Maghreb. Syria is fundamentally no different
from Lebanon except in the strong military regime which rules it. But the real
civil war taking place nowadays between the Sunni majority and the Shi'ite
Alawi ruling minority (a mere 12% of the population) testifies to the severity
of the domestic trouble.
Iraq is,
once again, no different in essence from its neighbors, although its majority
is Shi'ite and the ruling minority Sunni. Sixty-five percent of the population
has no say in politics, in which an elite of 20 percent holds the power. In
addition there is a large Kurdish minority in the north, and if it weren't for
the strength of the ruling regime, the army and the oil revenues, Iraq's future
state would be no different than that of Lebanon in the past or of Syria today.
The seeds of inner conflict and civil war are apparent today already,
especially after the rise of Khomeini to power in Iran, a leader whom the
Shi'ites in Iraq view as their natural leader.
All the
Gulf principalities and Saudi Arabia are built upon a delicate house of sand in
which there is only oil. In Kuwait, the Kuwaitis constitute only a quarter of
the population. In Bahrain, the Shi'ites are the majority but are deprived of
power. In the UAE, Shi'ites are once again the majority but the Sunnis are in
power. The same is true of Oman and North Yemen. Even in the Marxist South
Yemen there is a sizable Shi'ite minority. In Saudi Arabia half the population
is foreign, Egyptian and Yemenite, but a Saudi minority holds power.
Jordan is
in reality Palestinian, ruled by a Trans-Jordanian Bedouin minority, but most
of the army and certainly the bureaucracy is now Palestinian. As a matter of
fact Amman is as Palestinian as Nablus. All of these countries have powerful
armies, relatively speaking. But there is a problem there too. The Syrian army
today is mostly Sunni with an Alawi officer corps, the Iraqi army Shi'ite with
Sunni commanders. This has great significance in the long run, and that is why
it will not be possible to retain the loyalty of the army for a long time
except where it comes to the only common denominator: The hostility towards
Israel, and today even that is insufficient.
Alongside
the Arabs, split as they are, the other Moslem states share a similar
predicament. Half of Iran's population is comprised of a Persian speaking group
and the other half of an ethnically Turkish group. Turkey's population
comprises a Turkish Sunni Moslem majority, some 50%, and two large minorities,
12 million Shi'ite Alawis and 6 million Sunni Kurds. In Afghanistan there are 5
million Shi'ites who constitute one third of the population. In Sunni Pakistan
there are 15 million Shi'ites who endanger the existence of that state.
This
national ethnic minority picture extending from Morocco to India and from
Somalia to Turkey points to the absence of stability and a rapid degeneration
in the entire region. When this picture is added to the economic one, we see
how the entire region is built like a house of cards, unable to withstand its
severe problems.
In this
giant and fractured world there are a few wealthy groups and a huge mass of
poor people. Most of the Arabs have an average yearly income of 300 dollars.
That is the situation in Egypt, in most of the Maghreb countries except for
Libya, and in Iraq. Lebanon is torn apart and its economy is falling to pieces.
It is a state in which there is no centralized power, but only 5 de facto
sovereign authorities (Christian in the north, supported by the Syrians and
under the rule of the Franjieh clan, in the East an area of direct Syrian
conquest, in the center a Phalangist controlled Christian enclave, in the south
and up to the Litani river a mostly Palestinian region controlled by the PLO
and Major Haddad's state of Christians and half a million Shi'ites). Syria is
in an even graver situation and even the assistance she will obtain in the
future after the unification with Libya will not be sufficient for dealing with
the basic problems of existence and the maintenance of a large army. Egypt is
in the worst situation: Millions are on the verge of hunger, half the labor
force is unemployed, and housing is scarce in this most densely populated area
of the world. Except for the army, there is not a single department operating
efficiently and the state is in a permanent state of bankruptcy and depends
entirely on American foreign assistance granted since the peace.6
In the
Gulf states, Saudi Arabia, Libya and Egypt there is the largest accumulation of
money and oil in the world, but those enjoying it are tiny elites who lack a
wide base of support and self-confidence, something that no army can guarantee.7 The Saudi army with all its equipment cannot defend the regime from
real dangers at home or abroad, and what took place in Mecca in 1980 is only an
example. A sad and very stormy situation surrounds Israel and creates
challenges for it, problems, risks but also far-reaching opportunities
for the first time since 1967. Chances are that opportunities missed at
that time will become achievable in the Eighties to an extent and along
dimensions which we cannot even imagine today.
The
"peace" policy and the return of territories, through a dependence
upon the US, precludes the realization of the new option created for us. Since
1967, all the governments of Israel have tied our national aims down to narrow
political needs, on the one hand, and on the other to destructive opinions at
home which neutralized our capacities both at home and abroad. Failing to take
steps towards the Arab population in the new territories, acquired in the
course of a war forced upon us, is the major strategic error committed by
Israel on the morning after the Six Day War. We could have saved ourselves all
the bitter and dangerous conflict since then if we had given Jordan to the
Palestinians who live west of the Jordan river. By doing that we would have
neutralized the Palestinian problem which we nowadays face, and to which we
have found solutions that are really no solutions at all, such as territorial
compromise or autonomy which amount, in fact, to the same thing.8 Today, we suddenly face immense opportunities for transforming the
situation thoroughly and this we must do in the coming decade, otherwise we
shall not survive as a state.
In the
course of the Nineteen Eighties, the State of Israel will have to go through
far-reaching changes in its political and economic regime domestically, along
with radical changes in its foreign policy, in order to stand up to the global
and regional challenges of this new epoch. The loss of the Suez Canal oil
fields, of the immense potential of the oil, gas and other natural resources in
the Sinai peninsula which is geomorphologically identical to the rich
oil-producing countries in the region, will result in an energy drain in the
near future and will destroy our domestic economy: one quarter of our present
GNP as well as one third of the budget is used for the purchase of oil.9 The search for raw materials in the Negev and on the coast will not,
in the near future, serve to alter that state of affairs.
(Regaining)
the Sinai peninsula with its present and potential resources is
therefore a political priority which is obstructed by the Camp David and the
peace agreements. The fault for that lies of course with the present
Israeli government and the governments which paved the road to the policy of
territorial compromise, the Alignment governments since 1967. The Egyptians
will not need to keep the peace treaty after the return of the Sinai, and they
will do all they can to return to the fold of the Arab world and to the USSR in
order to gain support and military assistance. American aid is guaranteed only
for a short while, for the terms of the peace and the weakening of the U.S.
both at home and abroad will bring about a reduction in aid. Without oil and
the income from it, with the present enormous expenditure, we will not be able
to get through 1982 under the present conditions and we will have to
act in order to return the situation to the status quo which existed in Sinai
prior to Sadat's visit and the mistaken peace agreement signed with him in
March 1979.10
Israel has
two major routes through which to realize this purpose, one direct and the
other indirect. The direct option is the less realistic one because of the
nature of the regime and government in Israel as well as the wisdom of Sadat
who obtained our withdrawal from Sinai, which was, next to the war of 1973, his
major achievement since he took power. Israel will not unilaterally break the
treaty, neither today, nor in 1982, unless it is very hard pressed economically
and politically and Egypt provides Israel with the excuse to take
the Sinai back into our hands for the fourth time in our short history. What is
left therefore, is the indirect option. The economic situation in Egypt, the
nature of the regime and its pan-Arab policy, will bring about a situation
after April 1982 in which Israel will be forced to act directly or indirectly in
order to regain control over Sinai as a strategic, economic and energy reserve
for the long run. Egypt does not constitute a military strategic problem
due to its internal conflicts and it could be driven back to the post 1967 war
situation in no more than one day.11
The myth
of Egypt as the strong leader of the Arab World was demolished back in 1956 and
definitely did not survive 1967, but our policy, as in the return of the Sinai,
served to turn the myth into "fact." In reality, however, Egypt's
power in proportion both to Israel alone and to the rest of the Arab World has
gone down about 50 percent since 1967. Egypt is no longer the leading political
power in the Arab World and is economically on the verge of a crisis. Without
foreign assistance the crisis will come tomorrow.12 In the short run, due to the return of the Sinai, Egypt will gain
several advantages at our expense, but only in the short run until 1982, and
that will not change the balance of power to its benefit, and will possibly
bring about its downfall. Egypt, in its present domestic political picture, is
already a corpse, all the more so if we take into account the growing
Moslem-Christian rift. Breaking Egypt down territorially into distinct
geographical regions is the political aim of Israel in the Nineteen Eighties on
its Western front.
Egypt is
divided and torn apart into many foci of authority. If Egypt falls apart,
countries like Libya, Sudan or even the more distant states will not continue
to exist in their present form and will join the downfall and
dissolution of Egypt. The vision of a Christian Coptic State in Upper Egypt
alongside a number of weak states with very localized power and without a
centralized government as to date, is the key to a historical development which
was only set back by the peace agreement but which seems inevitable in the long
run.13
The
Western front, which on the surface appears more problematic, is in fact less
complicated than the Eastern front, in which most of the events that make the
headlines have been taking place recently. Lebanon's total dissolution into
five provinces serves as a precendent for the entire Arab world including
Egypt, Syria, Iraq and the Arabian peninsula and is already following that
track. The dissolution of Syria and Iraq later on into ethnically or
religiously unqiue areas such as in Lebanon, is Israel's primary target on the
Eastern front in the long run, while the dissolution of the military power of
those states serves as the primary short term target. Syria will fall apart, in
accordance with its ethnic and religious structure, into several states such as
in present day Lebanon, so that there will be a Shi'ite Alawi state along its
coast, a Sunni state in the Aleppo area, another Sunni state in Damascus
hostile to its northern neighbor, and the Druzes who will set up a state,
maybe even in our Golan, and certainly in the Hauran and in northern
Jordan. This state of affairs will be the guarantee for peace and security
in the area in the long run, and that aim is already within our reach
today.14
Iraq, rich
in oil on the one hand and internally torn on the other, is guaranteed
as a candidate for Israel's targets. Its dissolution is even more important
for us than that of Syria. Iraq is stronger than Syria. In the short run it is
Iraqi power which constitutes the greatest threat to Israel. An Iraqi-Iranian
war will tear Iraq apart and cause its downfall at home even before it is able
to organize a struggle on a wide front against us. Every kind of
inter-Arab confrontation will assist us in the short run and will shorten the
way to the more important aim of breaking up Iraq into denominations as in
Syria and in Lebanon. In Iraq, a division into provinces along
ethnic/religious lines as in Syria during Ottoman times is possible. So, three
(or more) states will exist around the three major cities: Basra, Baghdad and
Mosul, and Shi'ite areas in the south will separate from the Sunni and Kurdish
north. It is possible that the present Iranian-Iraqi confrontation will deepen
this polarization.15
The entire
Arabian peninsula is a natural candidate for dissolution due to internal and
external pressures, and the matter is inevitable especially in Saudi Arabia.
Regardless of whether its economic might based on oil remains intact or whether
it is diminished in the long run, the internal rifts and breakdowns are a clear
and natural development in light of the present political structure.16
Jordan
constitutes an immediate strategic target in the short run but not in the long run, for it does not constitute a real threat in
the long run after its dissolution, the termination of the lengthy
rule of King Hussein and the transfer of power to the Palestinians in the short
run.
There is
no chance that Jordan will continue to exist in its present structure for a long
time, and Israel's policy, both in war and in peace, ought to be directed at
the liquidation of Jordan under the present regime and the transfer of power to
the Palestinian majority. Changing the regime east of the river will also cause the
termination of the problem of the territories densely populated with Arabs west
of the Jordan. Whether in war or under conditions of peace, emigrationfrom the
territories and economic demographic freeze in them, are the guarantees for the
coming change on both banks of the river, and we ought to be active in order to
accelerate this process in the nearest future. The autonomy plan ought also
to be rejected, as well as any compromise or division of the territories for,
given the plans of the PLO and those of the Israeli Arabs themselves, the
Shefa'amr plan of September 1980, it is not possible to go on living in
this country in the present situation without separating the two nations, the
Arabs to Jordan and the Jews to the areas west of the river. Genuine
coexistence and peace will reign over the land only when the Arabs understand
that without Jewish rule between the Jordan and the sea they will have neither
existence nor security. A nation of their own and security will be theirs only
in Jordan.17
Within
Israel the distinction between the areas of '67 and the territories beyond
them, those of '48, has always been meaningless for Arabs and nowadays no
longer has any significance for us. The problem should be seen in its entirety
without any divisions as of '67. It should be clear, under any future political
situation or mifitary constellation, that the solution of the problem
of the indigenous Arabs will come only when they recognize the
existence of Israel in secure borders up to the Jordan river and beyond
it, as our existential need in this difficult epoch, the nuclear epoch
which we shall soon enter. It is no longer possible to live with three fourths
of the Jewish population on the dense shoreline which is so dangerous in a
nuclear epoch.
Dispersal
of the population is therefore a domestic strategic aim of the highest order;
otherwise, we shall cease to exist within any borders. Judea, Samaria and the
Galilee are our sole guarantee for national existence, and if we do not become
the majority in the mountain areas, we shall not rule in the country and we
shall be like the Crusaders, who lost this country which was not theirs anyhow,
and in which they were foreigners to begin with. Rebalancing the country
demographically, strategically and economically is the highest and most central
aim today. Taking hold of the mountain watershed from Beersheba to the Upper
Galilee is the national aim generated by the major strategic consideration
which is settling the mountainous part of the country that is empty of
Jews today.l8
Realizing
our aims on the Eastern front depends first on the realization of this internal
strategic objective. The transformation of the political and economic
structure, so as to enable the realization of these strategic aims, is the key
to achieving the entire change. We need to change from a centralized economy in
which the government is extensively involved, to an open and free market as
well as to switch from depending upon the U.S. taxpayer to developing, with our
own hands, of a genuine productive economic infrastructure. If we are not able
to make this change freely and voluntarily, we shall be forced into it by world
developments, especially in the areas of economics, energy, and politics, and
by our own growing isolation.l9
From a
military and strategic point of view, the West led by the U.S. is unable to
withstand the global pressures of the USSR throughout the world, and Israel
must therefore stand alone in the Eighties, without any foreign assistance,
military or economic, and this is within our capacities today, with no
compromises.20 Rapid changes in the world will also bring about a change in the
condition of world Jewry to which Israel will become not only a last resort but
the only existential option. We cannot assume that U.S. Jews, and the
communities of Europe and Latin America will continue to exist in the present
form in the future.21
Our
existence in this country itself is certain, and there is no force that could
remove us from here either forcefully or by treachery (Sadat's method). Despite
the difficulties of the mistaken "peace" policy and the problem of
the Israeli Arabs and those of the territories, we can effectively deal with
these problems in the foreseeable future.
THREE IMPORTANT POINTS have
to be clarified in order to be able to understand the significant possibilities
of realization of this Zionist plan for the Middle East, and also why it had to
be published.
The
Military Background of The Plan
The
military conditions of this plan have not been mentioned above, but on the many
occasions where something very like it is being "explained" in closed
meetings to members of the Israeli Establishment, this point is clarified. It
is assumed that the Israeli military forces, in all their branches, are
insufficient for the actual work of occupation of such wide territories as
discussed above. In fact, even in times of intense Palestinian
"unrest" on the West Bank, the forces of the Israeli Army are
stretched out too much. The answer to that is the method of ruling by means of
"Haddad forces" or of "Village Associations" (also known as
"Village Leagues"): local forces under "leaders" completely
dissociated from the population, not having even any feudal or party structure
(such as the Phalangists have, for example). The "states" proposed by
Yinon are "Haddadland" and "Village Associations," and
their armed forces will be, no doubt, quite similar. In addition, Israeli
military superiority in such a situation will be much greater than it is even
now, so that any movement of revolt will be "punished" either by mass
humiliation as in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, or by bombardment and
obliteration of cities, as in Lebanon now (June 1982), or by both. In order to
ensure this, the plan, as explained orally, calls for the
establishment of Israeli garrisons in focal places between the mini states,
equipped with the necessary mobile destructive forces. In fact, we have seen
something like this in Haddadland and we will almost certainly soon see the
first example of this system functioning either in South Lebanon or in all
Lebanon.
It is
obvious that the above military assumptions, and the whole plan too, depend
also on the Arabs continuing to be even more divided than they are now, and on
the lack of any truly progressive mass movement among them. It may be that
those two conditions will be removed only when the plan will be well advanced,
with consequences which can not be foreseen.
Why it is
necessary to publish this in Israel?
The reason
for publication is the dual nature of the Israeli-Jewish society: A very great
measure of freedom and democracy, specially for Jews, combined with
expansionism and racist discrimination. In such a situation the Israeli-Jewish
elite (for the masses follow the TV and Begin's speeches) has to be
persuaded. The first steps in the process of persuasion are oral, as
indicated above, but a time comes in which it becomes inconvenient. Written
material must be produced for the benefit of the more stupid
"persuaders" and "explainers" (for example medium-rank
officers, who are, usually, remarkably stupid). They then "learn it,"
more or less, and preach to others. It should be remarked that Israel, and even
the Yishuv from the Twenties, has always functioned in this way. I myself well
remember how (before I was "in opposition") the necessity of war with
was explained to me and others a year before the 1956 war, and the necessity of
conquering "the rest of Western Palestine when we will have the
opportunity" was explained in the years 1965-67.
Why is it
assumed that there is no special risk from the outside in the publication of
such plans?
Such risks
can come from two sources, so long as the principled opposition inside Israel
is very weak (a situation which may change as a consequence of the war on
Lebanon) : The Arab World, including the Palestinians, and the United States.
The Arab World has shown itself so far quite incapable of a detailed and
rational analysis of Israeli-Jewish society, and the Palestinians have been, on
the average, no better than the rest. In such a situation, even those who are
shouting about the dangers of Israeli expansionism (which are real enough) are
doing this not because of factual and detailed knowledge, but because of belief
in myth. A good example is the very persistent belief in the non-existent
writing on the wall of the Knesset of the Biblical verse about the Nile and the
Euphrates. Another example is the persistent, and completely false
declarations, which were made by some of the most important Arab leaders, that
the two blue stripes of the Israeli flag symbolize the Nile and the Euphrates,
while in fact they are taken from the stripes of the Jewish praying shawl
(Talit). The Israeli specialists assume that, on the whole, the Arabs will pay
no attention to their serious discussions of the future, and the Lebanon war
has proved them right. So why should they not continue with their old methods
of persuading other Israelis?
In the
United States a very similar situation exists, at least until now. The more or
less serious commentators take their information about Israel, and much of
their opinions about it, from two sources. The first is from articles in the
"liberal" American press, written almost totally by Jewish admirers
of Israel who, even if they are critical of some aspects of the Israeli state,
practice loyally what Stalin used to call "the constructive
criticism." (In fact those among them who claim also to be
"Anti-Stalinist" are in reality more Stalinist than Stalin, with
Israel being their god which has not yet failed). In the framework of such
critical worship it must be assumed that Israel has always "good
intentions" and only "makes mistakes," and therefore such a plan
would not be a matter for discussion--exactly as the Biblical genocides
committed by Jews are not mentioned. The other source of information, The
Jerusalem Post, has similar policies. So long, therefore, as the situation
exists in which Israel is really a "closed society" to the
rest of the world, because the world wants to close its eyes, the
publication and even the beginning of the realization of such a plan is
realistic and feasible.
Israel Shahak
June 17, 1982
Jerusalem
June 17, 1982
Jerusalem
Israel
Shahak is a professor of organic chemistly at
Hebrew University in Jerusalem and the chairman of the Israeli League for Human
and Civil Rights. He published The Shahak Papers, collections of
key articles from the Hebrew press, and is the author of numerous articles and
books, among them Non-Jew in the Jewish State. His latest book is Israel's
Global Role: Weapons for Repression, published by the AAUG in 1982. Israel Shahak: (1933-2001)
1. American Universities Field Staff. Report No.33, 1979.
According to this research, the population of the world will be 6 billion in
the year 2000. Today's world population can be broken down as follows: China,
958 million; India, 635 million; USSR, 261 million; U.S., 218 million
Indonesia, 140 million; Brazil and Japan, 110 million each. According to the
figures of the U.N. Population Fund for 1980, there will be, in 2000, 50 cities
with a population of over 5 million each. The population ofthp;Third World will
then be 80% of the world population. According to Justin Blackwelder, U.S.
Census Office chief, the world population will not reach 6 billion because of
hunger.
2. Soviet nuclear policy has been well summarized by two American
Sovietologists: Joseph D. Douglas and Amoretta M. Hoeber, Soviet
Strategy for Nuclear War, (Stanford, Ca., Hoover Inst. Press, 1979). In the
Soviet Union tens and hundreds of articles and books are published each year
which detail the Soviet doctrine for nuclear war and there is a great deal of
documentation translated into English and published by the U.S. Air
Force,including USAF: Marxism-Leninism on War and the Army: The Soviet
View, Moscow, 1972; USAF: The Armed Forces of the Soviet State.
Moscow, 1975, by Marshal A. Grechko. The basic Soviet approach to the matter is
presented in the book by Marshal Sokolovski published in 1962 in Moscow:
Marshal V. D. Sokolovski, Military Strategy, Soviet Doctrine and
Concepts(New York, Praeger, 1963).
3. A picture of Soviet intentions in various areas of the world can be drawn
from the book by Douglas and Hoeber, ibid. For additional
material see: Michael Morgan, "USSR's Minerals as Strategic Weapon in the
Future," Defense and Foreign Affairs, Washington, D.C., Dec.
1979.
4. Admiral of the Fleet Sergei Gorshkov, Sea Power and the State,
London, 1979. Morgan, loc. cit. General George S. Brown (USAF)
C-JCS,Statement to the Congress on the Defense Posture of the United States
For Fiscal Year 1979, p. 103; National Security Council, Review of
Non-Fuel Mineral Policy, (Washington, D.C. 1979,); Drew Middleton, The
New York Times, (9/15/79); Time, 9/21/80.
5. Elie Kedourie, "The End of the Ottoman Empire," Journal
of Contemporary History, Vol. 3, No.4, 1968.
6. Al-Thawra, Syria 12/20/79, Al-Ahram,12/30/79, Al
Ba'ath, Syria, 5/6/79. 55% of the Arabs
are 20 years old and younger, 70% of the Arabs live in Africa, 55% of the Arabs
under 15 are unemployed, 33% live in urban areas, Oded Yinon, "Egypt's
Population Problem," The Jerusalem Quarterly, No. 15, Spring
1980.
7. E. Kanovsky, "Arab Haves and Have Nots," The Jerusalem
Quarterly, No.1, Fall 1976, Al Ba'ath, Syria, 5/6/79.
8. In his book, former Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin said that the Israeli
government is in fact responsible for the design of American policy in the
Middle East, after June '67, because of its own indecisiveness as to the future
of the territories and the inconsistency in its positions since it established
the background for Resolution 242 and certainly twelve years later for the Camp
David agreements and the peace treaty with Egypt. According to Rabin, on June
19, 1967, President Johnson sent a letter to Prime Minister Eshkol in which he
did not mention anything about withdrawal from the new territories but exactly
on the same day the government resolved to return territories in exchange for
peace. After the Arab resolutions in Khartoum (9/1/67) the government altered
its position but contrary to its decision of June 19, did not notify the U.S.
of the alteration and the U.S. continued to support 242 in the Security Council
on the basis of its earlier understanding that Israel is prepared to return territories.
At that point it was already too late to change the U.S. position and Israel's
policy. From here the way was opened to peace agreements on the basis of 242 as
was later agreed upon in Camp David. See Yitzhak Rabin. Pinkas Sherut,
(Ma'ariv 1979) pp. 226-227.
9. Foreign and Defense Committee Chairman Prof. Moshe Arens argued in an
interview (Ma 'ariv,10/3/80) that the Israeli government failed to
prepare an economic plan before the Camp David agreements and was itself
surprised by the cost of the agreements, although already during the
negotiations it was possible to calculate the heavy price and the serious error
involved in not having prepared the economic grounds for peace.
The former
Minister of Treasury, Mr. Yigal Holwitz, stated that if it were not for the
withdrawal from the oil fields, Israel would have a positive balance of
payments (9/17/80). That same person said two years earlier that the government
of Israel (from which he withdrew) had placed a noose around his neck. He was
referring to the Camp David agreements (Ha'aretz, 11/3/78). In the
course of the whole peace negotiations neither an expert nor an economics
advisor was consulted, and the Prime Minister himself, who lacks knowledge and
expertise in economics, in a mistaken initiative, asked the U.S. to give us a
loan rather than a grant, due to his wish to maintain our respect and the
respect of the U.S. towards us. See Ha'aretz1/5/79. Jerusalem
Post, 9/7/79. Prof Asaf Razin, formerly a senior consultant in the
Treasury, strongly criticized the conduct of the negotiations; Ha'aretz,
5/5/79. Ma'ariv, 9/7/79. As to matters concerning the oil fields
and Israel's energy crisis, see the interview with Mr. Eitan Eisenberg, a
government advisor on these matters, Ma'arive Weekly, 12/12/78. The
Energy Minister, who personally signed the Camp David agreements and the
evacuation of Sdeh Alma, has since emphasized the seriousness of our condition
from the point of view of oil supplies more than once...see Yediot
Ahronot, 7/20/79. Energy Minister Modai even admitted that the government
did not consult him at all on the subject of oil during the Camp David and
Blair House negotiations. Ha'aretz, 8/22/79.
10. Many sources report on the growth of the armaments budget in Egypt and on
intentions to give the army preference in a peace epoch budget over domestic
needs for which a peace was allegedly obtained. See former Prime Minister
Mamduh Salam in an interview 12/18/77, Treasury Minister Abd El Sayeh in an
interview 7/25/78, and the paper Al Akhbar, 12/2/78 which clearly
stressed that the military budget will receive first priority, despite the
peace. This is what former Prime Minister Mustafa Khalil has stated in his
cabinet's programmatic document which was presented to Parliament, 11/25/78.
See English translation, ICA, FBIS, Nov. 27. 1978, pp. D 1-10. According to
these sources, Egypt's military budget increased by 10% between fiscal 1977 and
1978, and the process still goes on. A Saudi source divulged that the Egyptians
plan to increase their militmy budget by 100% in the next two years; Ha'aretz,
2/12/79 and Jerusalem Post, 1/14/79.
11. Most of the economic estimates threw doubt on Egypt's ability to
reconstruct its economy by 1982. See Economic Intelligence Unit,
1978 Supplement, "The Arab Republic of Egypt"; E. Kanovsky,
"Recent Economic Developments in the Middle East," Occasional
Papers, The Shiloah Institution, June 1977; Kanovsky, "The Egyptian
Economy Since the Mid-Sixties, The Micro Sectors," Occasional
Papers, June 1978; Robert McNamara, President of World Bank, as reported in Times,
London, 1/24/78.
12. See the comparison made by the researeh of the Institute for Strategic
Studies in London, and research camed out in the Center for Strategic Studies
of Tel Aviv University, as well as the research by the British scientist, Denis
Champlin, Military Review, Nov. 1979, ISS: The Military
Balance 1979-1980, CSS; Security Arrangements in Sinai...by
Brig. Gen. (Res.) A Shalev, No. 3.0 CSS; The Military Balance and the
Military Options after the Peace Treaty with Egypt, by Brig. Gen. (Res.) Y.
Raviv, No.4, Dec. 1978, as well as many press reports including El
Hawadeth, London, 3/7/80; El Watan El Arabi, Paris, 12/14/79.
13. As for religious ferment in Egypt and the relations between Copts and
Moslems see the series of articles published in the Kuwaiti paper, El
Qabas, 9/15/80. The English author Irene Beeson reports on the rift between
Moslems and Copts, see: Irene Beeson, Guardian, London, 6/24/80,
and Desmond Stewart, Middle East Internmational, London 6/6/80. For
other reports see Pamela Ann Smith, Guardian, London, 12/24/79; The
Christian Science Monitor 12/27/79 as well as Al Dustour,
London, 10/15/79; El Kefah El Arabi, 10/15/79.
14. Arab Press Service, Beirut, 8/6-13/80. The New Republic,
8/16/80, Der Spiegel as cited by Ha'aretz,
3/21/80, and 4/30-5/5/80; The Economist, 3/22/80; Robert Fisk, Times,
London, 3/26/80; Ellsworth Jones, Sunday Times, 3/30/80.
15. J.P. Peroncell Hugoz, Le Monde, Paris 4/28/80; Dr. Abbas
Kelidar, Middle East Review, Summer 1979; Conflict Studies,
ISS, July 1975; Andreas Kolschitter, Der Zeit, (Ha'aretz,
9/21/79) Economist Foreign Report, 10/10/79, Afro-Asian
Affairs, London, July 1979.
16. Arnold Hottinger, "The Rich Arab States in Trouble," The
New York Review of Books, 5/15/80; Arab Press Service, Beirut,
6/25-7/2/80; U.S. News and World Report, 11/5/79 as well as El
Ahram, 11/9/79; El Nahar El Arabi Wal Duwali, Paris 9/7/79; El
Hawadeth, 11/9/79; David Hakham,Monthly Review, IDF, Jan.-Feb. 79.
17. As for Jordan's policies and problems see El Nahar El Arabi Wal
Duwali, 4/30/79, 7/2/79; Prof. Elie Kedouri, Ma'ariv 6/8/79;
Prof. Tanter,Davar 7/12/79; A. Safdi, Jerusalem Post,
5/31/79; El Watan El Arabi 11/28/79; El Qabas,
11/19/79. As for PLO positions see: The resolutions of the Fatah Fourth
Congress, Damascus, August 1980. The Shefa'amr program of the Israeli Arabs was
published in Ha'aretz, 9/24/80, and byArab Press Report 6/18/80.
For facts and figures on immigration of Arabs to Jordan, see Amos Ben Vered, Ha'aretz,
2/16/77; Yossef Zuriel,Ma'ariv 1/12/80. As to the PLO's position
towards Israel see Shlomo Gazit, Monthly Review; July 1980; Hani El
Hasan in an interview, Al Rai Al'Am, Kuwait 4/15/80; Avi Plaskov,
"The Palestinian Problem," Survival, ISS, London Jan.
Feb. 78; David Gutrnann, "The Palestinian Myth,"Commentary,
Oct. 75; Bernard Lewis, "The Palestinians and the PLO," Commentary Jan.
75; Monday Morning, Beirut, 8/18-21/80; Journal of
Palestine Studies, Winter 1980.
18. Prof. Yuval Neeman, "Samaria--The Basis for Israel's Security," Ma'arakhot 272-273,
May/June 1980; Ya'akov Hasdai, "Peace, the Way and the Right to
Know," Dvar Hashavua, 2/23/80. Aharon Yariv, "Strategic
Depth--An Israeli Perspective," Ma'arakhot 270-271,
October 1979; Yitzhak Rabin, "Israel's Defense Problems in the
Eighties," Ma'arakhot October 1979.
19. Ezra Zohar, In the Regime's Pliers (Shikmona, 1974);
Motti Heinrich, Do We have a Chance Israel, Truth Versus Legend (Reshafim,
1981).
20. Henry Kissinger, "The Lessons of the Past," The
Washington Review Vol 1, Jan. 1978; Arthur Ross, "OPEC's
Challenge to the West," The Washington Quarterly, Winter,
1980; Walter Levy, "Oil and the Decline of the West," Foreign
Affairs, Summer 1980; Special Report--"Our Armed Forees-Ready or
Not?" U.S. News and World Report 10/10/77; Stanley
Hoffman, "Reflections on the Present Danger," The New York
Review of Books 3/6/80; Time 4/3/80; Leopold Lavedez
"The illusions of SALT" Commentary Sept. 79; Norman
Podhoretz, "The Present Danger,"Commentary March 1980;
Robert Tucker, "Oil and American Power Six Years Later," Commentary Sept.
1979; Norman Podhoretz, "The Abandonment of Israel," Commentary July
1976; Elie Kedourie, "Misreading the Middle East," Commentary July
1979.
21. According to figures published by Ya'akov Karoz, Yediot Ahronot,
10/17/80, the sum total of anti-Semitic incidents recorded in the world in 1979
was double the amount recorded in 1978. In Germany, France, and Britain the
number of anti-Semitic incidents was many times greater in that year. In the
U.S. as well there has been a sharp increase in anti-Semitic incidents which
were reported in that article. For the new anti-Semitism, see L. Talmon,
"The New Anti-Semitism," The New Republic, 9/18/1976;
Barbara Tuchman, "They poisoned the Wells," Newsweek2/3/75.
Appendix:
"Israel Talks of a New Exodus"
"Israel Talks of a New Exodus"
Further Reading
Compare
the Zionist plan for regional Jewish imperialism in the Middle East with the
purportedly "anti-Zionist," if not even "anti-Jewish,"
vision of Hebrew imperialism proposed by the Hebrew Canaanist movement:
The Vision of the New Hebrew Nation and its Enemies by Yaacov Shavit
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