Bron: https://www.zerohedge.com/news/2019-05-22/rand-corp-how-destroy-russia
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1
BRIEF
T
his brief summarizes a report that comprehensively examines nonviolent, cost-imposing options that the United States and its allies could pursue acrosseconomic, political, and military areas to stress—overextend and unbalance—Russia’s economy and armed forces and the regime’s political standing at homeand abroad. Some of the options examined are clearly more promising than others,but any would need to be evaluated in terms of the overall U.S. strategy for dealingwith Russia, which neither the report nor this brief has attempted to do.
2
The maxim that “Russia isnever so strong nor so weak asit appears” remains as true in thecurrent century as it was in the19th and 20th.
T
oday’s Russia suffers from many
vulnerabilities
—oil and gas prices well below peak thathave caused a drop in living standards, economic sanctions that have furthered thatdecline, an aging and soon-to-be-declining population, and increasing authoritarianism under Vladimir Putin’s now-continued rule. Such vulnerabilities are coupled with deep-seated (ifexaggerated)
anxieties
about the possibility of Western-inspired regime change, loss of greatpower status, and even military attack.
Despite these vulnerabilities and anxieties, Russiaremains a powerful country that still manages tobe a U.S. peer competitor in a few key domains.Recognizing that some level of competition withRussia is inevitable, RAND researchers conducteda qualitative assessment of “cost-imposing options”that could unbalance and overextend Russia. Suchcost-imposing options could place new burdenson Russia, ideally heavier burdens than would beimposed on the United States for pursuing thoseoptions. The work builds on the concept of long-termstrategic competition developed during the ColdWar, some of which originated at RAND. A seminal1972 RAND report posited that the United Statesneeded to shift its strategic thinking away from tryingto stay ahead of the Soviet Union in all dimensionsand toward trying to control the competition andchannel it into areas of U.S. advantage. If this shiftcould be made successfully, the report concluded,the United States could prompt the Soviet Union toshift its limited resources into areas that posed lessof a threat. The new report applies this concept to today’sRussia. A team of RAND experts developedeconomic, geopolitical, ideological, informational,and military options and qualitatively assessed themin terms of their likelihood of success in extendingRussia, their benefits, and their risks and costs.
3
Expanding U.S. energy production
would stressRussia’s economy, potentially constraining itsgovernment budget and, by extension, its defensespending. By adopting policies that expand worldsupply and depress global prices, the United Statescan limit Russian revenue. Doing so entails littlecost or risk, produces second-order benefits forthe U.S. economy, and does not need multilateralendorsement.
Imposing deeper trade and financial sanctions
would also likely degrade the Russian economy,especially if such sanctions are comprehensive andmultilateral. Thus, their effectiveness will dependon the willingness of other countries to join in sucha process. But sanctions come with costs and,depending on their severity, considerable risks.
Increasing Europe’s ability to import gas fromsuppliers other than Russia
could economicallyextend Russia and buffer Europe against Russianenergy coercion. Europe is slowly moving in thisdirection by building regasification plants for liquefiednatural gas (LNG). But to be truly effective, this optionwould need global LNG markets to become moreflexible than they already are and would need LNG tobecome more price-competitive with Russian gas.
Encouraging the emigration from Russia ofskilled labor and well-educated youth
has fewcosts or risks and could help the United States andother receiving countries and hurt Russia, but anyeffects—both positive for receiving countries andnegative for Russia—would be difficult to noticeexcept over a very long period. This option also hasa low likelihood of extending Russia.
ECONOMIC COST-IMPOSING MEASURES
Economic Cost-Imposing OptionsLikelihood of Successin Extending RussiaBenefitsCosts and Risks
Expand U.S. energy productionHighHighLowImpose deeper trade and financial sanctionsHighHighHighIncrease Europe’s ability to import LNG fromsources other than RussiaModerateHighModerateEncourage emigration from Russia of skilledlabor and well-educated youthLowLowLow
NOTE: For all the tables in this brief, high and low rankings for costs and risks are inverted in desirability from the rest of the table; i.e., low costs are good in thesame way that a high likelihood of success is. Thus, a low cost is shaded in green while a low likelihood of success is shaded in red. All assessments listed in thetables in this brief are based on analysis by the report’s authors.
P e r c e n t a g e o f t h e t o t a l v a l u e o f e x p o r t s
10080604002012 2013 2014 2015 201620
All other exportsPetroleum exports
SOURCE: United Nations (UN),
UN Comtrade Database
, electronic onlinedatabase, 2017.
Russian petroleum exports are declining
4
Providing lethal aid to Ukraine
would exploitRussia’s greatest point of external vulnerability. Butany increase in U.S. military arms and advice toUkraine would need to be carefully calibrated toincrease the costs to Russia of sustaining its existingcommitment without provoking a much wider conflictin which Russia, by reason of proximity, would havesignificant advantages.
Increasing support to the Syrian rebels
could jeopardize other U.S. policy priorities, such ascombating radical Islamic terrorism, and could riskfurther destabilizing the entire region. Furthermore,this option might not even be feasible, given theradicalization, fragmentation, and decline of theSyrian opposition.
Promoting liberalization in Belarus
likely wouldnot succeed and could provoke a strong Russianresponse, one that would result in a generaldeterioration of the security environment in Europeand a setback for U.S. policy.
Expanding ties in the South Caucasus
—competing economically with Russia—would bedifficult because of geography and history.
Reducing Russian influence in Central Asia
would be very difficult and could prove costly.Increased engagement is unlikely to extendRussia much economically and likely to bedisproportionately costly for the United States.
Flip Transnistria and expel the Russian troopsfrom the region
would be a blow to Russianprestige, but it would also save Moscow money andquite possibly impose additional costs on the UnitedStates and its allies.
GEOPOLITICAL COST-IMPOSING MEASURES
Syrian Democratic Forces trainees, representing an equalnumber of Arab and Kurdish volunteers, stand in formation attheir graduation ceremony in northern Syria, August 9, 2017.
Geopolitical Cost-Imposing OptionsLikelihood of Successin Extending RussiaBenefitsCosts and Risks
Provide lethal aid to UkraineModerateHighHighIncrease support to the Syrian rebelsLowModerateHighPromote liberalization in BelarusLowHighHighExpand ties in the South CaucasusLowLowModerateReduce Russian influence in Central AsiaLowLowModerateFlipping TransnistriaLowLowModerate
5
Diminishing faith in the Russian electoralsystem
would be difficult because of state controlover most media sources. Doing so could increasediscontent with the regime, but there are seriousrisks that the Kremlin could increase repression orlash out and pursue a diversionary conflict abroadthat might run counter to Western interests.
Creating the perception that the regime isnot pursuing the public interest
could focuson widespread, large-scale corruption and furtherchallenge the legitimacy of the state. But it is hardto assess whether political volatility and protestswould lead to a more extended Russia—less able orinclined to threaten Western interests abroad—or toa Russia more inclined to lash out in retaliation or todistract, making this a high-risk option.
Encouraging domestic protests and othernonviolent resistance
would focus on distractingor destabilizing the Russian regime and reducing thelikelihood that it would pursue aggressive actionsabroad, but the risks are high and it would bedifficult for Western governments to directly increasethe incidence or intensity of anti-regime activities inRussia.
Undermining Russia’s image abroad
wouldfocus on diminishing Russian standing andinfluence, thus undercutting regime claims ofrestoring Russia to its former glory. Furthersanctions, the removal of Russia from non-UNinternational forums, and boycotting such events asthe World Cup could be implemented by Westernstates and would damage Russian prestige. But theextent to which these steps would damage Russiandomestic stability is uncertain.While none of these measures has a high probabilityof success, any or all of them would prey on theRussian regime’s deepest anxieties and might beemployed as a deterrent threat to diminish Russia’sactive disinformation and subversion campaignsabroad.
IDEOLOGICAL AND INFORMATIONAL COST-IMPOSINGMEASURES
Ideological and InformationalCost-Imposing OptionsLikelihood of Successin Extending RussiaBenefitsCosts and Risks
Diminish faith in the Russian electoral systemLowModerateHighCreate the perception that the regime is notpursuing the public interestModerateModerateHighEncourage domestic protests and othernonviolent resistanceLowModerateHighUndermine Russia’s image abroadModerateModerateModerate
Muscovites protesting the war in Ukraine and Russia’s supportof separatism in the Crimea on the Circular Boulevards inMoscow on March 15, 2014.
6
Reposturing bombers within easy strikingrange
of key Russian strategic targets has a highlikelihood of success and would certainly getMoscow’s attention and raise Russian anxieties; thecosts and risks of this option are low as long as thebombers are based out of range of most of Russia’stheater ballistic and ground-based cruise missiles.
Reposturing fighters so that they are closer totheir targets
than bombers as a way to achievehigher sortie rates to compensate for their smallerpayloads would likely concern Moscow even morethan reposturing bombers, but the likelihood ofsuccess is low and risks are high. Because eachaircraft would need to fly multiple sorties duringa conventional conflict, Russian leaders would
AIR AND SPACE COST-IMPOSING MEASURES
Air and Space/NuclearCost-Imposing OptionsLikelihood of Successin Extending RussiaBenefitsCosts and RisksOption 1: Changing air and space force posture and operations
Reposture bombersHighModerateLowReposture fightersLowModerateHighDeploy additional tactical nuclear weaponsHighLowHighReposition U.S. and allied ballistic missiledefense systemsLowLowModerate
Option 2: Increasing aerospace research and development (R&D)
Invest more in low-observable aircraftModerateModerateModerateInvest more in autonomous or remotely pilotedaircraftHighModerateModerateInvest more in long-range strike aircraft andmissilesHighHighModerateInvest more in longer-range high-speed anti-radiation missiles (HARMs)HighModerateModerateInvest more in new electronic warfaretechnologiesModerateModerateLowFocus on long-range, precision-guidedconventional missiles (e.g., conventionalprompt global strike)ModerateModerateHighFocus on space-based weaponsLowModerateHighFocus on “spaceplanes”Low to moderateModerateHighFocus on small satellitesLowModerateHigh
Option 3: Increasing air and missile components of the nuclear triad
Break out of the nuclear arms control regimeLowModerateHigh
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probably be confident that they could destroymany fighters on the ground and shut downtheir deployment airfields early on with few or noadditions to their missile inventory.
Deploying additional tactical nuclear weapons
to locations in Europe and Asia could heightenRussia’s anxiety enough to significantly increaseinvestments in its air defenses. In conjunctionwith the bomber option, it has a high likelihood ofsuccess, but deploying more such weapons mightlead Moscow to react in ways contrary to U.S. andallied interests.
Repositioning U.S. and allied ballistic missiledefense systems
to better engage Russian ballisticmissiles would also alarm Moscow but would likelybe the least effective option because Russia couldeasily saturate current systems and any plannedupgrades with a small percentage of its existingmissile inventory, leaving many missiles still availableto hold U.S. and allied targets at risk.
There are also ways to get Russia to extenditself in strategic competition.
In terms ofbenefits, such developments would exploitMoscow’s demonstrated fear of U.S. airpowercapabilities and doctrines. Developing new low-observable, long-range bombers, or simplyadding significantly more of types that are alreadyavailable or programmed (B-2s and B-21s) wouldbe worrisome for Moscow, as would developingautonomous or remotely piloted strike aircraft andproducing them in high numbers. All options wouldlikely incentivize Moscow to devote ever-greaterresources to making its command and controlsystems harder, more mobile, and more redundant.
A key risk of these options is being drawninto arms races that result in cost-imposingstrategies directed against the United States.
For example, investing in ballistic missile defensesystems and space-based weapons would alarmMoscow, but Russia could defend against suchdevelopments by taking measures that wouldprobably be considerably cheaper than the costs ofthese systems to the United States.
As for likelihood of success, some options aregood cost-imposing strategies,
but some—suchas investing more in HARMs or other electronicwarfare technologies—are clearly better than others,and some approaches should be avoided, suchas those that focus on space-based weapons orballistic missile defense systems.
The United States might goad Russia into acostly arms race by breaking out of the nucleararms control regime,
but the benefits are unlikelyto outweigh U.S. costs. The financial costs of anuclear arms race would probably be as high for theUnited States as they would be for Russia, perhapshigher. But the more serious costs would be politicaland strategic.
Marines assigned to the Thunderbolts of Marine Fighter AttackSquadron (VMFA) 251 remove a training AGM-88 HARM froman F/A-18C Hornet on the flight deck of the
Nimitz
-classaircraft carrier USS
Theodore Roosevelt
(CVN 71).
8
Increasing U.S. and allied naval force postureand presence
in Russia’s operating areas couldforce Russia to increase its naval investments,diverting investments from potentially moredangerous areas. But the size of investment requiredto reconstitute a true blue-water naval capabilitymakes it unlikely that Russia could be compelled orenticed to do so.
Increasing naval R&D efforts
would focus ondeveloping new weapons that allow U.S. submarinesto threaten a broader set of targets or enhance theirability to threaten Russian nuclear ballistic missilesubmarines (SSBNs), which could impose anti-submarine warfare costs on Russia. There are limitedrisks, but success depends on being able to developthese capabilities and on whether they are sufficientlycapable of influencing Russian expenditures.
Shifting nuclear posture toward SSBNs
wouldentail increasing the percentage of the U.S. nucleartriad assigned to SSBNs by increasing the sizeof that fleet. While it might force Russia to investin capabilities that can operate in a blue-waterenvironment in two oceans and would reduce risksto U.S. strategic posture, the option is unlikely toentice Russia into changing its strategy and, thus,extending itself.
Checking the Black Sea buildup
would involvedeploying strengthened North Atlantic TreatyOrganization (NATO) anti-access and area denialover the Black Sea—perhaps in the form of long-range, land-based anti-ship missiles—to drive upthe cost of defending Russian bases in Crimea andlower the benefit to Russia of having seized this area.Russia would certainly mount a vigorous diplomaticand informational campaign to dissuade coastalNATO and non-NATO states from participating. Also,operating in the Black Sea is politically and logisticallymore difficult for the U.S. Navy than the RussianNavy; it is also more dangerous for the former in aconflict.
MARITIME COST-IMPOSING MEASURES
Maritime Cost-Imposing OptionsLikelihood of Successin Extending RussiaBenefitsCosts and Risks
Increase U.S. and allied naval force postureand presenceModerateModerateLowIncrease naval R&D effortsModerateModerateModerateShift nuclear posture toward SSBNsLowLowLowCheck the Black Sea buildupModerateModerateModerate
A U.S. sailor aboard the guided missile destroyer USS
Mustin
(DDG 89) fires a torpedo at a simulated target during Valiant Shield2014 in the Pacific Ocean September 18, 2014.
9
Increasing U.S. forces in Europe, increasingEuropean NATO member ground capabilities,and deploying a large number of NATO forceson the Russian border
would likely have onlylimited effects on extending Russia. All the optionswould enhance deterrence, but the risks vary. Ageneral increase in NATO ground force capabilities inEurope—including closing European NATO memberreadiness gaps and increasing the number of U.S.forces stationed in traditional locations in WesternEurope—would have limited risks. But large-scaledeployments on Russia’s borders would increase therisk of conflict with Russia, particularly if perceivedas challenging Russia’s position in eastern Ukraine,Belarus, or the Caucasus.
Increasing the size and frequency of NATOexercises in Europe may help to enhancereadiness and deterrence, but it is unlikelyto prompt a costly Russian response unlessthe exercises also send risky signals.
Large-
scale NATO exercises held near Russia’s bordersand exercises that practice counterattack oroffensive scenarios could be perceived as showingthe intent and willingness to consider offensiveoperations. For example, a NATO exercise simulatinga counterattack to retake NATO territory lost toadvancing Russian forces might look like an exerciseto prepare for an invasion of a piece of Russianterritory, such as Kaliningrad.
Developing but not deploying an intermediate-range missile
could bring Russia back intoconformity with the Intermediate-Range NuclearForces Treaty but could also prompt an accelerationof Russian missile programs. Withdrawing from thattreaty and building the missiles but not deployingthem in Europe would add little to U.S. capabilitiesand would probably prompt Russia to deploy suchmissiles itself—and, perhaps, invest more in ballisticmissile defense. Taking the further step of deployingthe missiles to Europe, assuming that NATO allieswere willing, would also almost certainly prompt aRussian response, potentially involving substantialresources, or at least the diversion of substantialresources from other defense spending, though it ishard to assess what share would be directed towarddefensive capabilities versus offensive or retaliatoryones.
Incremental investments in new technologies
to counter Russian air defenses and increase U.S.long-range fires could significantly improve defenseand deterrence while compelling increased Russianinvestment in countermeasures. Investments inmore-revolutionary, next-generation technologiescould have even greater effects, given the Russianconcerns about new physical principles, butdepending on the capability, such investments couldalso risk strategic stability by threatening the Russianregime and leadership security in a crisis.
LAND AND MULTIDOMAIN COST-IMPOSING MEASURES
10
Land and MultidomainCost-Imposing OptionsLikelihood of Successin Extending RussiaBenefitsCosts and RisksOption 1: Increasing U.S. and NATO land forces in Europe
Increase U.S. forces in EuropeModerateModerateModerateIncrease European NATO member groundcapabilitiesLowHighLowDeploy large number of NATO forces on theRussian borderModerateModerateHigh
Option 2: Increasing NATO exercises in Europe
Increase the size of U.S participationLowModerateModerateGenerate a mass mobilization of EuropeanNATO member forcesLowHighModerateHold exercises on Russia’s bordersModerateModerateHighHold exercises practicing counterattack oroffensive scenariosModerateModerateHigh
Option 3: Withdrawing from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty
Fund a missile development program withoutwithdrawingModerateLowModerateWithdraw and build missiles but do not deployto EuropeHighLowModerateWithdraw, build missiles, and deploy to EuropeHighModerateHigh
Option 4: Investing in new capabilities to manipulate Russian risk perceptions
Invest in incremental improvements incounter
–
anti
-
access and area denialcapabilities (e.g., enhanced Army TacticalMissile Systems, advanced anti-radiationguided missiles)HighModerateModerateInvest in revolutionary, swarm counter
–
anti
-
access and area denial capabilitiesHighHighHighInvest in incremental improvements incounter–ground forces/fires (e.g., enhancedJavelin)LowLowLowInvest in revolutionary, unmanned groundforces/fires capabilitiesModerateModerateModerateInvest in weapons based on “new physicalprinciples” (e.g,. directed-energy counter–air-defense weapons)ModerateHighHigh
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IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ARMY
The task of “extending Russia” need not fall primarilyon the Army or even the U.S. armed forces as awhole. Indeed, the most promising ways to extendRussia—those with the highest benefit, the lowestrisk, and greatest likelihood of success—likely falloutside the military domain. Russia is not seekingmilitary parity with the United States and, thus,might simply choose not to respond to some U.S.military actions (e.g., shifts in naval presence); otherU.S. military actions (e.g., posturing forces closerto Russia) could ultimately prove more costly to theUnited States than to Russia. Still, our findings haveat least three major implications for the Army.
The U.S. Army should rebuild itslinguistic and analytical expertiseon Russia.
Because Russia does posea long-term threat, the Army needs to developthe human capital to engage in this strategiccompetition.
The Army should consider investingand encouraging the other servicesto invest more in capabilities, suchas Army Tactical Missile Systems, IndirectFire Protection Capability Increment 2, longer-range anti-air defense, and other systemsdesigned to counter Russian anti-accessand area denial capabilities.
The Army alsomight consider spending some R&D resourceson less-mature, more-futuristic systems (e.g.,swarm unmanned aerial vehicles or remote combatvehicles). While these measures would likely beinsufficient in themselves to greatly extend Russia,they would benefit U.S. deterrence efforts and couldaugment a broader whole-of-government policy.
Even if the Army were not directlyinvolved in extending Russia per se,it would play a key role in mitigatingthe possible blowback.
All the options to extendRussia incur some risk. As a result, enhancing U.S.deterrence posture in Europe and increasing U.S.military capabilities (e.g., an enhanced Javelin oractive protection systems for Army vehicles) mightneed to go hand in hand with any move to extendRussia, as a way of hedging against the chance oftensions with Russia escalating into conflict.
132
Exercise Artemis Strike was a German-led tactical live-fire exercise with live Patriot and Stinger missiles at the NATO MissileFiring Installation in Chania, Greece, from October 31 to November 9, 2017. More than 200 U.S. soldiers and approximately 650German airmen participated in the realistic training within a combined construct, exercising the rigors associated with forceprojection and educating operators on their air missile defense systems.
12
CONCLUSIONS
The most-promising options to “extend Russia”are those that directly address its vulnerabilities,anxieties, and strengths, exploiting areas ofweakness while undermining Russia’s currentadvantages. In that regard, Russia’s greatestvulnerability, in any competition with the UnitedStates, is its economy, which is comparatively smalland highly dependent on energy exports. Russianleadership’s greatest anxiety stems from the stabilityand durability of the regime, and Russia’s greateststrengths are in the military and info-war realms. Thetable below draws from the earlier tables to identifythe most-promising options.Most of the options discussed, includingthose listed here, are in some sense escalatory,and most would likely prompt some Russiancounterescalation. Thus, besides the specific risksassociated with each option, there is additional riskattached to a generally intensified competition witha nuclear-armed adversary to consider. This meansthat every option must be deliberately planned andcarefully calibrated to achieve the desired effect.Finally, although Russia will bear the cost of thisincreased competition less easily than the UnitedStates will, both sides will have to divert nationalresources from other purposes. Extending Russiafor its own sake is not a sufficient basis in mostcases to consider the options discussed here.Rather, the options must be considered in thebroader context of national policy based on defense,deterrence, and—where U.S. and Russian interestsalign—cooperation.
RB-10014-A (2019)
This brief describes work done in the RAND Arroyo Center documented in
Extending Russia: Competing from Advantageous Ground
, by James Dobbins, Raphael S. Cohen,Nathan Chandler, Bryan Frederick, Edward Geist, Paul DeLuca, Forrest E. Morgan, Howard J. Shatz, and Brent Williams, RR-3063-A, 2019 (available at www.rand.org/t/RR3063). To view this brief online, visit www.rand.org/t/RB10014. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to helpmake communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’spublications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.
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Most-Promising Cost-Imposing OptionsLikelihood of Successin Extending RussiaBenefitsCosts and Risks
Expand U.S. energy productionHighHighLowImpose deeper trade and financial sanctionsHighHighHighIncrease U.S. and allied naval force postureand presenceModerateModerateLowReposture bombersHighModerateLowInvest more in autonomous or remotely pilotedaircraftHighModerateModerateInvest more in long-range strike aircraft andmissilesHighHighModerateInvest more in longer-range HARMsHighModerateModerateInvest more in new electronic warfaretechnologiesModerateModerateLow
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