800 Nederland is de rechterhand van de enig echte Nieuwe Hitler.

In 1999  schreven de Neocons hun plan voor een 100 jarig Rijk door middel van oorlog en geweld : het PNAC Report.
Ze begrepen wel dat het niet zo gemakkelijk zou zijn om de burgers tot al die oorlogen over te halen, tenzij... tenzij Amerika op dramatiusche wijze zou worden aangevallen. Net als in Pearl Harbor gebeurde. Ook toen wilde het volk niet mee doen met  WO2, maar na de doden bij Pearl Harbor was het volk woedend en wilde het oorlog.
En verdomd: op 11 sept 2001 kregen ze hun Pearl Harbor.

En direct daarna wàren ze de baas in Amerika.  ( Wesley Clark:  "Right after 9/11  these people committed a  Coup, a policy Coup." )

Sindsdien zijn al heel wat buurlanden van Israel vernietigd.
Niet op legale wijze natuurlijk.
Maar als je zegt dat het voor  'de humaniteit' is  en voor 'democratie'  en  als je zegt dat jij beter bent dan de anderen  ( Exceptional,  indispensable, City on the Hill)  dan hoef je je niet aan de wet te houden.
Het mooiste is natuurlijk als je andere landen mee krijgt die - al is het maar symbolisch-  mee gaan vechten.
Dan heb je een coalitie, en lijkt het net alsof je echt aan de goede kant van de Geschiedenis staat.
En Nederland was altijd het eerste land dat  mee wilde vechten.....


Uit onderstaande wikileak blijkt dat Nederland het braafste schaap uit de kudde is: altijd wilden we als eersten mee helpen bij de vernietiging van weer een landje dat Israel's Lebensraum tekort deed.

Punt 22 ( helemaal onderaan) vat het goed samen: 

Als ' beïnvloeders ' van andere EU  landen moeten de Nederlanders worden aangemoedigd om  een steeds prominentere rol spelen op het wereldtoneel.
Het zal moeite kosten om de Nederlanders in de kijker te zetten, maar
loont koninklijk. De Nederlanders hebben een goede reputatie, een hoge geloofwaardigheid en hun goede capaciteiten maken hen tot effectieve leiders over een breed bereik van geografische regio's en veel inhoudelijke kwesties.

Kortom: met Nederland hebben wij, de VS, goud in handen. Ze kunnen veel voor ons doen.

Het originele Wikileak document staat onderaan, maar is lastig te lezen. 

Daarom een beter de lezen versie als eerste: 

1. (S) SUMMARY:  With the EU divided and its direction

uncertain, the Dutch serve as a vital transatlantic anchor in

Europe.  As one of the original six EU members, the Dutch

ally with the British to counter Franco-German efforts to

steer Europe off a transatlantic course.  The Netherlands'

solid European and international credentials create a

powerful "multiplier" effect.  In Iraq, Dutch forces provided

the physical and political cover for Japan to deploy and the

Dutch are using their NATO Training Mission commitment to

push others to do more.  In Afghanistan, the Dutch drove much

of the Phase III planning for ISAF and deployed Dutch troops

in combat operations for the first time in more than 30

years.  The Dutch have led Europe in launching pilot projects

to strengthen international counterterrorism cooperation, and

initiated the U.S.-EU dialogue on terrorist financing which

laid the groundwork for a proposed major international

Terrorism Financing Conference in 2006.

2. (S) (SUMMARY CONTINUED) The Dutch are expanding their

leadership beyond Europe.  Dutch strategic interests in the

Caribbean make them logical partners to counter Venezuelan

meddling in the region.  They are expanding their military

involvement in Africa, in part to provide a secure

environment for their robust development assistance program,

and in part to add "eyes and ears" on the ground.  In the

Middle East, the Dutch enjoy good relations with Israel and

the Palestinians and would welcome a more active role; they

quickly promised funds for an expanded Multinational Observer

Force (MFO) and might, under the right circumstances, commit

troops.  Even in areas where we disagree, such as drugs and

trafficking in persons, Dutch views may be shifting.  As the

headquarters for major international legal institutions, the

Netherlands offers a unique opportunity for advancing foreign

policy goals far beyond Dutch borders.

3. (S)  (SUMMARY CONTINUED)  The coalition government, headed

by PM Balkenende, is naturally inclined to work closely with

the U.S.  The balance could shift toward Brussels, however,

if a center-left government comes to power in 2007 (or

earlier), as predicted by most polls.  The nearly one million

Muslim immigrants are largely non-integrated, which is

forcing the Dutch to question long-standing assumptions about

Dutch "tolerance" and "identity."  The murder of Theo van

Gogh focused attention on Islamic extremism, and the Dutch

feel they are ahead of much of Europe in addressing this

growing problem.  Strengthening U.S.-Dutch ties across the

political spectrum is necessary to ensure that the Dutch

continue to enlist others to pursue interests in line with

the U.S., especially in the political-military sphere.  Early

and active consultations are the key to harnessing Dutch

energies in enhanced pursuit of U.S. interests.  END SUMMARY.

LEADERS IN EUROPE

-----------------

4. (S)  Along with the British, the Dutch form a strong,

reliable transatlantic anchor in Europe.  As a founding

member of NATO, one of the original six members of the EU,

and Britain's strongest ally on continent, the Dutch are an

influential voice in Europe despite having a population of

just under 16 million.  Prime Minister Balkenende states

often that the Dutch "take their responsibilities seriously"

and therefore expect to be heard.  While the Dutch "no" to

the EU's constitutional treaty embarrassed Balkenende, the

vote revealed that the search for EU integration and

consensus has its limits, capping a trend that started in the

90's with then Liberal Party leader (and later EU

Commissioner) Fritz Bolkestein's proposals to redefine the

scope of European integration to protect Dutch national

interests.

5. (S) With the French-German engine of European integration

stalled, German elections pending, and the EU unable to agree

on finances, leadership opportunities for the Dutch are

growing.  This trend is enhanced by the gravitation of EU

decision making to smaller groups, as Dutch participation can

make or break internal groupings.  The Dutch and Italian

refusal to attend a "group of six" meeting recently proposed

by Schroeder, for example, effectively squelched his

initiative.  The British Ambassador here recently confided

that Blair sees the Dutch as essential to pursuing his

European objectives and ensuring that transatlantic relations

remain high on the European agenda.  The leaders of the

Netherlands, UK, Norway, Denmark, and Sweden already meet

quietly several times a year to coordinate positions prior to

EU Council and other high-level EU meetings.

6. (S) Dutch leadership within the EU does not weaken their

commitment to NATO, where they are "go-to guys" for resolving

potential EU-NATO conflicts.  Their active, if often behind

the scenes, support for NATO SYG (and former Dutch Foreign

Minister) Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, as well as their commitment

to the NRF (and SRF, ISAF, and NTM-I), have helped push back

efforts, such as Tervuren, which might otherwise create

tensions between the NRF and EU battlegroups or other

emerging ESDP capabilities.  Foreign Minister Bot recently

proposed restructuring NATO's decision-making and funding

mechanisms to make them more effective.  The appointment of

Herman Schaper, the former deputy director general of

political affairs at the Dutch MFA and a good friend of the

U.S., as the new Dutch permrep to NATO should create more

opportunities for productive cooperation.

POLITICAL-MILITARY COOPERATION BEYOND THE EU

--------------------------------------------

7. (S) The Dutch are increasingly aware that strategic

interests outside Europe warrant their attention and

leadership, especially in the political-military sphere.  For

example:

- Venezuela:  The Dutch have strategic interests in the

Caribbean (i.e., the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba) and are

deeply concerned about Chavez' meddling in the region.  As a

Caribbean power, the Dutch have good reasons to lead an

effort to balance traditional Spanish dominance on Latin

American issues in the EU, but the U.S. and others will need

to push them to take this role.  The Dutch are active

partners in regional drug enforcement efforts, and recently

demonstrated their ability to deploy military forces (F-16's)

on short notice.  Persuading the Dutch to counter Chavez's

destabilization efforts more actively would give us a

reliable European partner in the region.

- Afghanistan:  According to CENTCOM, the Dutch took a strong

lead in organizing and soliciting forces to staff ISAF Phase

III, and are now preparing to deploy up to 1,400 personnel in

conjunction with British, Canadian, and possibly Australian

forces.  Separately, the Dutch deployment of Special Forces

in a combat role represents a major shift in Dutch priorities

away from peace-keeping to combat missions for the first time

since the 1960's.  The Dutch remain a strong supporter in the

war on terrorism in Afghanistan.  We should encourage them

both to continue to make significant contributions, and to

push others to do more.

- Africa:  Senior Dutch military officials say they are

considering expanding their military presence in Africa to

include Burundi, Rwanda, Eastern Congo, Botswana, Zambia, and

Ivory Coast, adding new "eyes and ears" on the ground.  The

Dutch have requested embedding a cell at EUCOM (similar to

that already operating in CENTCOM) to coordinate their

actions with the U.S. and other allies.  One objective of the

Dutch military deployments is to provide a secure environment

for what is already one of the most ambitious assistance ( Ontwikkelingshulp) 

programs in the world.  The Dutch are the fourth largest

provider of assistance to Africa world-wide.  In 2005 they

established a 110 million Euro Stability Fund for security

sector reform in the African Great Lakes Region and Sudan (as

well as Afghanistan and Iraq.)  Dutch deployments in Africa

have solid support in Parliament, while the focus on security

as an aspect of development provides an attractive

justification for potential European partners.  We should not

only encourage the Dutch to increase their direct involvement

in Africa, but also explore whether the Dutch could act as a

"clearinghouse" for other interested parties.

- Iraq:  The Dutch were instrumental in providing early

logistic support to U.S. forces in Iraq (including permitting

transshipments through Rotterdam when other ports in Europe

would not.)  The Dutch deployed 1,200 troops directly to the

southern province of al-Muthanna for 20 months, including two

controversial extensions.  Although the Dutch have since

withdrawn from al-Muthanna, their presence provided the

political and military cover necessary for Japan to commit

forces.  The Dutch provided 25 trainers for the NATO Training

Mission in Iraq, and have offered to provide up to 100 if

other countries would make comparable contributions.  We

should urge the Dutch to continue to push their EU and NATO

partners to do more in Iraq.

- Middle East:  The Dutch enjoy a reputation for "balance"

almost unique in Europe, as they are strong supporters of

Israel, yet trusted by Arabs.  Given Foreign Minister Bot's

expressed willingness to take a more active regional role.

We should look for opportunities to harness Dutch interest

through participation in the Forum for the Future and other

initiatives.  The Dutch have already promised to make a

financial contribution to an expanded Multinational Observer

Force (MFO) if asked, and, under the right circumstances,

might be prepared to send peace-keepers to the region as well.

8. (S) These commitments demonstrate how the Dutch "take

their responsibilities seriously" in practice by committing

real resources -- money, troops, hardware, and political

capital -- to tackle real problems, as well as their

"multiplier" effect in the political-military realm. The fact

that the Dutch are providing the head (Peter Feith) and

observers to the EU's new monitoring mission in Aceh is the

latest example of their assuming leadership of an important

international mission in a region where they feel special

ties (as witnessed by FM Bot's historic decision this year to

attend the commemoration of Indonesian independence, the

first such visit by a senior Dutch official since Indonesian

independence).

9. (S) The Dutch have one of the largest, most geographically

diverse deployments of military forces in the world, with

more troops deployed as a percentage of their total forces

than any other ally.  Defense Minister Kamp and CHOD Berlijn

recently restructured the Dutch military to eliminate layers

of bureaucracy, including independent service chiefs, thereby

creating a leaner, more deployable force.  Kamp and Berlijn

believe firmly in the "use or lose" principle, and have

accordingly sought increasingly challenging operations --

such as the Special Forces deployment to Afghanistan and

potential operations in sub-Saharan Africa.  Their desire to

maximize the military's capabilities and their preference for

U.S. equipment, even when alternative European suppliers

exist, make the Dutch strong supporters of the Joint Strike

Fighter (JSF) program.  The Dutch are one of only two

countries (Italy is the other) whose financial contributions

merit Tier II status in JSF development.  Berlijn is pushing

to lock in an early commitment for 50 planes (out of a total

of 85) to prevent JSF from becoming an issue in the 2007

elections.  The Dutch are also seeking Tactical Tomahawks for

Dutch frigates, additional lift capacity (CH-47, C-130,

KDC-10), and are continuing to update their remaining

hardware (AH-64D, F-16's, Patriot Missile System, etc.) all

of which are focused on meeting their Prague Capability

Commitment objectives as well as their ability to sustain

extended expeditionary operations outside the European

theater.

COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION

----------------------------

10. (S) Faced with growing threats in their own country, as

witnessed by the murder of Theo van Gogh in November 2004,

the Dutch believe they are in the forefront of Europe with

regard to counterterrorism, arguing that legislation and

other steps earlier adopted by the Dutch are only now being

considered in countries like the UK and Italy.  Led by

Justice Minister Donner and Finance Minister Zalm, the Dutch

were the first in Europe to implement the Container Security

Initiative (CSI), Radiological Gates, DOE's Megaports

program, U.S. Customs' Green Lane Program, and, soon, Trusted

Flyers.  China has engaged the Dutch on next generation

protocols and standards for transport security, includng RFID

technology.  It will be important to monitor and work with

the Dutch as they work with China.  The Dutch have also

expressed an interest to participate in DHS's "Centers of

Excellence."  While the EU was arguing with us and itself

over releasing personal records to airlines, the Dutch

allowed U.S. immigration teams (IAP) to operate at Schipol

airport.  The Dutch were instrumental in pushing the EU in

2003 to designate Hamas in its entirety as a terrorist

entity; an EU-wide designation of the Dutch branch of the

Al-Aqsa followed.  During their EU Presidency the Dutch

hosted an EU-wide seminar to raise awareness of terrorist

financing issues and have offered to host a major

international conference on the same subject in 2006. The

Dutch continue to push for EU designation of Hizballah in its

entirety and to strengthen the EU's "Clearinghouse"

designation process.  Given their record, we should continue

to look to the Dutch to launch joint pilot programs in

Europe, and, more generally, to push counterterrorism issues

to the top of the European agenda more generally.

DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

----------------------

11. (S)  The Netherlands is among the world's leading aid

donors, having budgeted USD 4.2 billion (0.74 percent of GDP,

with a target of raising it to 0.8 percent) in assistance in

2004.  It is a top donor of unearmarked assistance to UN

humanitarian programs.  In 2003, the Netherlands introduced a

more focused aid strategy, which phased out smaller aid

programs in wealthier countries.  Dutch bilateral aid is now

directed to 36 partner countries, including 18 in Africa.  In

2003, President Bush and Prime Minister Balkenende signed an

MOU to coordinate HIV/AIDS programs in Ghana, Zambia, Rwanda

and Ethiopia that emphasizes public-private partnerships.

Balkenende recently expressed interest in using the

Millennium Challenge Corporation as a model for promoting

public-private partnerships world-wide.  USAID's involvement

with a Heineken AIDS treatment and education program in

Rwanda has been particularly successful, and the World Bank

has adopted it as a model.  Dutch creativity and credibility

in development makes them good potential partners for future

joint initiatives with the U.S.  We should also take

advantage of their experience and insights to help shift

global aid efforts in the direction of sustainable long-term

development.

CENTER OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS

--------------------------------------------

12. (S) With the International Court of Justice (ICJ),

International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia

(ICTY), the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), the

Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, the International Criminal Court

(ICC) and other international legal institutions all located

in The Hague, our ability to have an impact in the

Netherlands on international issues ranging from Iraq to the

Balkans is unique.  With a historical interest in

international law dating back to Grotius, the Dutch view

themselves as natural defenders of international legal norms

and practices.  This tradition made them the perfect hosts

for a conference of Iraqi judges in The Hague in 2004, and

has pushed them to the forefront of international efforts to

train a new generation of Iraqi jurists.  While their

legalistic approach can be frustrating, they are flexible.

Their concerns about U.S. interpretations of the Geneva

Protocols have not prevented their Special Forces from

deploying in Afghanistan.   the Cuban-sponsored resolution on Guantanamo

at the Human Rights Commission last year despite concerns

about the treatment of detainees.  But, as Foreign Minister

Bot told Deputy Secretary Zoellick recently, over the long

run Dutch human rights concerns must be addressed to ensure

that public and parliamentary support does not erode; we and

the Dutch need to work together to resolve this concern.

Finally, the Dutch combination of seeking pragmatic solutions

while remaining true to their legal principles could make the

Dutch an important asset in resolving our differences with

the EU over the ICC and article 98 agreements under the right

circumstances.

ECONOMICS AND TRADE

-------------------

13. (S) Balkenende shares our interest in promoting an open

international trading system and has been an ally in U.S.-EU

trade disputes such as Boeing-Airbus and the Foreign Sales

Corporation Tax.  The Dutch share with the British a vision

of a market-friendly Europe driven by free trade.  They are

the third largest investor in the U.S. and the fourth largest

recipient of U.S. investment world-wide.  Their efforts to

shift the Lisbon agenda in a more cooperative direction and

to promote innovation and competition are creating additional

opportunities for U.S. investors in Europe.  Because the

Netherlands has one of the highest broadband penetrations in

Europe, emerging research efforts in the areas of

nanotechnology, life sciences, and other IT-related areas,

and a new tax treaty, the country offers U.S. companies an

important gateway into Europe.
If consulted early and regularly, the Netherlands can also be an important ally in navigating the EU's regulatory environment and removing

obstacles.

DRUGS AND TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS

--------------------------------

14. (S) Narcotics and trafficking in persons remain areas of

difficulty.  Despite fundamental differences regarding "soft

drugs" and legalized prostitution, the Balkenende government

has worked to prevent these differences from defining our

relationship.  There are also signs that Dutch attitudes may

be shifting.  The Dutch remain a major producer of synthetic

drugs.  On the other hand, Dutch Health Minister Hoogevorst

recently signed a precedent-setting MOU with the U.S. to

share information on the health risks of new strains of

marijuana with higher concentrations of THC, which may

convince the Dutch to rethink their approach to "soft drugs"

in general.  The Dutch are addressing drug tourism -- a

recent proposal to restrict the sale of marijuana to Dutch

passport holders in Maastricht, for example, could cut down

on cross-border smuggling and other drug-related crime.  We

should support such initiatives actively.

BALKENENDE SOLID INTERNATIONALLY...

-----------------------------------

15. (S)  We are fortunate to have in the Balkenende

government an outward-looking partner for whom working with

the U.S. and the U.K. comes naturally.  Balkenende and FM Bot

take pride in building bridges between the U.S. and Europe.

Nowhere was this more evident than during the Dutch

presidency of the EU.  On two issues of great importance to

the U.S. -- the China Arms Embargo and accession talks for

Turkey -- the Dutch moved, with our active urging, from

following an EU "consensus" set by others to redefining the

issue on their, and our, terms.  In both cases, Bot and

Balkenende overcame initial skepticism and concluded that

Dutch and U.S. interests coincided -- a pattern we have seen

repeated on other less important issues.  FM Bot began the EU

presidency telling us that lifting the Arms Embargo was a

"done deal."  Later, however, he actively intervened to

prevent a lift on "his" watch, saying that he did not want

the blame for causing a rift between the U.S. and EU.

Despite Balkenende's personal skepticism about bringing

Turkey into the EU, he and Bot (a former Ambassador to

Turkey) worked hard to ensure that Turkey got its date to

start accession talks with the EU during the Dutch

presidency, and want to see the agreement they helped

negotiate successfully implemented.  We will want the Dutch

to continue to draw on the relationships they developed

during the presidency to coax both sides to move in the right

direction as October 3 approaches.

16. (S) Specific U.S. policies provoke squalls of anger and

frustration here, but President Bush's visit to the

Netherlands in 2005 to commemorate V-E day at the WWII Dutch

American Cemetery at Margraten was met with universal acclaim

and provoked remarkably little protest.  Even Dutch opposed

to U.S. policies warmly welcomed the visit as a reminder of

enduring, shared values forged in the crucibles of World War

II and the Cold War.  This mission has pursued an ambitious

program of outreach to future Dutch leaders to ensure that

these emotions are passed to the next generation.  In this

effort, the President's youth roundtable in Maastricht and

former Secretary of State Powell's town hall meeting with

young leaders in The Hague were notable successes, which can

serve as models for future efforts.  Given the

disproportionate influence wielded by the Dutch in

international fora, we should expand our active exchange

programs (including the Fulbright and International Visitor

Leadership Programs) to help shape the successor generation.

...BUT FACES DOMESTIC CHALLENGES

--------------------------------

17. (S) Unfortunately, the outward-looking, transatlantic

orientation of the Balkenende cabinet is offset domestically

by strong strains of Euro-centralism and Dutch-provincialism.

 This division will become more pronounced as the parties

prepare for local elections in March 2006, and national

elections in May 2007.  Current polls show that Balkenende's

center-right coalition (his second government) is falling in

the polls, while the main, center-left opposition Labor party

(PvdA) and fringes on the right and left are gaining.

Balkenende is gambling that his economic reform agenda will

pay dividends in time for the 2007 elections, but that is

uncertain.  There is a strong chance that a center-left

government dominated by the PvdA will come to power in 2007

-- or earlier if the 2006 local election results prompt

national elections.

18. (S) Although U.S.-Dutch relations should remain

fundamentally sound despite a shift to the center-left, a

PvdA-led government would present new challenges.  PvdA

leader Wouter Bos has made clear his tendency to look to

Brussels first in setting Dutch international priorities.  He

sees the Netherlands less as a transatlantic "bridge builder"

than as a follower of EU consensus.  As with Schroeder in

Germany, Bos might also find it tempting to adopt a critical

attitude toward the U.S. during elections to lock in his left

flank.  The PvdA is already raising allegations of U.S.

abuses to challenge the rationale for Dutch deployments in

Afghanistan, and does not support the JSF program.  It is in

our interest both to support the current government's

transatlantic orientation and to engage actively with the

opposition to shift them in a favorable direction.

THE ISLAMIC FACTOR

------------------

19. (S) A new, but potentially serious factor in Dutch

domestic politics is its large, poorly integrated Muslim

population, currently numbering just under 1 million, or 5.8

percent of the population.  USG-sponsored polls show that 83

percent of Dutch Muslims identify much more strongly with

their religion than with their host country, while 51 percent

have little or no faith in the Dutch government as an

institution.  While the problems of Dutch integration

captured international headlines following the van Gogh

murder, the Dutch believe they have an early start on the

rest of Europe in seeking creative ways to address these

concerns.  Their strong interest in sharing and soliciting

ideas has opened up opportunities for Embassy and USG

outreach and consultations throughout Dutch society,

providing insights into a growing problem throughout Europe.

We expect our experiences here will provide good indications

of broader European trends as well as opportunities to

influence their direction.

CONCLUSIONS

-----------

20. (S)  The Netherlands is a complicated, multi-layered

society.  Prevailing myths about the Dutch -- e.g., they are

homogenous, universally tolerant, pacifist, etc.-- do not

accurately gauge differences within society or reflect Dutch

potential to influence international events.  While the Dutch

prefer to see themselves as "balancing" between Europe and

the U.S., this balance can shift due to domestic and

international factors.

21. (S) The key to maximizing Dutch effectiveness is to

involve them early through high-level consultations and

exchanges.  Dutch pragmatism and our similar world-views make

the Netherlands fertile ground for initiatives others in

Europe might be reluctant, at least initially, to embrace.

22. (S) As multipliers, the Dutch should be encouraged to

play an increasingly prominent role on the global stage.

Coaxing the Dutch into the spotlight can take effort, but

pays off royally.  Dutch credentials, credibility, and

capabilities make them effective leaders across a wide range

of geographic regions and substantive issues.

23. (S) The Dutch are actively and favorably involved in

Afghanistan, Africa, Iraq, the Middle East, the Balkans, the

Caribbean, Indonesia, and elsewhere.  They are our best

partner in developing pilot projects in the counterterrorism

area, and are world leaders in development, free trade,

international law and human rights.  In pursuit of U.S.

interests in all these areas of interest and leadership, we

should build upon our successes to date to take the Dutch to

the "next level."

SOBEL

AMBASSADOR'S PARTING THOUGHTS ON TAKING THE DUTCH TO THE NEXT LEVEL
Date: 2005 August 22, 17:01 (Monday)	Canonical ID: 05THEHAGUE2309_a
Original Classification: SECRET	Current Classification: SECRET
Handling Restrictions -- Not Assigned --	Character Count: 26597
Executive Order: -- Not Assigned --	Locator: TEXT ONLINE
TAGS: EAID - Economic Affairs--Foreign Assistance | ECON- Economic Affairs--Economic Conditions, Trends and Potential | EUN- European Communities |NL - Netherlands | PGOV - Political Affairs--Government; Internal Governmental Affairs |PREL - Political Affairs--External Political Relations |PTER - Political Affairs--Terrorists and Terrorism |USUN - United States Mission to the United Nations	Concepts: -- Not Assigned --
Enclosure: -- Not Assigned --	Type: TE - Telegram (cable)
Office Origin: -- N/A or Blank -- Office Action: -- N/A or Blank --	Archive Status: -- Not Assigned --
From: Netherlands The Hague	Markings: -- Not Assigned --
To: -- N/A or Blank --

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1. (S) SUMMARY: With the EU divided and its direction uncertain, the Dutch serve as a vital transatlantic anchor in Europe. As one of the original six EU members, the Dutch ally with the British to counter Franco-German efforts to steer Europe off a transatlantic course. The Netherlands' solid European and international credentials create a powerful "multiplier" effect. In Iraq, Dutch forces provided the physical and political cover for Japan to deploy and the Dutch are using their NATO Training Mission commitment to push others to do more. In Afghanistan, the Dutch drove much of the Phase III planning for ISAF and deployed Dutch troops in combat operations for the first time in more than 30 years. The Dutch have led Europe in launching pilot projects to strengthen international counterterrorism cooperation, and initiated the U.S.-EU dialogue on terrorist financing which laid the groundwork for a proposed major international Terrorism Financing Conference in 2006. 2. (S) (SUMMARY CONTINUED) The Dutch are expanding their leadership beyond Europe. Dutch strategic interests in the Caribbean make them logical partners to counter Venezuelan meddling in the region. They are expanding their military involvement in Africa, in part to provide a secure environment for their robust development assistance program, and in part to add "eyes and ears" on the ground. In the Middle East, the Dutch enjoy good relations with Israel and the Palestinians and would welcome a more active role; they quickly promised funds for an expanded Multinational Observer Force (MFO) and might, under the right circumstances, commit troops. Even in areas where we disagree, such as drugs and trafficking in persons, Dutch views may be shifting. As the headquarters for major international legal institutions, the Netherlands offers a unique opportunity for advancing foreign policy goals far beyond Dutch borders. 3. (S) (SUMMARY CONTINUED) The coalition government, headed by PM Balkenende, is naturally inclined to work closely with the U.S. The balance could shift toward Brussels, however, if a center-left government comes to power in 2007 (or earlier), as predicted by most polls. The nearly one million Muslim immigrants are largely non-integrated, which is forcing the Dutch to question long-standing assumptions about Dutch "tolerance" and "identity." The murder of Theo van Gogh focused attention on Islamic extremism, and the Dutch feel they are ahead of much of Europe in addressing this growing problem. Strengthening U.S.-Dutch ties across the political spectrum is necessary to ensure that the Dutch continue to enlist others to pursue interests in line with the U.S., especially in the political-military sphere. Early and active consultations are the key to harnessing Dutch energies in enhanced pursuit of U.S. interests. END SUMMARY. LEADERS IN EUROPE ----------------- 4. (S) Along with the British, the Dutch form a strong, reliable transatlantic anchor in Europe. As a founding member of NATO, one of the original six members of the EU, and Britain's strongest ally on continent, the Dutch are an influential voice in Europe despite having a population of just under 16 million. Prime Minister Balkenende states often that the Dutch "take their responsibilities seriously" and therefore expect to be heard. While the Dutch "no" to the EU's constitutional treaty embarrassed Balkenende, the vote revealed that the search for EU integration and consensus has its limits, capping a trend that started in the 90's with then Liberal Party leader (and later EU Commissioner) Fritz Bolkestein's proposals to redefine the scope of European integration to protect Dutch national interests. 5. (S) With the French-German engine of European integration stalled, German elections pending, and the EU unable to agree on finances, leadership opportunities for the Dutch are growing. This trend is enhanced by the gravitation of EU decision making to smaller groups, as Dutch participation can make or break internal groupings. The Dutch and Italian refusal to attend a "group of six" meeting recently proposed by Schroeder, for example, effectively squelched his initiative. The British Ambassador here recently confided that Blair sees the Dutch as essential to pursuing his European objectives and ensuring that transatlantic relations remain high on the European agenda. The leaders of the Netherlands, UK, Norway, Denmark, and Sweden already meet quietly several times a year to coordinate positions prior to EU Council and other high-level EU meetings. 6. (S) Dutch leadership within the EU does not weaken their commitment to NATO, where they are "go-to guys" for resolving potential EU-NATO conflicts. Their active, if often behind the scenes, support for NATO SYG (and former Dutch Foreign Minister) Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, as well as their commitment to the NRF (and SRF, ISAF, and NTM-I), have helped push back efforts, such as Tervuren, which might otherwise create tensions between the NRF and EU battlegroups or other emerging ESDP capabilities. Foreign Minister Bot recently proposed restructuring NATO's decision-making and funding mechanisms to make them more effective. The appointment of Herman Schaper, the former deputy director general of political affairs at the Dutch MFA and a good friend of the U.S., as the new Dutch permrep to NATO should create more opportunities for productive cooperation. POLITICAL-MILITARY COOPERATION BEYOND THE EU -------------------------------------------- 7. (S) The Dutch are increasingly aware that strategic interests outside Europe warrant their attention and leadership, especially in the political-military sphere. For example: - Venezuela: The Dutch have strategic interests in the Caribbean (i.e., the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba) and are deeply concerned about Chavez' meddling in the region. As a Caribbean power, the Dutch have good reasons to lead an effort to balance traditional Spanish dominance on Latin American issues in the EU, but the U.S. and others will need to push them to take this role. The Dutch are active partners in regional drug enforcement efforts, and recently demonstrated their ability to deploy military forces (F-16's) on short notice. Persuading the Dutch to counter Chavez's destabilization efforts more actively would give us a reliable European partner in the region. - Afghanistan: According to CENTCOM, the Dutch took a strong lead in organizing and soliciting forces to staff ISAF Phase III, and are now preparing to deploy up to 1,400 personnel in conjunction with British, Canadian, and possibly Australian forces. Separately, the Dutch deployment of Special Forces in a combat role represents a major shift in Dutch priorities away from peace-keeping to combat missions for the first time since the 1960's. The Dutch remain a strong supporter in the war on terrorism in Afghanistan. We should encourage them both to continue to make significant contributions, and to push others to do more. - Africa: Senior Dutch military officials say they are considering expanding their military presence in Africa to include Burundi, Rwanda, Eastern Congo, Botswana, Zambia, and Ivory Coast, adding new "eyes and ears" on the ground. The Dutch have requested embedding a cell at EUCOM (similar to that already operating in CENTCOM) to coordinate their actions with the U.S. and other allies. One objective of the Dutch military deployments is to provide a secure environment for what is already one of the most ambitious assistance programs in the world. The Dutch are the fourth largest provider of assistance to Africa world-wide. In 2005 they established a 110 million Euro Stability Fund for security sector reform in the African Great Lakes Region and Sudan (as well as Afghanistan and Iraq.) Dutch deployments in Africa have solid support in Parliament, while the focus on security as an aspect of development provides an attractive justification for potential European partners. We should not only encourage the Dutch to increase their direct involvement in Africa, but also explore whether the Dutch could act as a "clearinghouse" for other interested parties. - Iraq: The Dutch were instrumental in providing early logistic support to U.S. forces in Iraq (including permitting transshipments through Rotterdam when other ports in Europe would not.) The Dutch deployed 1,200 troops directly to the southern province of al-Muthanna for 20 months, including two controversial extensions. Although the Dutch have since withdrawn from al-Muthanna, their presence provided the political and military cover necessary for Japan to commit forces. The Dutch provided 25 trainers for the NATO Training Mission in Iraq, and have offered to provide up to 100 if other countries would make comparable contributions. We should urge the Dutch to continue to push their EU and NATO partners to do more in Iraq. - Middle East: The Dutch enjoy a reputation for "balance" almost unique in Europe, as they are strong supporters of Israel, yet trusted by Arabs. Given Foreign Minister Bot's expressed willingness to take a more active regional role. We should look for opportunities to harness Dutch interest through participation in the Forum for the Future and other initiatives. The Dutch have already promised to make a financial contribution to an expanded Multinational Observer Force (MFO) if asked, and, under the right circumstances, might be prepared to send peace-keepers to the region as well. 8. (S) These commitments demonstrate how the Dutch "take their responsibilities seriously" in practice by committing real resources -- money, troops, hardware, and political capital -- to tackle real problems, as well as their "multiplier" effect in the political-military realm. The fact that the Dutch are providing the head (Peter Feith) and observers to the EU's new monitoring mission in Aceh is the latest example of their assuming leadership of an important international mission in a region where they feel special ties (as witnessed by FM Bot's historic decision this year to attend the commemoration of Indonesian independence, the first such visit by a senior Dutch official since Indonesian independence). 9. (S) The Dutch have one of the largest, most geographically diverse deployments of military forces in the world, with more troops deployed as a percentage of their total forces than any other ally. Defense Minister Kamp and CHOD Berlijn recently restructured the Dutch military to eliminate layers of bureaucracy, including independent service chiefs, thereby creating a leaner, more deployable force. Kamp and Berlijn believe firmly in the "use or lose" principle, and have accordingly sought increasingly challenging operations -- such as the Special Forces deployment to Afghanistan and potential operations in sub-Saharan Africa. Their desire to maximize the military's capabilities and their preference for U.S. equipment, even when alternative European suppliers exist, make the Dutch strong supporters of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program. The Dutch are one of only two countries (Italy is the other) whose financial contributions merit Tier II status in JSF development. Berlijn is pushing to lock in an early commitment for 50 planes (out of a total of 85) to prevent JSF from becoming an issue in the 2007 elections. The Dutch are also seeking Tactical Tomahawks for Dutch frigates, additional lift capacity (CH-47, C-130, KDC-10), and are continuing to update their remaining hardware (AH-64D, F-16's, Patriot Missile System, etc.) all of which are focused on meeting their Prague Capability Commitment objectives as well as their ability to sustain extended expeditionary operations outside the European theater. COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION ---------------------------- 10. (S) Faced with growing threats in their own country, as witnessed by the murder of Theo van Gogh in November 2004, the Dutch believe they are in the forefront of Europe with regard to counterterrorism, arguing that legislation and other steps earlier adopted by the Dutch are only now being considered in countries like the UK and Italy. Led by Justice Minister Donner and Finance Minister Zalm, the Dutch were the first in Europe to implement the Container Security Initiative (CSI), Radiological Gates, DOE's Megaports program, U.S. Customs' Green Lane Program, and, soon, Trusted Flyers. China has engaged the Dutch on next generation protocols and standards for transport security, includng RFID technology. It will be important to monitor and work with the Dutch as they work with China. The Dutch have also expressed an interest to participate in DHS's "Centers of Excellence." While the EU was arguing with us and itself over releasing personal records to airlines, the Dutch allowed U.S. immigration teams (IAP) to operate at Schipol airport. The Dutch were instrumental in pushing the EU in 2003 to designate Hamas in its entirety as a terrorist entity; an EU-wide designation of the Dutch branch of the Al-Aqsa followed. During their EU Presidency the Dutch hosted an EU-wide seminar to raise awareness of terrorist financing issues and have offered to host a major international conference on the same subject in 2006. The Dutch continue to push for EU designation of Hizballah in its entirety and to strengthen the EU's "Clearinghouse" designation process. Given their record, we should continue to look to the Dutch to launch joint pilot programs in Europe, and, more generally, to push counterterrorism issues to the top of the European agenda more generally. DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE ---------------------- 11. (S) The Netherlands is among the world's leading aid donors, having budgeted USD 4.2 billion (0.74 percent of GDP, with a target of raising it to 0.8 percent) in assistance in 2004. It is a top donor of unearmarked assistance to UN humanitarian programs. In 2003, the Netherlands introduced a more focused aid strategy, which phased out smaller aid programs in wealthier countries. Dutch bilateral aid is now directed to 36 partner countries, including 18 in Africa. In 2003, President Bush and Prime Minister Balkenende signed an MOU to coordinate HIV/AIDS programs in Ghana, Zambia, Rwanda and Ethiopia that emphasizes public-private partnerships. Balkenende recently expressed interest in using the Millennium Challenge Corporation as a model for promoting public-private partnerships world-wide. USAID's involvement with a Heineken AIDS treatment and education program in Rwanda has been particularly successful, and the World Bank has adopted it as a model. Dutch creativity and credibility in development makes them good potential partners for future joint initiatives with the U.S. We should also take advantage of their experience and insights to help shift global aid efforts in the direction of sustainable long-term development. CENTER OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS -------------------------------------------- 12. (S) With the International Court of Justice (ICJ), International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, the International Criminal Court (ICC) and other international legal institutions all located in The Hague, our ability to have an impact in the Netherlands on international issues ranging from Iraq to the Balkans is unique. With a historical interest in international law dating back to Grotius, the Dutch view themselves as natural defenders of international legal norms and practices. This tradition made them the perfect hosts for a conference of Iraqi judges in The Hague in 2004, and has pushed them to the forefront of international efforts to train a new generation of Iraqi jurists. While their legalistic approach can be frustrating, they are flexible. Their concerns about U.S. interpretations of the Geneva Protocols have not prevented their Special Forces from deploying in Afghanistan. The Dutch also helped sway the EU to vote against the Cuban-sponsored resolution on Guantanamo at the Human Rights Commission last year despite concerns about the treatment of detainees. But, as Foreign Minister Bot told Deputy Secretary Zoellick recently, over the long run Dutch human rights concerns must be addressed to ensure that public and parliamentary support does not erode; we and the Dutch need to work together to resolve this concern. Finally, the Dutch combination of seeking pragmatic solutions while remaining true to their legal principles could make the Dutch an important asset in resolving our differences with the EU over the ICC and article 98 agreements under the right circumstances. ECONOMICS AND TRADE ------------------- 13. (S) Balkenende shares our interest in promoting an open international trading system and has been an ally in U.S.-EU trade disputes such as Boeing-Airbus and the Foreign Sales Corporation Tax. The Dutch share with the British a vision of a market-friendly Europe driven by free trade. They are the third largest investor in the U.S. and the fourth largest recipient of U.S. investment world-wide. Their efforts to shift the Lisbon agenda in a more cooperative direction and to promote innovation and competition are creating additional opportunities for U.S. investors in Europe. Because the Netherlands has one of the highest broadband penetrations in Europe, emerging research efforts in the areas of nanotechnology, life sciences, and other IT-related areas, and a new tax treaty, the country offers U.S. companies an important gateway into Europe. If consulted early and regularly, the Netherlands can also be an important ally in navigating the EU's regulatory environment and removing obstacles. DRUGS AND TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS -------------------------------- 14. (S) Narcotics and trafficking in persons remain areas of difficulty. Despite fundamental differences regarding "soft drugs" and legalized prostitution, the Balkenende government has worked to prevent these differences from defining our relationship. There are also signs that Dutch attitudes may be shifting. The Dutch remain a major producer of synthetic drugs. On the other hand, Dutch Health Minister Hoogevorst recently signed a precedent-setting MOU with the U.S. to share information on the health risks of new strains of marijuana with higher concentrations of THC, which may convince the Dutch to rethink their approach to "soft drugs" in general. The Dutch are addressing drug tourism -- a recent proposal to restrict the sale of marijuana to Dutch passport holders in Maastricht, for example, could cut down on cross-border smuggling and other drug-related crime. We should support such initiatives actively. BALKENENDE SOLID INTERNATIONALLY... ----------------------------------- 15. (S) We are fortunate to have in the Balkenende government an outward-looking partner for whom working with the U.S. and the U.K. comes naturally. Balkenende and FM Bot take pride in building bridges between the U.S. and Europe. Nowhere was this more evident than during the Dutch presidency of the EU. On two issues of great importance to the U.S. -- the China Arms Embargo and accession talks for Turkey -- the Dutch moved, with our active urging, from following an EU "consensus" set by others to redefining the issue on their, and our, terms. In both cases, Bot and Balkenende overcame initial skepticism and concluded that Dutch and U.S. interests coincided -- a pattern we have seen repeated on other less important issues. FM Bot began the EU presidency telling us that lifting the Arms Embargo was a "done deal." Later, however, he actively intervened to prevent a lift on "his" watch, saying that he did not want the blame for causing a rift between the U.S. and EU. Despite Balkenende's personal skepticism about bringing Turkey into the EU, he and Bot (a former Ambassador to Turkey) worked hard to ensure that Turkey got its date to start accession talks with the EU during the Dutch presidency, and want to see the agreement they helped negotiate successfully implemented. We will want the Dutch to continue to draw on the relationships they developed during the presidency to coax both sides to move in the right direction as October 3 approaches. 16. (S) Specific U.S. policies provoke squalls of anger and frustration here, but President Bush's visit to the Netherlands in 2005 to commemorate V-E day at the WWII Dutch American Cemetery at Margraten was met with universal acclaim and provoked remarkably little protest. Even Dutch opposed to U.S. policies warmly welcomed the visit as a reminder of enduring, shared values forged in the crucibles of World War II and the Cold War. This mission has pursued an ambitious program of outreach to future Dutch leaders to ensure that these emotions are passed to the next generation. In this effort, the President's youth roundtable in Maastricht and former Secretary of State Powell's town hall meeting with young leaders in The Hague were notable successes, which can serve as models for future efforts. Given the disproportionate influence wielded by the Dutch in international fora, we should expand our active exchange programs (including the Fulbright and International Visitor Leadership Programs) to help shape the successor generation. ...BUT FACES DOMESTIC CHALLENGES -------------------------------- 17. (S) Unfortunately, the outward-looking, transatlantic orientation of the Balkenende cabinet is offset domestically by strong strains of Euro-centralism and Dutch-provincialism. This division will become more pronounced as the parties prepare for local elections in March 2006, and national elections in May 2007. Current polls show that Balkenende's center-right coalition (his second government) is falling in the polls, while the main, center-left opposition Labor party (PvdA) and fringes on the right and left are gaining. Balkenende is gambling that his economic reform agenda will pay dividends in time for the 2007 elections, but that is uncertain. There is a strong chance that a center-left government dominated by the PvdA will come to power in 2007 -- or earlier if the 2006 local election results prompt national elections. 18. (S) Although U.S.-Dutch relations should remain fundamentally sound despite a shift to the center-left, a PvdA-led government would present new challenges. PvdA leader Wouter Bos has made clear his tendency to look to Brussels first in setting Dutch international priorities. He sees the Netherlands less as a transatlantic "bridge builder" than as a follower of EU consensus. As with Schroeder in Germany, Bos might also find it tempting to adopt a critical attitude toward the U.S. during elections to lock in his left flank. The PvdA is already raising allegations of U.S. abuses to challenge the rationale for Dutch deployments in Afghanistan, and does not support the JSF program. It is in our interest both to support the current government's transatlantic orientation and to engage actively with the opposition to shift them in a favorable direction. THE ISLAMIC FACTOR ------------------ 19. (S) A new, but potentially serious factor in Dutch domestic politics is its large, poorly integrated Muslim population, currently numbering just under 1 million, or 5.8 percent of the population. USG-sponsored polls show that 83 percent of Dutch Muslims identify much more strongly with their religion than with their host country, while 51 percent have little or no faith in the Dutch government as an institution. While the problems of Dutch integration captured international headlines following the van Gogh murder, the Dutch believe they have an early start on the rest of Europe in seeking creative ways to address these concerns. Their strong interest in sharing and soliciting ideas has opened up opportunities for Embassy and USG outreach and consultations throughout Dutch society, providing insights into a growing problem throughout Europe. We expect our experiences here will provide good indications of broader European trends as well as opportunities to influence their direction. CONCLUSIONS ----------- 20. (S) The Netherlands is a complicated, multi-layered society. Prevailing myths about the Dutch -- e.g., they are homogenous, universally tolerant, pacifist, etc.-- do not accurately gauge differences within society or reflect Dutch potential to influence international events. While the Dutch prefer to see themselves as "balancing" between Europe and the U.S., this balance can shift due to domestic and international factors. 21. (S) The key to maximizing Dutch effectiveness is to involve them early through high-level consultations and exchanges. Dutch pragmatism and our similar world-views make the Netherlands fertile ground for initiatives others in Europe might be reluctant, at least initially, to embrace. 22. (S) As multipliers, the Dutch should be encouraged to play an increasingly prominent role on the global stage. Coaxing the Dutch into the spotlight can take effort, but pays off royally. Dutch credentials, credibility, and capabilities make them effective leaders across a wide range of geographic regions and substantive issues. 23. (S) The Dutch are actively and favorably involved in Afghanistan, Africa, Iraq, the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caribbean, Indonesia, and elsewhere. They are our best partner in developing pilot projects in the counterterrorism area, and are world leaders in development, free trade, international law and human rights. In pursuit of U.S. interests in all these areas of interest and leadership, we should build upon our successes to date to take the Dutch to the "next level." SOBEL