Saturday, May 17, 2014

349 The Odessa massacre was done by the Kiev regime.

This blog: http://tiny.cc/6w01fx

UPDATE on 18 may:  
Dear reader, 
I am too busy to read the news that came out today and yesterday, but I will give the links: 

From Voltaire net:  http://www.globalresearch.ca/ukraine-oligarch-ihor-kolomoisky-offers-1-million-to-murder-federalist-leader-oleg-tsarev/5382749

Washingon's blog: http://www.globalresearch.ca/is-the-west-directly-responsible-for-the-massacres-in-ukraine/5382769

Eric Zuesse: http://www.globalresearch.ca/oligarch-ihor-kolomoyskyi-washingtons-man-in-ukraine/5382766

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UPDATE 22 may : a video and some text whioch I saw on The Saker's blog:

Here's a vid of the labor hall in Odessa. This is one of the main leaders of maidan, voice easily recognizable. He clearly states when going through the labor union hall that 'it's just like labor union hall in maidan, piles of bodies'. They burned that building in Kiev and right sector left their prisoners in the building to burn alive, handcuffed and some shackled to heating system pipes on the floor occupied by right sector. Notice the bright sunlight at the beginning as right sector is coming downstairs and the 'burn boy' who had just set the stairs on fire. His task was to burn the faces and hands of the bodies found, some he burned alive. The sunlight shows right sector was in the building well before the main crowds got there, ergo the massacre was planned well in advance as we all know.


====
Through sound reasoning it was clear that it must have been Kiev who planned to kill 40 people in Odessa  ( or was it 120 people?)
For this reason: essential in the killings were the radical people like Cantauer Mikola and people from the Right Sector who were mingled  amongst the footbalfans during the pro-Kiev demonstration.

It was Mikola and his friends who openly did shoot at the people who jumped out of the burning building. It was he and his friends who knocked to dead the people who had fallen on the ground, with base ball sticks, as we see on the video.
Even hardcore hooligans will not create a massacre and kill 40 to 120 people. They were angry, but not that angry as we can see on the video's.

If they were only football fans and hooligans, the crowd probably had been running away when they were shot at by the 'Orange Ribbon pro Russians' , whom I consider AP ( Agent Provocateurs)

Here is a recent message about two phone calls that were intercepted, ands which prove that mr Kolomoisky was the one who organised it all:

Below that you find a message that I wrote in DeJoop, ion which I come to the conclusion that it can never be Putin who organised the massacre. ( It is in Dutch)

======================================================

Bloodbath in Odessa Guided by Interim Rulers of Ukraine 

By Antifascist

May 16 2014 "ICH" - "OR" -  The information provided below was obtained from an insider in one of Ukraine’s law-enforcement agencies, who wished to remain anonymous for obvious reasons. It is clear that there are people even within the interim administration in Kiev who are against ofwhat happened in Odessa on May 2 and throughout the whole country

Scheming
After the loss of Crimea and the popular uprising in Mariupol, Odessa is now Ukraine’s only gateway to the sea, thus making it the most important city in the country after Kiev.
Ten days before the tragedy a secret meeting was held in Kiev, chaired by the incumbent president Olexander Turchinov, to prepare a special operation in Odessa. Present were minister of internal affairs Arsen Avakov, the head of the Ukrainian Security Service Valentin Nalivaychenko, and the secretary of the National Security and Defense Council Andriy Parubiy. Ukrainian oligarch Ihor Kolomoiskiy, the Kiev-appointed head of regional administration of the Dnepropetrovsk region, was consulted in regard to the operation.
During that meeting Arsen Avakov has reportedly came up with the idea of using football hooligans, known as “ultras,” in the operation. Ever since his time as the head of the Kharkov regional administration he has worked closely with the fans leaders, whom he continued to sponsor even from his new home in Italy.
Kolomoisky temporarily delivered his private “Dnieper-1” Battalion under the command of law-enforcement officials in Odessa and also authorized a cash payment of $5,000 for “each pro-Russian separatist” killed during the special operation.

Mykola Volvov was wanted by the Ukrainian police since 2012 for fraud.
A couple of days before the operation in Odessa Andriy Parubiy brought dozens of bullet-proof vests to local ultra-nationalists. This video shows an episode of handing the vests to the local Maidan activists in Odessa. Take note of the person who receives the load. He is Mykola Volkov, a local hard-core criminal who would be repeatedly screened during the assault on Trade Unionist House gun-shooting at the people and reporting about the “incident” by phone to an official in Kiev.

Preparations
Ultranationalist militants from the extremist Ukrainian National Assembly (UNA-UNSO), who could be recognized by their red armbands, were also used during the operation. They were assigned a key role in the staging of the provocations: they masqueraded as the defenders of the tent city on Kulikovo Field, and then lured its occupants to the House of Trade Unions to be slaughtered.
Fifteen roadblocks were set up outside of Odessa, secured by militants under the personal command of Kolomoisky’s “Dnieper-1” Battalion, as well as Right Sector’s thugs from Dnepropetrovsk and the western regions of Ukraine. In addition, two military units from the Self-Defense of Maidan arrived in Odessa, under the command of the acting head of the administration of the president, Sergey Pashinsky – the same man who was caught with a sniper rifle in the trunk of his car on Feb. 18 on Independence Square (Maidan) in Kiev. Pashinsky later claimed that he had not been fully informed about the plans for the operation and had dispatched his men only to “protect the people of Odessa.”Thus, there were a total of about 1,400 fighters from other regions of Ukraine in the vicinity at the time –thus countering the idea that there were “residents of Odessa” who burned down the House of Trade Unions.
Deputy chief of Odessa police and principle coordinator of the operation Dmitry Fucheji mysteriously
disappeared soon after the tragedy in Odessa.
The role of the Odessa police forces in the operation was personally directed by the head of the regional police, Petr Lutsyuk, and his deputy Dmitry Fucheji. Lutsyuk was assigned the task of neutralizing Odessa’s regional governor, Vladimir Nemirovsky, to prevent him from putting together an independent strategy that could disrupt the operation. Fucheji led the militants right to Greek Square where he was allegedly “wounded” (in order to evade responsibility for subsequent events).
The operation was originally scheduled for May 2 – the day of a soccer match, which would justify the presence of a large number of sports fans (“ultras”) downtown and would also mean there would be a minimal number of Odessa residents on the streets who were not involved in the operation, since the majority of the city’s population would be out of town enjoying their May Day holidays.

Operation
Train from Kharkov arrived in Odessa on May 2 at 8.00 am carrying fans of the Metallist soccer club, including some “ultras” who were taking part in the operation. In addition, militants from the “Dnieper-1” Battalion and Right Sector simultaneously entered the city in small groups. Some of the Self-Defense of Maidan militants also arrived from Kiev, most of them by cars. That day the Odessa police were under strict orders not to stop cars with license plates from Kiev, Dnipropetrovsk, and Lvov.
In the afternoon, some of the fighters headed toward Sobornaya Square, where those taking part in the “March for a United Ukraine” were scheduled to gather. Their task was to organize the crowd and lead them to the barricades on Greek Square. A “special operations” group adorned with St. George ribbons donned their balaclavas and marched down Alexandrovsky Avenue. These were the “pro-Russian activists” seen in numerous photos and videos. The provocateurs wore red armbands on their sleeves in order to distinguish themselves from the real, Odessa-based activists. Likewise, the police who had insider information about the details of the operation sported red armbands as well.Unfortunately, some of the real activists, who were not privy to that information, gave in to the provocateurs’ urgings and rushed off to “stop the fascists”.
Many eyewitnesses recorded what happened next. With the support of the police, the supposedly “pro-Russian” provocateurs lined up near the “Afina” shopping center at the intersection of Greek str. and Vice Admiral Zhukov line, where provocateurs from among the soccer fans, including those representing Right Sector and UNA-UNSO, attacked them (which was confirmed even by the pro-Maidan observers). Firearms were used by both sides and both sides suffered fatalities.
The task of distracting the “honest” soccer fans from the game and directing the crowd toward Kulikovo Field had been fully accomplished. The provocateurs that had incited the crowd then retreated to the “Afina” shopping center, where they were later taken away by the police. They had suffered injuries but no fatalities.
While the confrontations were underway on Greek Square, a group of Right Sector thugs were readying the main part of the operation, code-named “Ha’ola” – from the phrase “Mizbeach Ha’ola”, which in Hebrew means “the altar of burnt offering”. They slipped into the House of Trade Unions through the back entrance and fortified their positions in the basement and the attic. This group contained only proven fighters who were experienced killers.
While the masses were moving through the city’s center from Greek Square to Kulikovo Field, some of the provocateurs got into cars and sped ahead of most of the crowd, rushing into the tent camp and inciting a panic by shouting “Right Sector is on its way!” and “They’re coming to kill you!” and so on. Led by the provocateurs, many activists entered the House of Trade Unions instead of scattering throughout the city. Some of them went down to the basement from which no one emerged alive – there they were tortured, killed, and butchered with machetes. Others headed upstairs. Gasoline was mixed with napalm to form deadly, acrid carbon monoxide. The recipe for these deadly cocktails was created by chemists from Independence Square, but they were not used there. In Odessa, the mixture was employed for the first time and this was no accident: a massacre with a large number of fatalities was needed in order to terrorize the entire country.
The “battle” for the House of Trade Unions lasted several hours – during which time some of the militants pretended to mount a resistance by tossing Molotov cocktails from the roof, while others methodically butchered, strangled, and incinerated their victims. In order to ensure that the fire could not be extinguished, water was completely shut off to the building.
After “Ha’ola” was complete, the Right Sector murderers fled the building through the side and rear exits and left town. The police then entered the structure. The number that became the official death toll – 46 – included only the dead on the upper floors of the building. The majority of the victims, who were in the basement, were not counted. The exact number of dead is unlikely to ever be known, but most sources claim that between 120 and 130 were killed.

The truth cannot be concealed
The junta has privatized the police and the security service, but forgot about the prosecutor’s office. And now the acting attorney general, Oleh Makhnitsky has stated:
“This action [in Odessa] was not prepared at some internal level, it was a well-planned and coordinated action in which some authorities’ representatives have taken part.”
It is unlikely that he will be permitted to name those who are truly responsible for the tragedy. But the junta in Kiev will not be able to completely conceal the truth about what happened in Odessa. This tragedy should be thoroughly investigated and those culpable should be brought to the international trial for committed crimes against humanity. Nuremberg-2 is waiting for Turchinov & Co.


Source in Russian: Antifascist

Translated and adapted by ORIENTAL REVIEW

OR’ UPDATE May 15, 2014 10.25 pm (MSK)
Two extremely important phone intercepts were made public today:
First is the telephone call of the Ukrainian oligarch of the Jewish origin Ihor Kolomoisky to former Ukrainian presidential candidate Oleg Tsarev, who is now leading the anti-fascist South-East resistance movement opposing Kiev’s junta. During the two-minutes talk Kolomoisky notes that a Jewish military man from Dnepropetrovsk (this region is currently a Kolomoisky’s barony) was killed on May 9 during clashes in Mariupol and warned Tsarev that the Jewish community in the city announced a bounty of 1 million US$ for Tsarev’s head. Kolomoisky also advised Tsarev to leave Ukraine. Full recording (in Russian):
Later today another related talk was leaked to Internet. A close friend of Tsarev Oleg Noginsky was talking to the honorary consul of Israel in Ukraine Ian Epstein. Noginsky informs him about this Kolomoisky’s call to Tsarev and asks to confirm whether the Jewish community in Dnepropetrovsk has really declared the bounty. Epstein strongly denies it. During the following opinions exchange on Kolomoisky’s behaviour Noginsky mentions as the established fact that Kolomoisky has hired the thugs who burnt people in Odessa on May 2. His motive was to exterminate people’s resistance against junta in Odessa and install Ihor Palitsa as his puppet governor in this city (the latter assumed office on May 6). According to Noginsky, Kolomoisky repeatedly asked Turchinov and other junta leaders “to leave him Odessa to restore the same order as in Dnepropetrovsk”. He also claimed that Kolomoisky “got crazy” and “thinks he is a new Hitler”.  Epstein is notably scared and insists that “Jews have nothing to do with this person”. He however agrees that the scandal, if made public, would be a game-changer for Ukraine.
Full conversation (in Russian):
So we encourage you to do. It is time to halt the bloody “game” in Ukraine. Spread the word!

© 2010-2014 Oriental Review
See also -
Workers Seize City in Eastern Ukraine From Pro-federalist: Thousands of steelworkers fanned out on Thursday through the city of Mariupol, establishing control over the streets and banishing the Pro-federalist militants who until recently had seemed to be consolidating their grip on power, possibly reversing the momentum in eastern Ukraine.
Ukraine's richest man does what gov't forces couldn't: Ukraine's richest man, who urged hundreds of his unarmed factory workers to help police wrestle back control of the city, taking down barricades and joining citizen patrols.
What's your response? -  Scroll down to add / read comments



Friday, May 16, 2014

348 What was promised to the Russians, back in 1990 ?

This blog: http://tiny.cc/fl9zfx

1)  Matlock, US ambassador in Moscow when the Wall fell.
2)  Ray McGovern, ex CIA.
3)  Lavrov,  Foreign Affairs, Russia, 2014.
See also: http://xevolutie.blogspot.nl/2014/11/399-gorbachov-on-nato-going-east-what.html
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Jack F. Matlock Jr., ambassador to the U.S.S.R. from 1987 to 1991, is the author of “Reagan and Gorbachev: How the Cold War Ended.”
One afternoon in September 1987, Secretary of State George Shultz settled in a chair across the table from Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in a New York conference room. Both were in the city for the United Nations General Assembly.
As he habitually did at the start of such meetings , Shultz handed Shevardnadze a list of reported human rights abuses in the Soviet Union. Shevardnadze’s predecessor, Andrei Gromyko, had always received such lists grudgingly and would lecture us for interfering in Soviet internal affairs.


This time, though, Shevardnadze looked Shultz in the eye and said through his interpreter: “George, I will check this out, and if your information is correct, I will do what I can to correct the problem. But I want you to know one thing: I am not doing this because you ask me to; I am doing it because it is what my country needs to do.”
Shultz replied: “Eduard, that’s the only reason either of us should do something. Let me assure you that I will never ask you to do something that I believe is not in your country’s interest.”
They stood and shook hands. As I watched the scene, with as much emotion as amazement, it dawned on me that the Cold War was over. The job of American ambassador in Moscow was going to be a lot easier for me than it had been for my predecessors.
I thought back to that moment as talks between Secretary of State John Kerry and Russia’s top diplomat this past week failed to resolve the crisis in Ukraine. It’s striking that the language being used publicly now is so much more strident than our language, public or private, was then. “It can get ugly fast if the wrong choices are made,” Kerry declared Wednesday, threatening sanctions.
I don’t believe that we are witnessing a renewal of the Cold War. The tensions between Russia and the West are based more on misunderstandings, misrepresentations and posturing for domestic audiences than on any real clash of ideologies or national interests. And the issues are far fewer and much less dangerous than those we dealt with during the Cold War.
But a failure to appreciate how the Cold War ended has had a profound impact on Russian and Western attitudes — and helps explain what we are seeing now.
The common assumption that the West forced the collapse of the Soviet Union and thus won the Cold War is wrong . The fact is that the Cold War ended by negotiation to the advantage of both sides.
At the December 1989 Malta summit, Mikhail Gorbachev and President George H.W. Bush confirmed that the ideological basis for the war was gone, stating that the two nations no longer regarded each other as enemies . Over the next two years, we worked more closely with the Soviets than with even some of our allies. Together, we halted the arms race, banned chemical weapons and agreed to drastically reduce nuclear weapons. I also witnessed the raising of the Iron Curtain, the liberation of Eastern Europe and the voluntary abandonment of communist ideology by the Soviet leader. Without an arms race ruining the Soviet economy and perpetuating totalitarianism, Gorbachev was freed to focus on internal reforms.
Because the collapse of the Soviet Union happened so soon afterward, people often confuse it with the end of the Cold War. But they were separate events, and the former was not an inevitable outcome of the latter.
Moreover, the breakup of the U.S.S.R. into 15 separate countries was not something the United States caused or wanted. We hoped that Gorbachev would forge a voluntary union of Soviet republics, minus the three Baltic countries. Bush made this clear in August 1991 when he urged the non-Russian Soviet republics to adopt the union treaty Gorbachev had proposed and warned against “suicidal nationalism.” Russians who regret the collapse of the Soviet Union should remember that it was the elected leader of Russia, Boris Yeltsin, who conspired with his Ukrainian and Belarusian counterparts to replace the U.S.S.R. with a loose and powerless “commonwealth.”
Even after the U.S.S.R. ceased to exist, Gorbachev maintained that “the end of the Cold War is our common victory.” Yet the United States insisted on treating Russia as the loser.
“By the grace of God, America won the Cold War,” Bush said during his 1992 State of the Union address. That rhetoric would not have been particularly damaging on its own. But it was reinforced by actions taken under the next three presidents.
President Bill Clinton supported NATO’s bombing of Serbia without U.N. Security Council approval and the expansion of NATO to include former Warsaw Pact countries. Those moves seemed to violate the understanding that the United States would not take advantage of the Soviet retreat from Eastern Europe. The effect on Russians’ trust in the United States was devastating. In 1991, polls indicated that about 80 percent of Russian citizens had a favorable view of the United States; in 1999, nearly the same percentage had an unfavorable view.
Vladi­mir Putin was elected in 2000 and initially followed a pro-Western orientation. When terrorists attacked the United States on Sept. 11, 2001, he was the first foreign leader to call and offer support. He cooperated with the United States when it invaded Afghanistan, and he voluntarily removed Russian bases from Cuba and Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam.
What did he get in return? Some meaningless praise from President George W. Bush, who then delivered the diplomatic equivalent of swift kicks to the groin: further expansion of NATO in the Baltics and the Balkans, and plans for American bases there; withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; invasion of Iraq without U.N. Security Council approval; overt participation in the “color revolutions” in Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan; and then, probing some of the firmest red lines any Russian leader would draw, talk of taking Georgia and Ukraine into NATO. Americans, heritors of the Monroe Doctrine, should have understood that Russia would be hypersensitive to foreign-dominated military alliances approaching or touching its borders.
President Obama famously attempted a “reset” of relations with Russia, with some success: The New START treaty was an important achievement, and there was increased quiet cooperation on a number of regional issues. But then Congress’s penchant for minding other people’s business when it cannot cope with its own began to take its toll.The Magnitsky Act , which singled out Russia for human rights violations as if there were none of comparable gravity elsewhere, infuriated Russia’s rulers and confirmed with the broader public the image of the United States as an implacable enemy.
The sad fact is that the cycle of dismissive actions by the United States met by overreactions by Russia has so poisoned the relationship that the sort of quiet diplomacy used to end the Cold War was impossible when the crisis in Ukraine burst upon the world’s consciousness. It’s why 43 percent of Russians are ready to believe that Western actions are behind the crisis and that Russia is under siege.
Putin’s military occupation of Crimea has exacerbated the situation. If it leads to the incorporation of Crimea in the Russian Federation , it may well result in a period of mutual recrimination and economic sanctions reminiscent of the Cold War. In that scenario, there would be no winners, only losers: most of all Ukraine itself, which may not survive in its present form, and Russia, which would become more isolated. Russia may also see a rise in terrorist acts from anti-Russian extremists on its periphery and more resistance from neighboring governments to membership in the economic union it is promoting.
Meanwhile, the United States and Europe would lose to the extent that a resentful Russia would make it even more difficult to address global and regional issues such as the Iranian nuclear program, North Korea and the Syrian civil war, to name a few. Russian policy in these areas has not always been all the United States desired, but it has been more helpful than many Americans realize. And encouraging a more obstructive Russia is not in anyone’s interest.

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2) How NATO Jabs Russia on Ukraine

The U.S. mainstream media portrays the Ukraine crisis as a case of Russian “imperialism,” but the reality is that Moscow has been reacting to aggressive moves by Washington to expand NATO to Russia’s border in violation of a post-Cold War pledge, writes ex-CIA analyst Ray McGovern.

By Ray McGovern
May 15 2014 "ICH" - "Consortium News" - Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov used Wednesday’s interview with Bloomberg News to address the overriding issue regarding the future of Ukraine, at least from Moscow’s perspective. Speaking in fluent English, he said Russia would be “categorically against” Ukraine joining NATO.
( You can see the interview below.  JV.) 
Lavrov said he welcomed the interviewer’s question regarding whether Ukraine can be part of NATO, recognizing it as a chance to shoehorn background information into the interview. It was an opportunity to explain Moscow’s position to a wide English-speaking international audience – first and foremost Americans. His comments seemed partly aimed at those so malnourished on “mainstream media” that they might be learning the history of NATO enlargement for the first time. Lavrov said:
“In my view, it all started … back in the 1990s, when in spite of all the pronouncements about how the Cold War was over and that there should be no winners – yet, NATO looked upon itself as a winner.”
Lavrov said U.S. and NATO reneged on a series of commitments: not to enlarge the Alliance; then (after NATO was expanded contrary to that commitment), not to deploy substantial forces on the territories of new NATO members; and then not to move NATO infrastructure to the Russian border.
“All these commitments have been, to one degree or another, violated,” said Lavrov, adding that “attempts to draw Ukraine into NATO would have a negative impact on the entire system of European security.” Lavrov said Russia’s national security interests and 25 years of recent history make this a key problem, not only for Ukraine and NATO, but also “an issue of Russia.”
Is Lavrov distorting the history? The answer is important – the more so inasmuch as the information needed to form cogent judgments is rarely found in the U.S. “mainstream media.” What happened in the months immediately before and after the fall of the Berlin Wall on Nov. 9/10, 1989, is key to understanding Russia’s attitude now.  

No Dancing
To his credit, President George H. W. Bush sent a reassuring message to the Soviets, saying, “I will not dance on the Berlin wall.” And just three weeks after it fell, Bush flew to Malta for a two-day summit with Gorbachev.
At a joint press conference on Dec. 3, 1989, Gorbachev said, “We are at the beginning of a long road to a lasting, peaceful era. The threat of force, mistrust, psychological and ideological struggle should all be things of the past.”
In the same vein, Bush spoke of a new future just begun “right here in Malta” – one of lasting peace and enduring East-West cooperation. This came just six months after Bush had publicly called in a major speech in Mainz, West Germany, for “a Europe whole and free.” At the time it did not seem one had to be Pollyanna to hope that flesh could be pinned to the bones of that rhetoric.
According to Jack Matlock, then-U.S. ambassador to the U.S.S.R. who took part in the Malta summit, the most basic agreement involved (1) Gorbachev’s pledge not to use force in Eastern Europe where the Russians had 24 divisions (some 350,000 troops) in East Germany alone, and (2) Bush’s promise not to “take advantage” of a Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe.
In early February 1990, Bush sent Secretary of State James Baker to work out the all-important details directly with Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze. Ambassador Matlock again was there and took careful notes on the negotiations, which focused on German reunification.
From memory, Matlock told me that Baker tried to convince Gorbachev that it was in Moscow’s interest to let a united Germany remain in NATO. Matlock recalled that Baker began his argument saying something like, “Assuming there is no expansion of NATO jurisdiction to the East, not one inch, what would you prefer, a Germany embedded in NATO, or one that can go independently in any direction it chooses.” [emphasis added]
The implication was that Germany might just opt to acquire nuclear weapons, were it not anchored in NATO. Gorbachev answered that he took Baker’s argument seriously, and wasted little time in agreeing to the deal.
Ambassador Matlock, one of the most widely respected experts on Russia, told me “the language used was absolute, and the entire negotiation was in the framework of a general agreement that there would be no use of force by the Soviets and no ‘taking advantage’ by the U.S.”
He added, “I don’t see how anybody could view the subsequent expansion of NATO as anything but ‘taking advantage,’ particularly since, by then, the U.S.S.R. was no more and Russia was hardly a credible threat.”
In his book Superpower Illusions, Matlock wrote that NATO enlargement was a function
of U.S. domestic politics not of foreign policy strategic thinking. It seems he got that right, too.


Tough Guy Clinton
From the campaign trail on Oct. 22, 1996, two weeks before he defeated Bob Dole for a second term as president, Bill Clinton used NATO enlargement to advertise his assertiveness in foreign policy and America’s status as the “world’s indispensable nation.” Clinton bragged about proposing NATO enlargement at his first NATO summit in 1994, saying it “should enlarge steadily, deliberately, openly.” He never explained why.
President Clinton, thus, reneged on the pledges made by Baker to Gorbachev and Shevardnadze. Clinton lamely called upon Russia to view NATO’s enlargement as an arrangement that will “advance the security of everyone.”
Clinton’s tough-guy-ism toward Russia was, in part, a response to even more aggressive NATO plans from Clinton’s Republican opponent Bob Dole, who had been calling for incorporating Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary as full members of NATO and had accused Clinton of “dragging his feet” on this. Clinton was not about to be out-toughed.
Those three countries joined NATO in 1999, starting a trend. By April 2009, nine more countries became members, bringing the post-Cold War additions to 12 – equal to the number of the original 12 NATO states.
Clinton made what quintessential Russian specialist Ambassador George Kennan called a “fateful error.” Writing in the New York Times on Feb. 5, 1997, Kennan asserted: “Expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era.”
“Such a decision may be expected to inflame the nationalistic, anti-Western and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion; to have an adverse effect on the development of Russian democracy; to restore the atmosphere of the cold war to East-West relations, and to impel Russian foreign policy in directions decidedly not to our liking.”
If you are the “sole indispensable” country in the world, though, you are sorely tempted not to heed the worrywarts.


Seeds of a Crisis
On Wednesday, Lavrov said the seeds of the current Ukraine crisis were sown in April 2008 during the NATO summit in Bucharest when NATO leaders stated in a declaration that “Georgia and Ukraine will be in NATO.”
Were Lavrov not the consummate diplomat, he might have also told his interviewer that, two months before the Bucharest summit, he had warned U.S. Ambassador to Russia William J. Burns to anticipate a strong Russian reaction to including Ukraine and Georgia in NATO. But diplomats don’t generally permit themselves an “I told you so.”
Thanks to Pvt. Chelsea (formerly Bradley) Manning and WikiLeaks, we have the text of a State Department cable dated Feb. 1, 2008, from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow bearing the unusual title:  “NYET MEANS NYET: RUSSIA’S NATO ENLARGEMENT REDLINES.”
The IMMEDIATE precedence that the cable bears shows that Ambassador Burns (now Deputy Secretary of State) was addressing a priority issue under active consideration in Washington.  Though it was six years ago, Burns interlocutor was the same Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. Here is Burns’s introductory summary of his discussions with Lavrov:
“Summary. Following a muted first reaction to Ukraine’s intent to seek a NATO membership action plan at the [upcoming] Bucharest summit, Foreign Minister Lavrov and other senior officials have reiterated strong opposition, stressing that Russia would view further eastward expansion as a potential military threat. NATO enlargement, particularly to Ukraine, remains ‘an emotional and neuralgic’ issue for Russia, but strategic policy considerations also underlie strong opposition to NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia.
“In Ukraine, these include fears that the issue could potentially split the country in two, leading to violence or even, some claim, civil war, which would force Russia to decide whether to intervene.”
Ambassador Burns continued: “Russia has made it clear that it would have to ‘seriously review’ its entire relationship with Ukraine and Georgia in the event of NATO inviting them to join. This could include major impacts on energy, economic, and political-military engagement, with possible repercussions throughout the region and into Central and Western Europe.”
Burns’s closing comment: “Russia’s opposition to NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia is both emotional and based on perceived strategic concerns about the impact on Russia’s interest in the region. … While Russian opposition to the first round of NATO enlargement in the mid-1990s was strong, Russia now feels itself able to respond more forcefully to what it perceives as actions contrary to its national interests.”
We don’t know whether Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice read Burns’s prescient remarks, but Lavrov’s warning clearly fell on deaf ears. On April 3, 2008, the NATO summit in Bucharest issued a formal declaration that “NATO welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO. We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO.”
Now, with events quickly spinning out of control in Ukraine, some policymakers need to tell President Obama that there can be even bigger trouble ahead, if Russia’s national security interests are not taken into account.
Ray McGovern works with Tell the Word, a publishing arm of the ecumenical Church of the Saviour in inner-city Washington. During his 27-year career as a CIA analyst, he was chief of the Soviet Foreign Policy Branch and was posted briefly to the Soviet Union. He is co-founder of Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity (VIPS).
© 2014 Consortium News

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3)  
Lavrov: very good and clear interview. ( MC Govern refers to this interview) 



  

Tuesday, May 13, 2014

347 The Crimea and International Law. Frankfurter Algemeine Zeitung.

This blog: http://tiny.cc/g1nwfx  

Original Article HERE

Dutch translation of the initiial 'scheme': 

De duitse professor Reinhard Merkel heeft de zaak als volgt ontrafeld:Heeft Rusland de Krim ingelijfd? Nee.Waren het Krim-referendum en de scheiding van de Oekraïne tegen het internationaal recht? Nee.Dus ze waren legitiem? Nee, ze hebben de Oekraïense grondwet geschonden (maar dat is geen kwestie van internationaal recht).Moest Rusland de toetreding van de Krim met Rusland niet hebben geweigerd, omdat het ongrondwettelijk was voor de Oekraïense wet?Nee, de Oekraïense grondwet bindt Rusland niet.Zijn de acties van Rusland dan in overeenstemming met het internationale recht? Nee, zijn militaire aanwezigheid op de Krim buiten de huurkazernes (gebieden waar het Russische leger legaal mocht zijn) was volgens het internationale recht illegaal.Omdat de afscheiding van de Krim alleen mogelijk was vanwege (de niet volledig wettige) Russische militaire aanwezigheid daar, is deze afscheiding dan niet onwettig? En dientengevolge, is de toetreding van Rusland tot de Krim niet een soort annexatie?Nee.https://www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/debatten/die-krim-und-das-voelkerrecht-kuehle-ironie-der-geschichte-12884464.html


Professor Reinhard Merkel teaches Law and Philosophy of law in Hamburg.
He wrote an article in one of the best German newspapers ( F.A.Z.)  in which he - meticuously-  argues that the change of Crimea from Ukraine to Russia, is acceptable.

I translated the article with google, and have - so far-  made a more understandable text of the first half of the article.  The rest will follow soon, I hope.
Below you will see the whole article in german.

In Wikipedia Merkels' view is copmrised in this sentence: "He ( Merkel) argues that the Russian military intervention in Crimea was an illegal support of a Secessionand not an Annexation."

Text below is a DeepL  Translation, INTO DUTCH  , done in 2026 .      ( More below:  translation to English)

Heeft Rusland de Krim geannexeerd? Nee. Waren het referendum op de Krim en de

afscheiding daarvan van Oekraïne in strijd met het volkenrecht? Nee. Waren ze dan wel rechtmatig? Nee; ze

waren in strijd met de Oekraïense grondwet (maar dat is geen kwestie van volkenrecht). Had

Rusland dan vanwege deze ongrondwettigheid de toetreding van de Krim niet moeten weigeren

? Nee; de Oekraïense grondwet is niet bindend voor Rusland. Was zijn optreden dan

in overeenstemming met het volkenrecht? Nee; in ieder geval was zijn militaire aanwezigheid op de Krim buiten zijn

pachtgebieden daar in strijd met het volkenrecht. Vloeit daaruit niet voort dat de afscheiding van de Krim, die pas mogelijk werd gemaakt door deze

militaire aanwezigheid, nietig was en dat

de daaropvolgende toetreding tot Rusland dus niets anders was dan een verkapte annexatie?

Nee.

De officiële verklaringen van westerse regeringen luiden anders. Als men hen gelooft, dan heeft

Rusland op de Krim volgens het volkenrecht hetzelfde gedaan als Saddam Hoessein in 1991 in Koeweit:

vreemd staatsgebied militair in beslag genomen en aan het eigen grondgebied toegevoegd. De annexatie

destijds, zoals men zich herinnert, heeft de dader een massale militaire aanval opgeleverd. Zou

een dergelijke aanval, afgezien van de politieke onhaalbaarheid ervan, vandaag de dag ook tegen

DE KRIM EN HET VOLKSRECHT

Koude ironie van de geschiedenis

Rusland heeft de volksrechtelijke aanspraken van Oekraïne geschonden. Maar men moet

het niet overdrijven. Wie het hardst om sancties roept, leidt alleen maar de aandacht af

van de eigen blamage.

Frankfurt am Main 22°

Feuilleton Debatten De Krim en het volkenrecht: de koele ironie van de geschiedenis

Debatten

RUBRIEKEN DEBAT BOEKEN MEDIA THEATER FILM POP KUNST KUNSTMARKT HOGESCHOOL/UNIVERSITEIT

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Rusland gerechtvaardigd? Zeker niet. Maar dat is niet de enige reden om

de officiële verklaringen van Berlijn tot Washington te wantrouwen.

Afscheiding, referendum en toetreding zijn iets anders dan annexatie

„Annexatie“ betekent in het volkenrecht de gewelddadige toe-eigening van grondgebied tegen de wil van de

staat waartoe het behoort, door een andere staat. Annexaties schenden het

interstatelijk geweldsverbod, de basisnorm van de juridische wereldorde. Meestal

vinden ze plaats in de vorm van een „gewapende aanval“, de ernstigste vorm

van interstatelijke rechtsschendingen. Dan leiden ze volgens artikel 51 van het VN-Handvest

tot het recht op militaire zelfverdediging van de aangevallen partij en op noodhulp door derde

staten – toestemming om oorlog te voeren, zelfs zonder goedkeuring van de Veiligheidsraad. Alleen al

deze overweging zou het vrijblijvende gebruik van het begrip „annexatie“ enigszins

moeten temperen. Toegegeven, de abstracte definitie ervan biedt ook ruimte voor allerlei misleidende interpretaties

. Uit een daarvan lijkt het volkenrechtelijke stigma te kunnen worden afgeleid dat het

het Westen momenteel aan het Russische optreden oplegt en waarmee het zijn eigen verontwaardiging

rechtvaardigt.

Maar dat is propaganda. Wat er op de Krim heeft plaatsgevonden, was iets anders: een

afscheiding, de uitroeping van staatsonafhankelijkheid, bevestigd door een referendum dat

de afscheiding van Oekraïne goedkeurde. Daarop volgde het verzoek om toetreding tot de Russische

Federatie, dat door Moskou werd aanvaard. Afscheiding, referendum en toetreding sluiten een annexatie

uit, zelfs als alle drie in strijd met het volkenrecht zouden zijn geweest. Het

verschil met annexatie dat zij aangeven, is ongeveer hetzelfde als dat tussen wegnemen en

aanvaarden. Zelfs als een overdrager, in dit geval de de facto-regering van de Krim, onrechtmatig handelt,

maakt hij de aanvaarder nog niet tot degene die wegneemt. Men kan de hele transactie weliswaar

om juridische redenen als nietig beschouwen. Dat maakt er echter nog geen annexatie van, geen roofzuchtige

landverovering met geweld, een grond voor oorlog volgens het volkenrecht.

Maar was het nietig? Waren de drie elementen ervan – referendum,

afscheiding, toetredingsverklaring – in strijd met het volkenrecht? Nee. Al

op het eerste gezicht is de bewering van de Amerikaanse

regering, dat het referendum

reeds in strijd zou zijn geweest met het volkenrecht. Als een deel van de

bevolking van een land onder zijn leden een volksraadpleging organiseert,

maakt dat het geen subject van het volkenrecht. Normen van het

algemene volkenrecht, zoals het verbod om de territoriale

integriteit van staten aan te tasten, hebben geen betrekking op dit deel en

kunnen door dit deel niet worden geschonden. Deze vaststelling reikt

verder dan het referendum op de Krim. Ook de

afscheidingsverklaring zelf schendt geen norm van het volkenrecht

en zou dat ook helemaal niet kunnen. Afscheidingsconflicten zijn een

aangelegenheid van binnenlands, niet van internationaal recht. Deze status quo van

het volkenrecht heeft het Internationaal Gerechtshof vier jaar geleden bevestigd in zijn juridisch advies voor

de Algemene Vergadering van de VN over de afscheiding van Kosovo.

De logica van een ‘het een of het ander’ geldt niet in het volkenrecht

Nu ontstaat hier de mogelijkheid voor allerlei sinistere manoeuvres in het geschil over de juiste

rechtsbegrippen. Evenmin als het volkenrecht een verbod op afscheiding kent, evenmin accepteert het

Inwoners van de Krim vieren op 16 maart in

Simferopol de afscheiding van Oekraïne.

Foto: AFP

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omgekeerd een recht daarop. Het bevat hierover geen regeling. De staten hebben kennelijk geen

belang bij het positief vastleggen van een rechtsgrondslag die de aantasting, ja zelfs vernietiging van hun

eigen grondgebied door tot afscheiding neigende minderheden zou toestaan. En aangezien zij niet

alleen degenen zijn die aan het volkenrecht gebonden zijn, maar ook de opstellers ervan, bestaat er

een dergelijke aanspraak juist niet, afgezien van nauw omschreven uitzonderingen die in het geval van de

Krim niet van toepassing zijn. De gemeenschap van staten is, zo luidt de nonchalante voetnoot in de

leer van het volkenrecht, geen club van zelfmoordenaars.

Daar valt in de propagandaoorlog wel iets mee te doen. De gangbare constatering dat

het volkenrecht de inwoners van de Krim geen recht op afscheiding heeft verleend, is volkomen juist. Maar

de daaruit getrokken conclusie, namelijk dat de afscheiding in strijd met het volkenrecht zou zijn geweest, is onjuist. Het

misleidende effect ervan, waarop de opstellers natuurlijk kunnen rekenen, ontleent het aan een

onjuiste parallel met het binnenlandse recht. Dit garandeert buiten zijn

concrete verboden altijd een principieel recht op vrijheid. Het staat toe wat het niet uitdrukkelijk

verbiedt. Daarom betekent de vaststelling dat iemand zonder toestemming

heeft gehandeld, binnen zijn werkingssfeer altijd tegelijkertijd het oordeel dat dit handelen onrechtmatig was.

De logica van een dergelijk ‘het een of het ander’ geldt niet in het volkenrecht. Het kent vormen van collectief

handelen, ten opzichte waarvan het zich neutraal opstelt. Afscheiding is een typisch voorbeeld. Een

algemeen verbod zou geen effect hebben, aangezien de mogelijke adressaten ervan niet

onderworpen zijn aan het volkenrecht. Maar toestemming hiervoor wordt in talrijke internationale documenten al

decennia lang afgewezen. Zelfs als algemeen vrijheidsrecht zou het volgens het volkenrecht niet te

rechtvaardigen zijn.

De authentieke wil van een grote meerderheid van de Krim-

bevolking

Dat lijkt vanzelf te zijn

ingepast in de door Brussel en Washington opgelegde taalregeling. Geen recht op afscheiding voor de Krim! Het referendum is een schending van het

volkenrecht en daarom nietig! De „toetreding“ tot Rusland is niets anders dan een

annexatie! Een mooie redenering. Maar helaas onjuist.

Maar de Russische militaire aanwezigheid? Maakt die de hele afscheidingsprocedure niet tot een farce?

Tot louter het product van een dreiging met geweld? Als dat zo zou zijn, dan zouden het verloop en de uitslag

van het referendum, net als de onafhankelijkheidsverklaring, uitsluitend aan de dreiger

moeten worden toegeschreven, ook al speelden de lokale bewoners met een glimlach mee in deze akelige enscenering

. Dan zou de term ‘annexatie’ terecht zijn. Zo annexeerde Stalin in 1940 de Baltische

staten. Na de bezetting en de gedwongen instelling van communistische

marionettenparlementen liet hij de leden daarvan in Moskou verzoeken om toetreding tot de

Sovjet-Unie, die hij vriendelijk inwilligde. Juist daarom was, bijna een halve

eeuw later, het loskomen van de Baltische staten van de late USSR geen afscheiding,

maar het herstel van een soevereiniteit die als rechtsgrond nooit was vervallen. Zou

dat niet het passende model zijn om de gebeurtenissen op de Krim te interpreteren?

Nee. De dwingende werking van de Russische militaire aanwezigheid had geen betrekking op de onafhankelijkheidsverklaring

noch op het daaropvolgende referendum. Zij waarborgde de mogelijkheid dat

deze gebeurtenissen plaatsvonden; op de uitkomst ervan had zij geen invloed.

De dreiging met geweld was niet gericht tegen de burgers of het parlement van de Krim, maar

tegen de soldaten van het Oekraïense leger. Wat zo werd voorkomen,

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was een militair ingrijpen van de centrale staat om

de afscheiding te voorkomen. Dat is de reden waarom de

Russische strijdkrachten de Oekraïense kazernes hebben geblokkeerd en

niet de stembureaus hebben bewaakt. Natuurlijk

wist Poetin dat de door hem gewenste resultaten zeker

waren en dat er geen gedwongen vervalsing nodig was. Maar of hij

anders zelfs daartoe bereid zou zijn geweest, staat niet ter

discussie. Ondanks alle verontwaardiging over het Russische optreden is

ook hier in het land niet serieus betwijfeld dat in

de uitslag van het referendum de authentieke wil van een grote

meerderheid van de bevolking van de Krim tot uiting kwam. Of de

officiële resultaten in detail correct waren, doet daarvoor niet

ter zake. De werkelijke cijfers lagen in ieder geval ver boven de

drempel van vijftig procent.

Schending van de territoriale integriteit

Niettemin was de Russische militaire aanwezigheid in strijd met het internationaal recht. Ook al heeft juist deze aanwezigheid wellicht

een bloedige inzet van gewapend geweld op de Krim voorkomen, toch schond zij het

interstatelijk interventieverbod. Dat maakt de daardoor mogelijk gemaakte afscheiding

geenszins ongeldig. Maar het geeft andere staten het recht op tegenmaatregelen, bijvoorbeeld

sancties. De evenredigheid daarvan moet echter worden afgemeten aan de feitelijke aanleiding

en niet aan een verzonnen schrikbeeld: aan militaire dwang op

vreemd staatsgrondgebied dus, maar niet aan een gewelddadige annexatie. Ondanks alle

overdreven uitingen van verontwaardiging lijkt men dat in de westerse regeringen

toch wel aan te voelen. Wacht maar af wat het toekomstige sanctieregime zal inhouden en vooral hoe lang het zal duren

. Daar zal men niet veel geduld voor nodig hebben. En vraag je dan af of zo’n reactie

op een echte, gewelddadige landroof niet vederlicht zou overkomen.

Rusland kan nog een andere schending van het volkenrecht worden verweten. Hoewel het algemene

volkenrecht afscheidingen niet verbiedt, omdat het de initiatiefnemers daarvan niet kan verplichten,

eist het even ondubbelzinnig van de andere staten dat zij de daardoor ontstane situatie niet erkennen, of

in ieder geval niet vóór de politieke consolidatie ervan. Twee dagen na het

referendum, op 18 maart, heeft Rusland de toetredingsovereenkomst met de Krim ondertekend.

Dat is waarschijnlijk de sterkste vorm van erkenning van een afgescheiden gebied als een

onafhankelijke staat. Weliswaar gaat de vraag of een onafhankelijke staat zich bij een andere

aansluit, de rest van de wereld evenmin aan als het volkenrecht. Maar of het toetredingsgebied na

een eerdere afscheiding als een dergelijke staat mag worden erkend, is wel degelijk van belang.

Talloze problemen die hiermee samenhangen, zijn in de doctrine van het volkenrecht al lang

omstreden. Over bepaalde grondbeginselen bestaat echter brede overeenstemming. Volgens die beginselen was de

Russische erkenning van de Krim als een toetredingsbevoegde onafhankelijke staat twee dagen na

haar afscheiding meer dan voorbarig. Dit betekende een schending van het volkenrechtelijke recht

van Oekraïne op eerbiediging van zijn territoriale integriteit. Ook dat rechtvaardigt internationale

tegenmaatregelen.

Verwarring over de basisbegrippen van het volkenrecht

Natuurlijk moeten de verontwaardigde westerse staten nu eerst eens naar zichzelf kijken. Voor

Vladimir Poetin verdedigt de toetreding van de Krim

tot de Russische Federatie. Foto: AP

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Zes jaar geleden, op 17 februari 2008, verklaarde het voorlopige burgerbestuur in Kosovo de

onafhankelijkheid van de Servische centrale staat. Dit was, hoewel het Internationaal

Gerechtshof dit twee jaar later heeft ontkend, in strijd met het relevante specifieke volkenrecht,

namelijk Resolutie 1244 van de VN-Veiligheidsraad van juni 1999, die Kosovo na de

NAVO-interventie onder de soevereiniteit van de Verenigde Naties plaatste en tegelijkertijd de

onschendbaarheid van de Servische grenzen garandeerde. Een dag na deze afscheiding hebben

Engeland, Frankrijk en de Verenigde Staten, en drie dagen later Duitsland, Kosovo

als onafhankelijke staat erkend.

Ook dat waren overhaaste erkenningen en daarmee

in strijd met het volkenrecht staande ingrepen in het recht van Servië op

eerbiediging van zijn territoriale integriteit. Destijds heeft Rusland het

Westen scherp bekritiseerd, vandaag speelt het hetzelfde spel. Dat

daarbij de rollen zijn omgedraaid, mag men beschouwen als de koele ironie van een

wereldgeschiedenis die nog steeds veel eerder de stelregels van

politieke macht volgt dan de normen van het

volkenrecht.

Dat is betreurenswaardig, maar voorlopig niet te veranderen. En dat

zou misschien een reden zijn om het volkenrecht

buiten de politieke discussie te laten en in ieder geval retorisch een beetje

terug te schroeven. Rusland heeft in strijd met het volkenrecht gehandeld, op een matig

dramatische manier en politiek gezien geenszins als een

roekeloze gangster. De nu ontstane situatie was voor de Krim op de lange termijn waarschijnlijk

toch onvermijdelijk. En de manier waarop deze nu tot stand is gekomen, heeft, ondanks al haar

onaangenaamheid, wellicht ernstigere conflicten voorkomen. Annexaties tussen staten zijn

daarentegen doorgaans oorlogsredenen.

Wie vandaag de dag met het oog op de Krim zo spreekt, brengt niet alleen

de basisbegrippen van het volkenrecht in de war, maar mobiliseert

hun legitimatiepotentieel op een gevaarlijke manier.

Als alle tekenen kloppen, is het Westen op dit moment

bezig om voor een mislukt buitenlands beleid de rekening

te betalen in de vorm van een blamage van wereldhistorische omvang. Het zou de

collaterale schade daarvan niet al te ver moeten uitbreiden naar het domein van het

volkenrecht.

 


Text below is a Google Translation, INTO ENGLISH a bit re-wrtitten to make it better readable. 
The Crimea and International Law.
The cool irony of history.
Russia has injured International legal rights of the Ukraine. But you should 'leave the church in the village' ( be reasonable). He who shouts loudest for sanctions , only deflected from his own disgrace .
07.04.2014 , by REINHARD MERKEL

Did Russia annex the Crimea ? No

Were the referendum in the Crimea and the separation from the Ukraine against international law ?   No

So they were legitimate?     No, they violated the Ukrainian Constitution (but that's not a question of international law ) . 

Should Russia not have refused the joining of Crimea with Russia, because it was unconstitutional for Ukraïne law? No, the Ukrainian constitution does not bind Russia. 

Were Russia's actions in accordance with international law then ?   No, its military presence in Crimea beyond its tenements (area's where  the Russian army was legally allowed to be) was illegal under international law . 

Then, as the secession of Crimea was  only possible because of (the not completely lawfull) Russian military presence there, is this secession not  unlawful?  And  by consequence, is the joining of Russia by the Crimea  not a kind of annexation ?   No
The official statements of Western governments are different from what I write above. If you believe them, then Russia has done the same in the Crimea (under international law)  as Saddam Hussein did in 1991 in Kuwait : foreign territory confiscated by military power. The annexation at that time , you remember , made that Saddam suffered a massive military strike . Is such a strike, apart from its political impossibility today-- justified against Russia? Certainly not . But that's not the only reason to distrust the official government vocatives from Berlin to Washington.
Secession, referendum , accession is something other than annexation.
" Annexation " in international law is called the violent appropriation of land against the will of the State to which it belongs , by another state . Annexations violate the interstate prohibition of violence , the basic norm of the legal world order. She is regularly done by way of an " armed attack " , the most severe form of intergovernmental violation of rights. Then,  under Article 51 of the UN Charter, the country that was attacked may use military self-defense and other ( third)  States may help militarily : these are permits to make war without the approval of the UN Security Council. This consideration ( Annexation makes war possible) should restrict the easy use of the title " annexation " a bit.  Of course, the abstract definition of 'Annexation' leaves room for all sorts of misleading interpretations. From one of these misleading interpretations the international legal Stigma seems to be derived  which the West currently sticks on the Russian approach, and to which The West accredits her own indignation.
But that's propaganda. What has taken place in the Crimea, was something else : a secession, the declaration of Independence (of the Crimea), confirmed by a referendum which approved the separation  from the Ukraine. This was followed by the application to join the Russian Federation, which Moscow accepted . Secession, then referendum and then joining Russia: these make an annexation untrue/impossible, even if all three would have been against international law. The difference with annexation is approximately like the difference between 'to take away' and 'to offer'. Even if a donor , here the de facto government of the Crimea, acts unlawful, that does not make the receiver to one who 'takes away' . One may indeed consider the whole transaction to be legally void. This still makes them not to be like 'annexation'  which is the rapacious land grab by force . [..... ?]
But was the passing of Crimea from Ukraine to Russia null and void ? Were their three elements - referendum , secession, Declaration of joining Russia - illegal under international law ? No. The claim of the U.S. government that already the referendum had violated international law is of course absurd as one can see immediately. When a part of a country's population organises among its members a plebiscite , then this does not make them the subject of international law . A plebiscite can not and will not touch norms of general international law , such as a prohibition to touch the territorial integrity of states.  Also the secession declaration does not violate any norm of international law and could not even do that. Secessionist conflicts are a matter of national , not international law. This status quo of International Law was confirmed four years ago by the International Court of Justice when it took a legal stance before the UN General Assembly about the secession of Kosovo.  
The logic of either- or is not valid in international law
( The text below was not re-written. It was only machine-translated by Google.
If you want to rewrite is, please do, and post it below as a comment.) 
Now here opens the way for all sorts of sinister maneuvers in the dispute over the appropriate legal terms . Just as the law recognizes a prohibition of secession, so little accepted it reversed a right to it. It is true to no regulation . The States have shown no interest in the positive settlement of a legal title which would allow the damage , even destruction of their own territories by secession inclined minorities. And since they are not only obligated by international law , but also its author , there is not such a claim even, apart from narrowly defined exceptions that are not relevant in the case of Crimea. The community of States, the sloppy footnote international legal doctrine , is not a club of suicides .
It can be to do something in the propaganda war . The common finding of international law had granted the Crimean residents no right to secession is quite right . But the provided deadline , so the secession was illegal under international law , is wrong. His misleading effect on which its creators can rely , of course , it refers from a failed parallel to national law. This ensures outside his concrete prohibitions always a basic civil right . It allows what is not expressly prohibited . Therefore, in his sphere is the finding that someone had acted without permission , always at the same time the verdict , this action was unlawful .
The logic of such an either- or is not valid in international law. It knows forms of collective action to which it is neutral . The secession is an exemplary case . A general ban would be illusory because its possible recipients are not subject to international law. But a permission is denied in a number of international documents for decades. Also, as a general right to freedom they would not be justified under international law .
The authentic will of a large majority of the Crimean population
That should have inserted the prescribed in Brussels and in Washington speech control by itself . No right to secession of Crimea ! The referendum is a violation of international law and therefore null and void ! The " accession " to Russia is nothing but an annexation ! A beautiful dissipation. Only sadly mistaken.
But the Russian military presence ? Does she not the whole procedure of secession into a farce ? For sheer product of a threat of violence ? If this were so , then would the process and outcome of the referendum as well as the Declaration of Independence alone attributable to the Impending , even if the locals played along with good grace when evil staging. The talk of the annexation would be correct. So Stalin annexed the Baltic states in 1940 . After their occupation and imposer of communist puppet parliaments whose members he had in Moscow asking for the connection to the Soviet Union , which he granted friendly. For this very reason was almost half a century later, the replacement of the Baltic States from the late USSR no secession, but the restoration of sovereignty which has never been extinguished as a legal document . Would not that be the right model for the interpretation of the operations in the Crimea ?  No. The coercive effect of the Russian military presence was referring not to the declaration of independence nor to the subsequent referendum. She secured the possibility of taking-place of these events ; their source and took it had no effect . Addressees of the threat of violence were not the citizens or the Parliament of the Crimea, but the soldiers of the Ukrainian army . What was so prevented , was a military intervention of the central government to suppress the secession. That is the reason why the Russian forces blocked the Ukrainian barracks and have not been around monitors the polling stations . Of course, Putin knew that the desired results from it were safe and no forced forgery needed . But whether he would otherwise have been willing even to is not at issue . For all the outrage over Russia's actions has been in this country is not seriously doubted that the result of the referendum was the authentic will of a large majority of the Crimean population expressed . Whether the official results were correct in detail , for it is of no consequence. The real figures were in any case far above the mark of fifty percent.
Disregard for the territorial integrity
However, the Russian military presence was illegal. Even if they just may have prevented a bloody use of force in the Crimea, they violated the intergovernmental intervention prohibition . This makes it not allowed secession null and void. But it authorized other states to take countermeasures , such as sanctions. Their proportionality has , however, to be calculated at its real cause and not to a fictitious bogeyman : So in a military assault on foreign territory , but not a violent annexation. With all the over-instrumentation of their own rebellion, we seem to feel that the Western governments , after all . You wait and see only the future sanctions regime and especially its duration. Lots of patience on there is not need. And then ask yourself whether such a response to a real violent land grab not seem light as a feather .
Yet another violation of international law must be covered Russia. Just as general international law prohibits secession , because it can not commit the author , so it unequivocally does not require , or at least not to recognize prior to their political consolidation of the other states , the situation thus created . Two days after the referendum , on March 18 , Russia signed the Agreement on the Accession of the Crimea. That should be the strongest form of recognition of a secessionist territory as a newly independent state. Although the question of whether an independent state joins another , the rest of the world goes on as little as the law of nations . But whether the candidate region may be recognized under a previous secession as such a state , very well .
Countless problems associated with it , are controversial in the international law doctrine for a long time . About certain basics but there is wide consensus . After Russia's recognition of the Crimea as a candidate capable independent state was two days after their separation more than rashly . You hurt , it means the international legal right of Ukraine to respect for their territorial integrity. Also that justifies international countermeasures.
Confusion of the international legal terms
To be sure, the outraged Western nations must now take their own noses. Six years ago , on 17 February 2008 , the provisional civil administration whose independence by the Serbian central government said in Kosovo. The violated , although the International Court of Justice has two years later denied by other relevant special law , namely the Resolution 1244 of the UN Security Council in June 1999 , which put Kosovo after the NATO intervention under the jurisdiction of the United Nations and also the inviolability the Serbian borders has guaranteed. One day after the secession have England , France and the United States , three days later Germany has recognized Kosovo as an independent state .
Even these were hasty acts of recognition and thus international law intervention in the Serbian claim to respect its territorial integrity. At that time, Russia has sharply criticized the West , today it plays the same game. The fact that the roles are reversed , you might be recorded as cool irony of world history , which is still the maxims of political power far more than following the norms of international law .
This is unfortunate , but the front hand not to change . And that might be a reason to leave the church under international law in the political village and at least rhetorically disarm a bit. Russia has acted contrary to international law , in moderately dramatic mode and politically not as a hasardierender gangster. The resulting state was now in the long term probably inevitable anyway for the Crimea. And the form in which he has now brought about , may have avoided more serious conflicts with all its unpleasantness . Annexations between states , however, are typically reasons for war .
Who talks like that with a view to the Crimea today , confused not only the basic concepts of international law , but mobilized their legitimation potential on a dangerous manner . If not assume all the characters , the West is just going to incur the receipt of a world-historical embarrassment for a failed foreign policy. It should not extend too far into the sphere of international law whose collateral damage.
Reinhard Merkel teaches Criminal Law and Philosophy at the University of Hamburg.
Source: F.A.Z.




Die Krim und das VölkerrechtKühle Ironie der Geschichte

Russland hat völkerrechtliche Ansprüche der Ukraine verletzt. Aber man sollte die Kirche im Dorf lassen. Wer am lautesten nach Sanktionen schreit, lenkt nur ab von der eigenen Blamage.
© DPAVergrößernBeitrittsjubel auf der Krim: War Russlands Vorgehen ein Völkerrechts- oder Verfassungsbruch?
Hat Russland die Krim annektiert? Nein. Waren das Referendum auf der Krim und deren Abspaltung von der Ukraine völkerrechtswidrig? Nein. Waren sie also rechtens? Nein; sie verstießen gegen die ukrainische Verfassung (aber das ist keine Frage des Völkerrechts). Hätte aber Russland wegen dieser Verfassungswidrigkeit den Beitritt der Krim nicht ablehnen müssen? Nein; die ukrainische Verfassung bindet Russland nicht. War dessen Handeln also völkerrechtsgemäß? Nein; jedenfalls seine militärische Präsenz auf der Krim außerhalb seiner Pachtgebiete dort war völkerrechtswidrig. Folgt daraus nicht, dass die von dieser Militärpräsenz erst möglich gemachte Abspaltung der Krim null und nichtig war und somit deren nachfolgender Beitritt zu Russland doch nichts anderes als eine maskierte Annexion? Nein.
Die offiziellen Bekundungen westlicher Regierungen lauten anders. Glaubt man ihnen, dann hat Russland auf der Krim völkerrechtlich das Gleiche getan wie Saddam Hussein 1991 in Kuweit: fremdes Staatsgebiet militärisch konfisziert und dem eigenen zugeschlagen. Die Annexion damals, man erinnert sich, hat ihrem Urheber einen massiven Militärschlag zugezogen. Wäre ein solcher Schlag, von seiner politischen Unmöglichkeit abgesehen, heute auch gegen Russland gerechtfertigt? Gewiss nicht. Aber das ist nicht der einzige Grund, den regierungsamtlichen Vokativen von Berlin bis Washington zu misstrauen.

Sezession, Referendum, Beitritt ist etwas anderes als Annexion

„Annexion“ heißt im Völkerrecht die gewaltsame Aneignung von Land gegen den Willen des Staates, dem es zugehört, durch einen anderen Staat. Annexionen verletzen das zwischenstaatliche Gewaltverbot, die Grundnorm der rechtlichen Weltordnung. Regelmäßig geschehen sie im Modus eines „bewaffneten Angriffs“, der schwersten Form zwischenstaatlicher Rechtsverletzungen. Dann lösen sie nach Artikel 51 der UN-Charta Befugnisse zur militärischen Notwehr des Angegriffenen und zur Nothilfe seitens dritter Staaten aus - Erlaubnisse zum Krieg auch ohne Billigung durch den Weltsicherheitsrat. Schon diese Überlegung sollte den freihändigen Umgang mit dem Prädikat „Annexion“ ein wenig disziplinieren. Freilich bietet dessen abstrakte Definition auch allerlei irreführenden Deutungen Raum. Aus einer von ihnen scheint sich das völkerrechtliche Stigma ableiten zu lassen, das der Westen derzeit dem russischen Vorgehen aufdrückt und an dem er die eigene Empörung beglaubigt.
Aber das ist Propaganda. Was auf der Krim stattgefunden hat, war etwas anderes: eine Sezession, die Erklärung der staatlichen Unabhängigkeit, bestätigt von einem Referendum, das die Abspaltung von der Ukraine billigte. Ihm folgte der Antrag auf Beitritt zur Russischen Föderation, den Moskau annahm. Sezession, Referendum und Beitritt schließen eine Annexion aus, und zwar selbst dann, wenn alle drei völkerrechtswidrig gewesen sein sollten. Der Unterschied zur Annexion, den sie markieren, ist ungefähr der zwischen Wegnehmen und Annehmen. Auch wenn ein Geber, hier die De-facto-Regierung der Krim, rechtswidrig handelt, macht er den Annehmenden nicht zum Wegnehmer. Man mag ja die ganze Transaktion aus Rechtsgründen für nichtig halten. Das macht sie dennoch nicht zur Annexion, zur räuberischen Landnahme mittels Gewalt, einem völkerrechtlichen Titel zum Krieg.
© AFPVergrößernBewohner der Krim feiern am 16. März in Simferopol die Loslösung von der Ukraine.
Aber war sie nichtig? Waren ihre drei Elemente - Referendum, Sezession, Beitrittserklärung - völkerrechtswidrig? Nein. Schon auf den ersten Blick ungereimt ist die von der amerikanischen Regierung ausgegebene Behauptung, bereits das Referendum habe gegen das Völkerrecht verstoßen. Veranstaltet ein Teil der Bevölkerung eines Landes unter seinen Mitgliedern ein Plebiszit, so macht ihn das nicht zum Völkerrechtssubjekt. Normen des allgemeinen Völkerrechts, etwa das Verbot, die territoriale Integrität von Staaten anzutasten, betreffen ihn nicht und können von ihm nicht verletzt werden. Die Feststellung reicht über das Referendum auf der Krim hinaus. Auch die Sezessionserklärung selbst verletzt keine völkerrechtliche Norm und könnte dies gar nicht. Sezessionskonflikte sind eine Angelegenheit innerstaatlichen, nicht internationalen Rechts. Diesen Status quo des Völkerrechts hat der Internationale Gerichtshof vor vier Jahren in seinem Rechtsgutachten für die UN-Generalversammlung zur Sezession des Kosovo bestätigt.

Die Logik eines Entweder-oder gilt im Völkerrecht nicht

Nun öffnet sich hier die Möglichkeit für allerlei sinistre Schachzüge im Streit um die passenden Rechtsbegriffe. Sowenig das Völkerrecht ein Verbot der Sezession kennt, so wenig akzeptiert es umgekehrt ein Recht darauf. Es trifft dazu keine Regelung. Die Staaten haben ersichtlich kein Interesse an der positiven Setzung eines Rechtstitels, der die Beschädigung, ja Zerstörung ihrer eigenen Territorien durch sezessionsgeneigte Minderheiten erlauben würde. Und da sie nicht nur die vom Völkerrecht Verpflichteten, sondern auch dessen Urheber sind, gibt es einen solchen Anspruch eben nicht, von eng umschriebenen Ausnahmen abgesehen, die im Fall der Krim nicht einschlägig sind. Die Gemeinschaft der Staaten, so die saloppe Fußnote der Völkerrechtslehre, ist kein Club von Selbstmördern.
Daraus lässt sich im Propagandakrieg etwas machen. Die landläufige Feststellung, das Völkerrecht habe den Krim-Bewohnern kein Recht zur Sezession gewährt, ist ganz richtig. Aber der mitgelieferte Schluss, also sei die Sezession völkerrechtswidrig gewesen, ist falsch. Seine irreführende Wirkung, auf die sich seine Urheber freilich verlassen können, bezieht er aus einer verfehlten Parallele zum innerstaatlichen Recht. Dieses gewährleistet außerhalb seiner konkreten Verbote stets ein prinzipielles Freiheitsrecht. Es erlaubt, was es nicht ausdrücklich untersagt. Deshalb bedeutet in seiner Sphäre die Feststellung, jemand habe ohne Erlaubnis gehandelt, stets zugleich das Verdikt, dieses Handeln sei rechtswidrig gewesen.
Die Logik eines solchen Entweder-oder gilt im Völkerrecht nicht. Es kennt Formen kollektiven Handelns, zu denen es sich neutral verhält. Die Sezession ist ein exemplarischer Fall. Ein allgemeines Verbot ginge ins Leere, da dessen mögliche Adressaten dem Völkerrecht nicht unterworfen sind. Aber eine Erlaubnis dazu wird in etlichen internationalen Dokumenten seit Jahrzehnten verneint. Auch als allgemeines Freiheitsrecht wäre sie völkerrechtlich nicht zu begründen.

Der authentische Wille einer großen Mehrheit der Krim-Bevölkerung

Das dürfte sich der in Brüssel und in Washington verordneten Sprachregelung wie von selbst eingefügt haben. Kein Recht der Krim auf Sezession! Das Referendum ein Bruch des Völkerrechts und daher null und nichtig! Der „Beitritt“ zu Russland nichts anderes als eine Annexion! Eine schöne Ableitung. Nur leider falsch.
Aber die russische Militärpräsenz? Macht sie nicht die ganze Prozedur der Sezession zur Farce? Zum schieren Produkt einer Drohung mit Gewalt? Wäre es so, dann wären Ablauf und Ergebnis des Referendums genauso wie die Erklärung der Unabhängigkeit allein den Drohenden zuzurechnen, auch wenn die Einheimischen mit guter Miene bei der bösen Inszenierung mitspielten. Die Rede von der Annexion wäre dann richtig. So hat Stalin 1940 die baltischen Staaten annektiert. Nach ihrer Besetzung und der Zwangseinrichtung kommunistischer Marionettenparlamente ließ er deren Mitglieder in Moskau um den Anschluss an die Sowjetunion ersuchen, den er freundlich gewährte. Ebendeshalb war ein knappes halbes Jahrhundert später die Ablösung der baltischen Staaten von der späten UdSSR keine Sezession, sondern die Wiederherstellung einer Souveränität, die als Rechtstitel nie erloschen war. Wäre das nicht das passende Modell zur Deutung der Vorgänge auf der Krim?
© APVergrößernWladimir Putin verteidigt die Aufnahme der Krim in die russische Förderation.
Nein. Die Zwangswirkung der russischen Militärpräsenz bezog sich weder auf die Erklärung der Unabhängigkeit noch auf das nachfolgende Referendum. Sie sicherte die Möglichkeit des Stattfindens dieser Ereignisse; auf deren Ausgang nahm und hatte sie keinen Einfluss. Adressaten der Gewaltandrohung waren nicht die Bürger oder das Parlament der Krim, sondern die Soldaten der ukrainischen Armee. Was so verhindert wurde, war ein militärisches Eingreifen des Zentralstaats zur Unterbindung der Sezession. Das ist der Grund, warum die russischen Streitkräfte die ukrainischen Kasernen blockiert und nicht etwa die Abstimmungslokale überwacht haben. Natürlich wusste Putin, dass die von ihm gewünschten Resultate sicher waren und keiner erzwungenen Fälschung bedurften. Aber ob er andernfalls sogar dazu bereit gewesen wäre, steht nicht zur Debatte. Bei aller Empörung über das russische Vorgehen ist auch hierzulande nicht ernsthaft bezweifelt worden, dass im Ergebnis des Referendums der authentische Wille einer großen Mehrheit der Krim-Bevölkerung zum Ausdruck kam. Ob die amtlichen Ergebnisse im Einzelnen korrekt waren, ist dafür ohne Belang. Die wirklichen Zahlen lagen jedenfalls weit über der Marke von fünfzig Prozent.

Missachtung der territorialen Integrität

Gleichwohl war die russische Militärpräsenz völkerrechtswidrig. Auch wenn gerade sie einen blutigen Einsatz von Waffengewalt auf der Krim verhindert haben mag, verletzte sie das zwischenstaatliche Interventionsverbot. Das macht die davon ermöglichte Sezession keineswegs nichtig. Aber es berechtigt andere Staaten zu Gegenmaßnahmen, zum Beispiel zu Sanktionen. Deren Verhältnismäßigkeit hat sich allerdings an ihrem tatsächlichen Anlass zu bemessen und nicht an einem fingierten Schreckgespenst: an einer militärischen Nötigung auf fremdem Staatsgebiet also, nicht aber einer gewaltsamen Annexion. Bei aller Überinstrumentierung der eigenen Empörung scheint man das in den westlichen Regierungen immerhin zu fühlen. Man warte nur das künftige Sanktionsregime und vor allem dessen Dauer ab. Viel Geduld wird man dafür nicht brauchen. Und frage sich dann, ob eine solche Antwort auf einen echten gewaltsamen Landraub nicht federleicht erschiene.
Noch eine weitere Völkerrechtsverletzung ist Russland vorzuhalten. Sowenig das allgemeine Völkerrecht Sezessionen verbietet, weil es deren Urheber nicht verpflichten kann, so unzweideutig verlangt es von den anderen Staaten, die dadurch geschaffene Lage nicht oder jedenfalls nicht vor deren politischer Konsolidierung anzuerkennen. Zwei Tage nach dem Referendum, am 18. März, hat Russland das Abkommen zum Beitritt der Krim unterzeichnet. Das dürfte die stärkste Form der Anerkennung eines Sezessionsgebiets als eines unabhängig gewordenen Staates sein. Zwar geht die Frage, ob sich ein unabhängiger Staat einem anderen anschließt, den Rest der Welt so wenig an wie das Völkerrecht. Aber ob das Beitrittsgebiet nach einer vorherigen Sezession als ein solcher Staat anerkannt werden darf, sehr wohl.
Zahllose Probleme, die damit zusammenhängen, sind in der Völkerrechtsdoktrin seit langem umstritten. Über bestimmte Grundlagen besteht aber weitgehend Einigkeit. Danach war die russische Anerkennung der Krim als eines beitrittsfähigen unabhängigen Staates zwei Tage nach ihrer Abspaltung mehr als vorschnell. Sie verletzte, heißt das, den völkerrechtlichen Anspruch der Ukraine auf Achtung ihrer territorialen Integrität. Auch das rechtfertigt internationale Gegenmaßnahmen.

Verwirrung der völkerrechtlichen Grundbegriffe

Freilich müssen sich die empörten westlichen Staaten nun an ihre eigenen Nasen fassen. Vor sechs Jahren, am 17. Februar 2008, erklärte die provisorische Zivilverwaltung im Kosovo dessen Unabhängigkeit vom serbischen Zentralstaat. Das verstieß, wiewohl der Internationale Gerichtshof das zwei Jahre später verneint hat, gegen einschlägiges spezielles Völkerrecht, nämlich die Resolution 1244 des UN-Sicherheitsrats vom Juni 1999, die den Kosovo nach der Nato-Intervention unter die Hoheitsgewalt der Vereinten Nationen gestellt und zugleich die Unverletzlichkeit der serbischen Grenzen garantiert hat. Einen Tag nach dieser Sezession haben England, Frankreich und die Vereinigten Staaten, drei Tage später hat Deutschland den Kosovo als unabhängigen Staat anerkannt.
© AFPVergrößernDie Ähnlichkeiten sind nicht vor der Hand zu weisen: Kosovo feiert seine Unabhängigkeit 2008
Auch das waren überhastete Akte der Anerkennung und damit völkerrechtswidrige Eingriffe in den Anspruch Serbiens auf Achtung seiner territorialen Integrität. Damals hat Russland den Westen scharf kritisiert, heute spielt es das gleiche Spiel. Dass dabei die Rollen vertauscht sind, mag man als kühle Ironie einer Weltgeschichte verbuchen, die noch immer den Maximen der politischen Macht weit eher folgt als den Normen des Völkerrechts.
Das ist bedauerlich, aber vorderhand nicht zu ändern. Und das wäre vielleicht ein Grund, die völkerrechtliche Kirche im politischen Dorf zu lassen und immerhin rhetorisch ein wenig abzurüsten. Russland hat völkerrechtswidrig gehandelt, in mäßig dramatischem Modus und politisch keineswegs wie ein hasardierender Gangster. Der nun entstandene Zustand war für die Krim langfristig wohl ohnehin unumgänglich. Und die Form, in der er nun herbeigeführt wurde, mag bei all ihrer Unerfreulichkeit gravierendere Konflikte vermieden haben. Annexionen zwischen Staaten sind dagegen typischerweise Kriegsgründe.
Mehr zum Thema
Wer heute mit Blick auf die Krim so redet, verwirrt nicht nur die völkerrechtlichen Grundbegriffe, sondern mobilisiert deren Legitimationspotential auf eine gefährliche Weise. Wenn nicht alle Zeichen trügen, ist der Westen soeben dabei, sich für eine verfehlte Außenpolitik die Quittung einer welthistorischen Blamage zuzuziehen. Er sollte deren Kollateralschäden nicht allzu weit in die Sphäre des Völkerrechts ausdehnen.
Reinhard Merkel lehrt Strafrecht und Rechtsphilosophie an der Universität Hamburg.
Quelle: F.A.Z.