1505 Finland lokte de Russische inval in 1939-40 (de Winter War) zelf uit door samen met de nazi's te werken.

Ik heb een twitter account en lees daar altijd heel interessanter zaken. 

Een van de betere bronnen is Rina Lu.  Geen idee waar deze persoon vandaan komt. 

UPDATE:  Ik heb hieronder  (onder de dikke gele lijn)  nog een artikel over Rusland <> Finland geplaatst, en wel van historicus Geoffrey Roberts.  Volgens Jeffrey Sachs is dit een briljant artikeltje !  ( Link naar Sachs) 

Rina Lu

@rinalu_

Finland’s Dirty Secret: From ‘Neutral’ Ally to Hitler’s Partner

Today, Finland loves to play the victim card, pretending it had nothing to do with the Siege of Leningrad. The line goes: “We didn’t attack the city, Mannerheim refused to bomb it, we were just standing there, minding our own business.” Cute story. Too bad it’s pure fiction.

Reality check: Finnish troops sat on Leningrad’s doorstep for three years. Not sipping coffee, not staying “neutral”. They were holding one-third of the blockade line. Without Finland’s part, the Germans couldn’t have fully strangled the city. Together, they closed the ring that starved a million people to death, including 400,000 children.

And Mannerheim the “savior”? Please. His orders were to bomb the Road of Life (which was not really a road but a frozen lake), the only route bringing food across Lake Ladoga.

On June 25, 1941, Mannerheim ordered the Finnish Army to begin hostilities against the USSR:

“I call you to a holy war against the enemy of our nation. Together with the mighty armed forces of Germany, as brothers-in-arms, we resolutely set out on a crusade against the enemy to secure a reliable future for Finland [1].”

Finland dreamed of expansion and had concrete plans. On the ‘Greater Finland’ dream map, you’ll find Russian cities like Murmansk, Leningrad, and Kandalaksha marked as theirs [2].👇

Map of ‘Greater Finland’

Meet Mannerheim

Before we move on to Finland’s well-known war against the USSR on Hitler’s side, we need to roll the clock back a bit and look at the context. Finland as a state was born inside Russia. Before the Russo-Swedish War, these lands were simply the eastern part of Sweden. After the war, Russia took them and created the autonomous Grand Duchy of Finland. It remained part of the Russian Empire until the revolution of 1917.

Now, meet Mannerheim – a military and political figure who came from poor Swedish-Finnish nobility, yet rose to become a general in the Russian army and an officer of the Imperial Guard, close to Nicholas II himself, part of the very top of the empire’s military elite. He received special assignments and was even dispatched on reconnaissance expeditions across Central Asia and China. But this is where his true colors began to show: he mingled freely with foreign officers — George Macartney, the British consul in Kashgar and a key intelligence player in the Great Game, and the French during his 1906–08 expedition in Asia. Later he was even suspected of ties to Masonic circles. All of this hints that his loyalties were never fully aligned with Russia [3].

After the collapse of the empire, he wasted no time. In the spring of 1919, Mannerheim explored cooperation with the British intervention forces against Soviet Russia. He set conditions: international recognition of Finnish independence, the cession of Petsamo, guarantees concerning East Karelia [4]. According to a British report drawn up by the representative, Mannerheim was, in February 1919, 'very willing to take St Petersburg and crush the Bolsheviks there' [5]. These demands, which implied control of areas around Petrozavodsk, were rejected since the Russian Whites, backed by Britain, opposed an independent Finland and any territorial concessions [6]. Nevertheless, Finnish volunteers mounted the so-called Aunus Expedition and attempted to capture Petrozavodsk in June 1919, but the operation ended in failure [7].

In October 1919, Mannerheim again approached General Yudenich—whose Northwestern Army was advancing on Petrograd with British naval support [8] —with a proposal for joint action. Once more, his terms were declined. Yet Finland still signaled alignment: on October 12, when the British and French fleets proclaimed a blockade of the Baltic states for negotiating peace with Soviet Russia, Finland under Mannerheim followed suit and declared its own blockade.

The coronation procession of Nicholas II and Alexandra Feodorovna in Moscow, 1896. On the left, in the honor guard of the Life Guards Cavalry Regiment – Gustaf Mannerheim.

Finland's Ties with Hitler in the 1930s

In 1934, Mannerheim began fortifying the Aland Islands – the key to controlling the northern Baltic [9] – despite Finland’s 1921 pledge to leave them unfortified [10]. In 1935 he turned to Germany, joining a secret conference with Hermann Göring, Hungarian Prime Minister Gömbös, and the head of the Polish Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee, to discuss joint action against the USSR [11]. By 1939 he was still entertaining German generals, personally showing Chief of Staff Franz Halder around Finland’s northern airfields and depots.

Meanwhile, the Finnish government tried to fortify the Aland Islands anyway. Everyone knew Finland couldn’t defend them alone, fortification meant handing them to Germany, which was already preparing for war with the USSR. So Helsinki asked Britain and Germany for permission, and both despite being at odds elsewhere eagerly agreed. The only country Finland didn’t consult was the USSR, the one most directly threatened.

After World War I, Germany was banned from building its own navy. But Helsinki stepped in to help. Already in the 1920s, Finland was secretly assisting Germany in rebuilding the Kriegsmarine in open violation of the Versailles Treaty [12]. The so-called Vesikko class, launched in the mid-1930s, was nothing less than the prototype for Germany’s Type II U-boats, the backbone of the Reich’s submarine arm once rearmament began in earnest. Finland pretended it was merely expanding its tiny fleet, but in reality it was a cover operation: a testing ground for Nazi Germany’s return to naval power [13]. These same Finnish submarines later fought against the USSR. One of them, Vesikko, still survives today as a museum ship in Helsinki, not a monument to “brave neutrality,” but to Finland’s complicity in Germany’s secret rearmament long before 1941.

Submarine Vesikko

Winter War: 1939–1940

Here comes the Winter War (1939–1940), the one Finns and online trolls love to cry about. Stalin was no fool: he understood perfectly well that Finland was not some innocent “neutral,” but a willing partner in Germany’s rearmament and a potential springboard for an attack on Leningrad. The Soviet leadership remembered the intervention years of 1918–19, when Mannerheim offered to fight alongside the British if he could seize teh area around Petrozavodsk, and when Finland even joined a blockade against Baltic states trying to make peace with Soviet Russia.

By the late 1930s, the danger was undeniable. The Aland Islands affair showed Finland openly coordinating with both Britain and Germany against Soviet security. Add to this the submarine program in Turku, secret talks with Göring and other anti-Soviet figures, and it was clear: if war with Germany came, Leningrad would be exposed to an attack from the north.

That is why Stalin proposed a territorial exchange in 1939, moving the border away from Leningrad in return for larger tracts of Soviet land in Karelia. He even offered alternatives, including leasing the territory [14]. The goal was straightforward: to push the frontier far enough west so that the USSR’s second capital, with millions of people and critical industry, would not be within artillery range of a hostile Finland aligned with Germany.

The basic Soviet aims in the negotiations were expressed in a memorandum handed by Stalin and Molotov to Paasikivi on 14 October:

“In the negotiations with Finland, the Soviet Union is mainly concerned with the settlement of two questions: a) securing the safety of Leningrad; b) becoming satisfied that Finland will maintain firm, friendly relations with the Soviet Union. In order to fulfil this duty, it is necessary: (1) To make it possible to block the opening of the Gulf of Finland by means of artillery fire from both coasts of the Gulf of Finland in order to prevent warships and transport ships of the enemy penetrating, to the waters of the Gulf of Finland. (2) To make it possible to prevent the access of the enemy to those islands in the Gulf of Finland which are situated west and north-west of the entrance to Leningrad. (3) To have the Finnish frontier in the Karelian Isthmus, which is now at a distance of 32 km. from Leningrad, i.e., within the range of long-distance artillery, moved somewhat farther northwards and northwestwards”

When Helsinki rejected every compromise, it confirmed what Moscow already suspected: Finland was betting on Germany, not neutrality. Even during the Winter War, Finland’s ambitions were expansionist, seizing Karelia and pushing toward Lake Onega. The war was not an unprovoked Soviet land grab, but the brutal outcome of a security dilemma Stalin tried (and failed) to solve through negotiation.

“If the Soviet Union suggests the conclusion of a treaty of mutual assistance, . . it should be pointed out that such a treaty is not compatible with Finland’s policy of neutrality” [15].

Map of Soviet and Finnish border proposals during the 1939 negotiations before the Winter War.

It is worth saying a few words about the so-called ‘Mainila incident.’ Western historians love to point at it as a Soviet provocation, but they never mention the weeks of Finnish shelling and border crossingsthat came before. Stalin didn’t start the war over one skirmish — he said it plainly: Finland wrecked the talks and refused compromise. The war began only after negotiations collapsed. The plan was already on Stalin’s desk by October 29. Mainila was never the cause — just the excuse the West clings to [16].

Telegram of the Deputy People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the USSR to the Acting Plenipotentiary of the USSR in Finland B. N. Yartsev

January 9, 1938. On December 17 at 12:30 p.m., our border patrol from the Ternavolok outpost of the Kalevala border detachment was subjected near border marker No. 690 to gunfire from two Finnish soldiers positioned on Finnish territory near the border. Bullets flew over the heads of our border guards. Make a protest on this matter and indicate to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that, despite assurances given by the Finnish government in connection with the killing in 1936 of our commander Spirin, gunfire from the Finnish border guards continues. Demand that the MFA take serious measures to put an end to the shootings. Potemkin

From the Final Chapter to the Opening Scene

The Winter War wrapped up on March 13, 1940, with the signing of the Moscow Peace Treaty. Finland was forced to surrender around 11% of its land to the USSR, including Karelia, Viipuri (now Vyborg), and key areas along the Gulf of Finland and Lake Ladoga. These acquisitions later proved critical in protecting Leningrad during its infamous blockade. Without them, the story of Leningrad, and perhaps the USSR itself, might have unfolded differently.

Just months after the treaty, Finnish leaders were already rekindling ties with Nazi Germany. By 1941, as Hitler unleashed Operation Barbarossa, Finland jumped into the fray, calling it the “Continuation War.” Under Mannerheim’s command, Finnish forces charged alongside the Wehrmacht, reclaimed Karelia, and ventured deep into Soviet territory, encircling Leningrad. Mannerheim’s grim intention was clear: Leningrad was to be erased — the complete destruction of Petersburg was being pressed by the Finnish ambassador in Berlin [17]. Yet the Finns still insist on their innocence, so let’s dig deeper into their myths.

Myth #1

Finland only wanted to ‘get back lost land.’

Myth busted. In late summer 1941, Finnish troops didn’t just “stop at the old border.” They pushed forward to meet up with Germany’s Army Group North, advancing toward Leningrad both through the Karelian Isthmus and around Lake Ladoga [18]. By August 31, they were already crossing the old Soviet-Finnish border at the Sestra River.

In September, they seized towns like Beloostrov and tried to break through heavy Soviet fortifications. Losses piled up, soldiers even refused to advance deeper, and military courts cracked down harshly on dissent. Mannerheim’s claim that he “chose to stop” is a half-truth at best, the Finnish army was bleeding and bogged down.

Meanwhile, the Finns pushed east, occupying Petrozavodsk and renaming it Jaanislinna, as if to erase its Russian past [19]. If that's "just reclaiming lost land," then what's next?

The document reframes the German attack on Leningrad as a victory for Finland’s security, justifying past Finnish resistance to Soviet demands and presenting the city’s destruction as liberation from a historical threat.

Myth #2.

Mannerheim didn’t know Hitler’s plans.

Myth busted. He knew everything. Already on June 25, 1941, a secret telegram from Finland’s envoy in Berlin made it crystal clear: Göring promised Finland new territories “as much as it wanted” once Leningrad was destroyed [20]. That same day, Mannerheim ordered his troops into the war alongside Germany, calling it a “holy war” and a “crusade.” Hardly the words of an innocent bystander.

Hitler’s own headquarters wasn’t hiding it either: in July 1941, Martin Bormann noted in his diary that the Führer wanted Leningrad wiped off the map and then handed to Finland. Finnish generals themselves were already sketching future borders along the Neva. A radio speech text was even prepared for Finnish radio in 1941, on the occasion of the capture of Leningrad.

The mood in Helsinki was one of anticipation. Finnish leaders openly spoke about the coming fall of Leningrad, rejected Soviet peace offers, and even debated what to do with the city once it was gone. President Risto Ryti himself said Petersburg “brought only evil” and should no longer exist as a major city.

Excerpt from Martin Bormann’s minutes of a meeting at Hitler’s headquarters, July 16, 1941. Bormann, Hitler’s private secretary and head of the Nazi Party Chancellery, recorded Hitler’s remark that Leningrad should be razed to the ground in order to hand the area over to Finland.

Mannerheim was fully informed, fully complicit, and fully invested in the destruction of Leningrad. (The telegram was sent to the President, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Mannerheim).

Here's another piece of evidence:

A telegram from Berlin to Helsinki on June 24, 1941, revealing that Finnish leaders were already clued in on the plans to obliterate Leningrad.

Translation:

“To President Ryti. Today in Carinhall I presented Göring with the Grand Cross with Chain and congratulated him on your behalf and on behalf of Mannerheim. He said that military operations are developing unexpectedly well. By yesterday morning 2,632 aircraft had been destroyed, of which 700 were shot down and finished off on the airfields, where they stood in rows, igniting one another. Tank forces have taken Minsk, Vilnius, and Kaunas. A government commission of 2,400 people is proceeding to the occupied territory.He asked about our prospects when ‘Alternative 5 and the Kola Peninsula’ were raised. He said that we can take whatever we want, ‘including Petersburg, which, like Moscow, is better to destroy. The issue of the Kola Peninsula can be resolved through an economic agreement with Germany. Russia will be broken up into small states.’The war was unexpected for Russia, which was waiting for an ultimatum and building illusions in order to gain time. In fact, it was a surprise also for the local Soviet embassy, whose adviser as late as Friday at Lundénström’s was still planning to expand cooperation. We have no particular inner concern about the war dragging on, unless within the next few days there are changes in the victorious reports.”

Myth #3.

Mannerheim saved Leningrad.

Myth busted. From day one, Finland was part of it. The very first bombs on Leningrad in June 1941 didn’t come from Germany [16]. They came from Finland. German planes couldn’t reach the city from East Prussia, so they took off and landed on Finnish airfields. Moreover, in the early hours of 22 June 1941, even before a formal declaration of war, Finnish submarines began laying mines in the Baltic Sea as part of Operation Kilpapurjehdus [21].

On the night of June 22, thirty-two German bombers crossed in from Finland. Soviet anti-air guns near Dibuny shot one down right away. The rest panicked, dropped their bombs all over the place, and rushed back to Finland. By the next day, the Soviets already had their first German prisoners: pilots who came straight from raids launched out of Finland.

And the last air raid on Leningrad in April 1944? Also from Finland. That night, 35 Finnish bombers set out from Joensuu to strike the city across Lake Ladoga. Soviet air defenses shredded the attack, forcing the planes to drop their bombs wildly and retreat. Beginning and end: Finnish involvement.

Then there’s the “Road of Life.” On January 22, 1942, Mannerheim signed an order demanding “special attention to offensive actions against enemy communications in the southern part of Lake Ladoga.” That’s a direct order to target the lifeline feeding a starving city. So much for “mercy.”

The biggest attempt came on October 22, 1942, with the assault on Sukho Island, a key point for controlling Ladoga supply routes. The operation was prepared by the Germans, reinforced with German and Italian naval units, but staged from Finnish-occupied territory and coordinated with Mannerheim himself. The attack failed thanks to Soviet naval and air forces but Mannerheim still sent thanks to the Germans and Italians for their efforts. No wonder Finnish historians tend to stay quiet about this episode.

Hitler’s adjutant Gerhard Engel stated directly that Marshal Mannerheim let him know Leningrad was also his goal, and that later “the plow would have to go over this city” [22].

Diagram of German bombing raids on Leningrad through Finnish territory on 22 June 1941.

Myth #4.

Britain and the U.S. pressured Finland not to storm Leningrad.

Myth busted: Finland liked to pretend it was keeping friendly ties with the West. But once it teamed up with Nazi Germany, those “good relations” with Britain and America were gone.

Yes, Churchill actually sent Mannerheim a personal letter in November 1941 asking him to halt his advance. He basically said: “Stop now, don’t cross the old border, or we’ll have to declare war on Finland [23].”

And how did Mannerheim reply? Polite words, but a flat no: “We can’t stop until our troops reach the lines that guarantee Finland’s security [24]”. Translation: we ain't gonna stop what we planned.

At the same time, the U.S. tried mediation. Washington passed Moscow’s offer: stop at the 1939 border, keep your land, and leave the war. Finland’s answer was a note sent back in November 1941 saying the opposite: Finland wanted a new border, taking Russian Karelia, Lake Onega, and more [25]. In other words not defense, but expansion.

Later, in 1943–44, Helsinki kept playing double games, pretending to explore peace while signing the Ryti–Ribbentrop pact with Nazi Germany to keep fighting. The U.S. cut ties but didn’t declare war (The U.S. basically kept Finland in the “not-quite-enemy” box because it wanted to leave the door open).

Finland wasn’t pushed to stop; it was politely asked and simply declined, opting for more land.

Here’s Hitler’s own adjutant spelling out what Finland’s leadership was thinking: “The Führer speaks particularly highly of Mannerheim. He once distrusted him for being too pro-American and tied to the lodges. But he is a ruthless soldier, admired for keeping the socialists on a leash. His hatred of Russia isn’t just about communism, but about centuries of Tsarist rule. His recent remark that after the capture of Leningrad the city should be demolished and the plow driven over it, because it only ever brought misfortune to his people is typical [26].”

Myth #5.

Mannerheim saved Finland in 1944.

Myth busted: Not really. After Stalingrad and the Red Army breaking the siege of Leningrad, Mannerheim himself admitted Finland had to look for a way out. By February 1943 his own intel chief was telling the government: “We need to change course and exit this war as soon as possible.”

The Red Army smashed those “unbreakable” defenses in 1944 through the new Mannerheim Line on the Karelian Isthmus in just one week. Finnish soldiers deserted by the tens of thousands, about 24,000 men, equal to two whole divisions, ran off in two weeks.

Finland begged Berlin for help, and Germany had to send in divisions, assault guns, and even 70 planes to keep the front from collapsing.

Why didn’t the Soviets roll straight into Helsinki? Because Stalin told Marshal Govorov: “Your task is not Helsinki, your task is Berlin.” Finland was a sideshow, Germany was the main goal [27].

That’s why Finland survived. Not because Mannerheim “saved” it, but because Moscow decided it had bigger fish to fry. The armistice was signed on September 19, 1944.

Diagram of the planned joint operations of German and Finnish troops on the immediate approaches to Leningrad, September 1941.

Myth #6.

Trust Mannerheim’s memoirs.

Myth busted: After the armistice with the USSR, Finnish leaders started burning documents like crazy. Finland’s chief censor, Kustaa Vilkuna, openly admitted that “high officials” were calling nonstop to demand destruction of sensitive files [28].

Mannerheim himself torched most of his personal archive in late 1945 and early 1946. Tons of staff records, intelligence reports, and other incriminating papers were destroyed or shipped abroad during Operation Stella Polaris and then “lost” in Switzerland.

And hidden they remain. Access to many collections is still restricted unless relatives grant permission. Files on Finnish SS units are “missing,” even though they show up in archival catalogs. The records of the Helsinki war crimes trials of 1945–46 have never been published.

The myth of “Mannerheim the savior” rests on selective memories and shredded paper. If Leningrad had fallen, it would have been mass death and the city wiped off the map. That’s exactly what Mannerheim and his German partners were planning and acted upon.

Myth #7.

The war began on June 25 because of Soviet bombings.

For decades Finnish historiography has repeated President Ryti’s claim that the USSR attacked “without any cause” on June 25, 1941, and that this marked the beginning of the war. But documents and research show the opposite. Already on June 22 German aircraft were striking Leningrad after taking off from Finnish airfields, and Finnish forces were cooperating with the Wehrmacht. The American historian Charles Lundin put it plainly: “Why would the Russians, if they had not completely lost their senses, open for themselves an additional and such a difficult front at the very moment when Hitler’s invincible war machine had invaded their country?” [29].

Thus, the Soviet air raids of June 25 were not the beginning but a response to attacks already launched from Finnish territory and to the stationing of German forces there. Moscow acted preemptively to shield Leningrad from further bombardments. The myth of “unprovoked Soviet aggression” is nothing more than wartime propaganda, which has stuck in Finnish public memory and is still echoed by some writers today.

Hitler Youth on a visit to Finland as guests of the Blue-and-Blacks.

Finnish Camps and the Hidden Genocide in Karelia, 1941–1944

But the story does not end with the Siege of Leningrad, where people were literally trapped — denied the chance to leave and cut off from food supplies. As a result, 1.5 million civilians perished, including 400,000 children, with 97% dying of starvation. People were forced to eat rats and even wallpaper glue to survive. Yet the joint barbaric tactics of the Finns and the Wehrmacht did not stop there. On Soviet territory, Finland established concentration camps for civilians — mostly women, children, and the elderly — who were held in horrific conditions.

Between 1941 and 1944, the Finnish army seized Eastern Karelia (USSR), unleashing terror on its civilian population.On October 24, 1941, Finland set up its first concentration camp for Soviet civilians of Slavic descent in Petrozavodsk, including women and children. Their chilling mission was ethnic cleansing and the erasure of the Russian presence in Finnish-occupied Karelia.

Barbed-wire enclosure and barracks of a Finnish-run camp during World War II. Such camps held not only Soviet prisoners of war but also thousands of civilians from occupied territories, including women and children. Mortality was high due to hunger, disease, and harsh conditions.

By the close of 1941, more than 13,000 civilians were behind bars. Fast forward to mid-1942, and that figure soared to nearly 22,000. In total, about 30,000 individuals endured the harsh realities of 13 camps, with a third succumbing to starvation, disease, and brutal forced labor. And this grim count doesn't even factor in the equally lethal POW camps. As the war drafted most men early on, women and children bore the brunt of the labor force in these camps. In April 1942, Finnish politician Väinö Voionmaa wrote home: “Out of 20,000 Russian civilians in Äänislinna, 19,000 are in camps. Their food was rotten horse meat. Children scavenge garbage for scraps. What would the Red Cross say if they saw this?” In 1942, the death rate in Finnish camps exceeded that of German ones. Testimonies describe corpses being hauled daily, teenagers forced into labor, and women and children made to work 10+ hour shifts in forests and camps, unpaid until 1943 [30].

Camp No. 2, unofficially known as the “death camp,” was notorious for its brutality. It held “disloyal” civilians, and its commandant, Finnish officer Solovaara, became infamous for public beatings and killings. In May 1942, he staged a mass beating of prisoners simply for begging. Those who resisted forced labor, often in brutal logging camps, were beaten to death in front of others “as a lesson.” For the slightest offense by a single prisoner, Lieutenant Salavaara deprived the entire camp of food rations. He also forced people to sit for hours in vats of cold water and drove out sick, starving people in nothing but a shirt into the snow [screen shot]. According to the Soviet Extraordinary State Commission, Finnish forces conducted medical experiments on prisoners and branded them with hot iron unlike the Nazis, who tattooed. Finland also engaged in slave trading, selling abducted Soviet civilians for agricultural labor. An estimated 14,000 civilians died in Karelia between 1941 and 1944, excluding POWs.

In Camp No. 5, survivors recounted how they were beaten when they were still just children. Some were beaten to death. They were given 350 grams of bread per day and 50 grams of horse meat for seven days, because of which many children died from cold and hunger. Brutal beatings and whippings were part of the policy toward the prisoners, carried out with wet rags soaked in salt — this was a common method of the Finnish guards. For almost three years civilians lived under such conditions in Finnish concentration camps, guilty only of having Soviet blood in their veins. Schools were turned into barracks, Russian textbooks were burned. The Finnish authorities plundered the prisoners, seizing blankets, watches, and suitcases. [31].

The Finnish Camp No. 6 in Vyborg was one of the most brutal camps for Soviet prisoners of war: up to 17,000 people passed through it, but only a few survived amid starvation, disease, lack of medical care, and constant abuse. Mortality reached catastrophic levels, and the camp earned the reputation of a “Finnish Buchenwald,” becoming a symbol of the barbaric treatment of POWs by the Finnish authorities on occupied Soviet territory. But many of the dead labeled as “prisoners of war” were actually civilians: most rural Soviets lacked passports, and anyone of conscription age was assumed to be a soldier. In 2021, the FSB declassified the names of 54 Finns responsible for the genocide of the Soviet population [32].

Declassified Soviet archival document identifying Finnish officials responsible for the system of concentration and internment camps during World War II.

All of this is unknown to the average European, American, and even Finn. History is rewritten and presented only through selective episodes, like the Winter War, which makes it difficult to trace the full chain of actions taken by Western countries. And this is no accident: once the sequence of events is laid out, any ordinary person can easily draw some very uncomfortable conclusions that lie right on the surface. So if World War II still feels “murky” to you, if you only have two or three scattered episodes in mind about a six-year global conflict that took 70–80 million lives and destroyed around 2,500 cities, maybe it’s because someone wants it that way.

Sources:

1. Mannerheim, Carl Gustaf. Order of the Day No. 1, 29 June 1941.
2. Mannerheim, Carl Gustaf. Memoirs.
3. Halén, Harry. Baron Mannerheim's Hunt for Ancient Central Asian Manuscripts. Helsinki, 1999.
4. U.S. Department of State. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, Volume II.Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1932. Document 1026.
5. Ahti, Martti. Salaliiton ääriviivat: oikeistoradikalismi ja hyökkäävä idänpolitiikka 1918–1919. Espoo: Weilin + Göös, 1987.
6. Potka & Kiviharju 2022;
7. Vahtola, Jouko. Nuorukaisten sota: Suomen sotaretki Aunukseen 1919. Helsinki: Otava, 1997.
8. Churchill Project. Citing The Churchill Documents, vol. 8.
9. TIME Magazine, 22 October 1934.
10. Convention Respecting the Non-Fortification and Neutralisation of the Åland Islands. League of Nations, 1921.
11. The Times, 15 October 1935.
12. Naval Encyclopedia. “Vesikko Submarine.”

    https://naval-encyclopedia.com/ww2/finland/vesikko.php

    .
13. Internet Archive. “History of Finland and IVS.”

    https://web.archive.org/web/20110706044927/http://www.vesikko.fi/history/finland_and_ivs/

    .
14. Tanner, Väinö. op. cit. p. 27–28.
15. The Development of Finnish-Soviet Relations of 1939. Helsinki, 1940, p. 47, 49.
16. Zimniaia voina 1939–1940. Kn. 2. I. V. Stalin i finskaia kampaniia: Stenogramma soveshchaniia pri TsK VKP(b).Moscow: Nauka, 1998. p. 272.
17. National Archive of Finland. Risto Ryti collection, Folder 28: T. M. Kivimäki’s letter to R. Witting, 26 September 1941.
18. Fiore, Massimiliano. The Neglected Campaign: The Italian Navy Contribution to the Siege of Leningrad. UAE, 2023.
19. Baryshnikov, V. N. Vstuplenie Finlyandii vo Vtoruyu mirovuyu voynu. 1940–1942. St. Petersburg, 2005.
20. State Archive of the Republic of Finland. Secret telegram from Finnish envoy T. M. Kivimäki, Berlin, 25 June 1941.
21. Naval Encyclopedia. “Vetehinen-class Submarines.”

    https://naval-encyclopedia.com/ww2/finland/vetehinen-class-submarines.php

    .
22. Engel, Gerhard. Heeresadjutant bei Hitler 1938–1943. Aufzeichnungen des Major Engel. Entry for July 1941. Stuttgart: DVA, 1974.
23. Letter from Prime Minister Churchill to Field Marshal Mannerheim, 29 November 1941.
24. Reply Letter from Field Marshal Mannerheim to Prime Minister Churchill, 2 December 1941.
25. Carl Gustaf Mannerheim. Memoirs
26. Engel, Gerhard. At the Heart of the Reich: The Secret Diary of Hitler’s Army Adjutant. London: Frontline, 2018.
27. Baryshnikov, N. I. Blokada Leningrada i Finlyandiya 1941–1944. St. Petersburg–Helsinki, 2002.
28. Baryshnikov, V. N. Mannergeym ne spasál Leningrad! St. Petersburg, 2013.
29. Lundin, Charles Leonard. Finland in the Second World War.
30. Väinö Voionmaa. Diplomaticheskaya pochta. 1984.
31. Chudovishchnyye zlodeyaniya finsko-fashistskikh zakhvatchikov na territorii Karelo-Finskoy SSR: Sbornik dokumentov i materialov. Gosizdat KFSSR, 1945.
32. RIA Novosti, 4 August 2021.
33. ----------------------------------------

Geoffrey Roberts – Durf te sussen: Finse lessen voor Oekraïense vredestichters

29 augustus 2025 Geopolitiek

Wat Oekraïne kan leren van de Finse oorlog met de Sovjet-Unie

Geoffrey Roberts is emeritus hoogleraar geschiedenis aan het University College Cork en lid van de Royal Irish Academy

Finland Foto's genomen in de richting van Ilomantsi op de Kuolismaa-weg op de dag van de wapenstilstand, 5 september 1944

Deze foto is in Finland publiek domein , omdat er óf een periode van 50 jaar is verstreken sinds het jaar van creatie, óf de foto voor het eerst is gepubliceerd vóór 1966.

De vaak aangehaalde analogie tussen de Russisch-Oekraïense oorlog en de Sovjet-Finse oorlogen van de jaren 40 is niet zo eenvoudig als het lijkt. Sterker nog, de verschillen tussen beide gebeurtenissen zijn minstens zo significant als de overeenkomsten. De situatie en keuzes van Kiev zijn zeker niet dezelfde als die van Helsinki 80 jaar geleden. Niettemin blijven de parallellen tussen de Finse en Oekraïense strijd om te overleven als onafhankelijke staten opvallend en leerzaam.

Van alle lessen die de Fins-Sovjetrelaties voor het huidige Oekraïne kunnen leren, is de meest relevante dat de Finse leiders, na hun land twee keer aan de rand van een catastrofe te hebben gebracht, de moed hadden om een ​​nederlaag te accepteren en daarmee de soevereiniteit en onafhankelijkheid van hun staat te redden. Bovendien was het Finlands naoorlogse appeasement jegens de Sovjets dat de toekomst van het land effectief veiligstelde en de basis legde voor de stabiliteit en welvaart die het tot een van de meest succesvolle landen van Europa hebben gemaakt.

Net als de oorlog in Oekraïne was de zogenaamde 'Winteroorlog' van 1939-1940 volledig te voorkomen. Stalin gaf de voorkeur aan een diplomatieke oplossing om zijn veiligheidszorgen weg te nemen, net als Poetin in 2022. Het falen van de diplomatie leidde tot de invasie van Finland door het Rode Leger in december 1939.

Finland maakte, samen met Estland, Letland en Litouwen, deel uit van een Baltische invloedssfeer die Hitler aan Stalin schonk onder auspiciën van het nazi-Sovjetpact. Stalin wilde alle vier de Baltische landen in zijn invloedssfeer brengen door middel van wederzijdse hulppacten en Sovjet-militaire bases. Maar met betrekking tot Finland stelde hij een belangrijke aanvullende eis: dat de Finnen hun grondgebied in de Zuid-Karelische landengte, grenzend aan Leningrad, zouden afstaan. Stalin beschouwde dit gebied als essentieel voor de veiligheid van de tweede stad van de Sovjet-Unie.

Terwijl de Baltische staten zich vrij snel overgaven aan de Sovjetdreigingen en -eisen, trokken de Finnen zich terug. Stalins reactie was zijn eis voor een wederzijds verdedigingspact te laten varen, maar hij drong aan op belangrijke territoriale concessies en bood tevens aan een groot deel van Sovjet-Karelië aan Finland over te dragen.

De Finse opperbevelhebber, maarschalk Gustaf Mannerheim, zelf een voormalige tsaristische generaal, waarschuwde dat een oorlog met Rusland een ramp voor Finland zou betekenen. Maar zijn politieke leiders, die dachten dat hun macht sterker was dan ze in werkelijkheid was, onderschatten Stalins vastberadenheid om de Sovjetpositie in de Oostzee veilig te stellen.

Toen Stalin zijn voorstel weigerde, ondernam hij militaire actie. Hij verwachtte dat een snelle en gemakkelijke oorlog snel tot een machtswisseling in Helsinki zou leiden.

In tegenstelling tot de propagandamythen, heeft het dappere Finland de Sovjets tijdens de 'Winteroorlog' niet tot stilstand weten te brengen. Heldhaftige Finse verdedigers voorkwamen weliswaar een onmiddellijke doorbraak van het Rode Leger en brachten zware verliezen toe, maar de Sovjets hergroepeerden zich en lanceerden in januari 1940 een tweede offensief. Begin maart stond het Rode Leger op het punt Helsinki in te nemen en heel Finland te bezetten. De Finnen smeekten wijselijk om vrede en bereikten een verdrag waarvan de voorwaarden niet veel verschilden van wat vóór de oorlog was aangeboden.

Finland had inderdaad zijn onafhankelijkheid uitgeroepen – ten koste van tienduizenden gesneuvelde strijders. De Sovjetslachtoffers waren nog hoger, maar het 5 miljoen man sterke Rode Leger was prima in staat dergelijke verliezen op te vangen.

Toen Stalin akkoord ging met wat in feite een compromisvrede was, hield hij rekening met de op handen zijnde aankomst in Finland van een Brits-Franse expeditieleger – 'vrijwilligers' die zogenaamd de taak hadden de Finnen te helpen, maar die in werkelijkheid van plan waren de controle over de Zweedse ijzerertsvelden te verwerven – een belangrijke bron voor de Duitse oorlogseconomie.

Zoals de Britse historicus AJP Taylor opmerkte: "De Britse en Franse regeringen waren hun verstand kwijt." Hun acties dreigden de Europese oorlog noordwaarts uit te breiden naar Scandinavië – een vooruitzicht dat noch Stalin, noch de Zweden, noch de Finnen wensten – en zouden de Sovjets in feite nog dieper in de Duitse invloedssfeer duwen.

Het Sovjet-Finse vredesverdrag redde de neutraliteit van Zweden, maar kwam te laat voor Denemarken en Noorwegen – die in april 1940 door de Duitsers werden binnengevallen om de overslag van essentieel Zweeds ijzererts te beschermen.

Zweden bleef neutraal gedurende de rest van de oorlog, maar de Finse leiders kozen ervoor zich aan te sluiten bij de nazi-aanval op de USSR in juni 1941. De Finnen noemden hun tweede confrontatie met de Sovjets een 'Vervolgoorlog' en beweerden dat ze geen bondgenoten van Hitler waren, maar medestrijders, wier doel het was verloren gebied terug te winnen. Voor de Sovjets was de redenering van de Finnen een onderscheid zonder onderscheid, gezien de omvang van Finlands militaire samenwerking met Duitsland en de rol die het land speelde bij het afsluiten van de blokkade van Leningrad – een belegering die honderdduizenden Sovjetburgers het leven kostte.

Toen het Rode Leger in de zomer van 1944 eindelijk door de Finse verdediging heen brak, stond Finland voor een nieuwe belangrijke keuze: akkoord gaan met de Sovjetvoorwaarden voor een wapenstilstand of tot het bittere einde aan de zijde van Duitsland blijven vechten.

De Finse beslissing in september 1944 om een ​​wapenstilstand en nederlaag te accepteren, voorkwam een ​​Sovjetbezetting en beperkte de onnodige verwoesting die was aangericht door een oorlog die 100.000 Finse levens had gekost. Het was een wanhopige beslissing, maar zoals de Finse historicus Kimmo Rentola benadrukt in zijn boek How Finland Survived Stalin (Yale University Press 2023), was het geboren uit zowel kracht als zwakte. De Finnen hadden hun moed getoond in twee oorlogen met de Sovjets. Ze hadden aanzienlijke territoriale en menselijke verliezen geleden, maar de kern van hun land bleef onder controle van Helsinki. De Finse politieke instellingen en maatschappelijke structuren bleven intact. De nationale eenheid werd gehavend, maar niet verbroken, en de Finse regering behield haar coherentie en beslissingsbevoegdheid.

De Sovjet-wapenstilstandsvoorwaarden waren streng, maar niet al te zwaar: extra territoriale verliezen in het gebied van Salla en Petsamo, een marinebasis op het schiereiland Porkkala ten zuiden van Helsinki (die de Sovjets in 1956 teruggaven), 300 miljoen dollar aan herstelbetalingen, een verbod op fascistische organisaties, bestraffing van oorlogsmisdadigers en legalisering van de communistische partij. De Finnen moesten ook alle banden met Duitsland verbreken en Duitse troepen met geweld van hun grondgebied verdrijven.

Onder deze omstandigheden had het zeker veel erger kunnen aflopen. Zoals een personage in Väinö Linna's grote Finse oorlogsroman – De Onbekende Soldaat – zei: "De Unie van Socialistische Sovjetrepublieken won, maar het volhardende kleine Finland kwam op een respectabele tweede plaats."

Van alle vijandelijke staten die tijdens de Tweede Wereldoorlog door het Rode Leger werden verslagen, was Finland de enige die onbezet bleef. De Finse communistische partij behoorde echter tot de sterkste van Europa – ze won een kwart van de stemmen bij de verkiezingen van 1945 – en het gevaar van een door de Sovjet-Unie gesteunde machtsovername bleef bestaan.

Die dreiging werd weggenomen door de ondertekening in 1948 van het Fins-Russische Verdrag van Vriendschap, Samenwerking en Wederzijdse Veiligheid – het pact dat de relatie van Finland met de Sovjet-Unie tijdens de Koude Oorlog vormgaf als zowel een buffer- als een brugstaat. Helsinki beloofde de noordflank van Moskou te verdedigen, maar was verder vrij om een ​​onafhankelijk, niet-gebonden buitenlands beleid te voeren. De Sovjets maakten evenmin bezwaar tegen een militair sterk Finland, zolang de 'gewapende neutraliteit' ervan niet tegen hen gericht was. Op binnenlands vlak bleven de Finnen hun eigen zaken regelen, inclusief de verwijdering in juli 1948 van de communisten uit de coalitieregering die tot dan toe het naoorlogse Finland had geregeerd.

Een belangrijke architect van het beleid dat later 'Finlandisering' werd genoemd, was Urho Kekkonen, premier en president van Finland gedurende een groot deel van de jaren vijftig, zestig en zeventig. Kekkonens stelregel was dat hoe meer vertrouwen de Sovjets in Finland hadden, hoe meer vrijheid het land had in zowel buitenlandse als binnenlandse aangelegenheden. Zijn grootste prestatie was het organiseren van de Helsinki-conferentie over Veiligheid en Samenwerking in Europa in 1975 – het hoogtepunt van de Oost-West-détente tijdens de Eerste Koude Oorlog.

Kekkonens relaties met zijn Sovjet-partners grensden aan het intieme. Geen enkele buitenlandse leider werd door de Sovjets met meer respect en eerbied behandeld, zelfs de leiders van andere communistische staten niet.

Oekraïne heeft al meer schade geleden dan de meeste landen tijdens de Tweede Wereldoorlog, inclusief Finland. Het heeft 20% van zijn grondgebied verloren. De samenleving is gehavend, gekneusd en verdeeld, en de interne politieke cohesie staat op de rand van de afgrond. Maar het blijft een functionerende staat, waarvan de regering de centrale territoriale kern van het land blijft controleren. Niemand twijfelt aan de moed en veerkracht van de Oekraïense strijdkrachten. In tegenstelling tot Finland in de jaren 40 heeft Oekraïne sterke internationale steun en het potentieel voor een snel herstel na de oorlog.

Het is nog niet te laat voor de Oekraïense leiders om de gewichtige en moedige beslissing te nemen om 'een respectabele tweede' grens te overschrijden.