Saturday, December 30, 2017

687 De 'Moslim Terreur' is in Washington bedacht en geproduceerd.

Hier een hoofdstuk uit het boek van William Engdahl:


Chapter Ten:

CIA Backs a “New Ottoman Caliphate” in Eurasia


“You must move in the arteries of the system without anyone noticing your existence until you reach all the power centers. . . . You must wait for the time when you are complete and conditions are ripe, until we can shoulder the entire world and carry it. . . . You must wait until such time as you have gotten all the state power . . . in Turkey. . . . Until that time, any step taken would be too early—like breaking an egg without waiting the full forty days for it to hatch.”
—Imam Fetullah Gülen, CIA-asset in a sermon to followers in Turkey

                     
“Because of the large amount of money that Gülen’s movement uses to finance his projects, there are claims that he has secret agreements with Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkic governments. There are suspicions that the CIA is a co-payer in financing these projects.”
—US State Department in a hearing opposing Gülen’s application for US residency





Fethullah Gülen’s Spider Net
As they were deploying Osama bin Laden’s Arab Mujahideen “holy warriors” into Chechnya and the Caucasus during the 1990s—in order to secure oil pipeline routes for the Anglo-American oil companies independent of Russian control—the CIA, working with a network of self-styled “neoconservatives” in Washington, began to build their most ambitious political Islam project ever.

It was called the Fethullah Gülen Movement, also known in Turkish as Cemaat, or “The Society.” Their focus was Hizmet, or what they defined as the “duty of Service” to the Islamic community. Curiously enough, the Turkish movement was based out of Saylorsburg, Pennsylvania, in the scenic foothills of the Pocono Mountains. There, its key figure, the reclusive Fethullah Gülen, was busy building a global network of Islam schools, businesses, and foundations, all with untraceable funds.[i] His Gülen Movement, or Cemaat, had no main address, no mailbox, no official organizational registration, no central bank account, nothing. His followers never demonstrated for Sharia or Jihad—their operations were all hidden from view.

In 2008, US Government court filings estimated the global value of Gülen’s empire at anywhere between $25 and $50 billion. No one could prove how large it was as there were no independent audits. In a US Court testimony during the hearing on Gülen’s petition for a special US Green Card permanent residence status, one loyal Cemaat journalist described the nominal extent of Gülen’s empire:
The projects sponsored by Gülen-inspired followers today number in the thousands, span international borders and are costly in terms of human and financial capital. These initiatives include over 2000 schools and seven universities in more than ninety countries in five continents, two modern hospitals, the Zaman newspaper (now in both a Turkish and English edition), a television channel (Samanyolu), a radio channel (Burc FM), CHA (a major Turkish news agency), Aksiyon (a leading weekly news magazine), national and international Gülen conferences, Ramadan interfaith dinners, interfaith dialog trips to Turkey from countries around the globe and the many programs sponsored by the Journalists and Writers Foundation. In addition, the Isik insurance company and Bank Asya, an Islamic bank, are affiliated with the Gülen community.[ii]

Bank Asya was listed among the Top 500 Banks in the world by London’s Banker magazine. It had joint-venture banking across Muslim Africa, from Senegal to Mali in a strategic cooperation agreement with the Islamic Development Bank’s Senegal-based Tamweel Africa Holding SA.[iii]Zaman, which also owned the English-language Today’s Zaman, was the largest daily paper in Turkey. The journalist’s description of the Gülen holdings named in the US Court document was very carefully formulated, especially with the statement “projects sponsored by Gülen-inspired followers,” which left actual ownership conveniently vague and completely untraceable.

By the late 1990s, Gülen’s movement had attracted the alarm and attention of an anti-NATO wing of the Turkish military and of the Ankara government.

After leading a series of brilliant military campaigns in the 1920s to win the Independence War that he initiated against an invasion by  foreign and allied forces of British, Greek, Italian, French, and other victors of World War I, Ataturk had established the modern Turkish state. He then launched a series of political, economic, and cultural reforms aimed at transforming the religiously-based Ottoman Caliphate into a modern, secular, and democratic nation-state. He built thousands of new schools, made primary education free and compulsory, and gave women equal civil and political rights, and reduced the burden of taxation on peasants.

Gülen and his movement aimed at nothing less than to roll-back the remains of that modern, secular Kemalism in Turkey, and return to the Caliphate of yore. In one of his writings to members, he declared, “With the patience of a spider we lay our net until people get caught in it.”[iv]

In 1998, Gülen defected to the US shortly before a treasonous speech he had made to his followers at a private gathering was made public. He had been recorded calling on his supporters to “work patiently and to creep silently into the institutions in order to seize power in the state,” treason by the Ataturk constitution of Turkey.

“Confronting the World” from Pennsylvania

In 1999, Turkish television aired footage of Gülen delivering a sermon to a crowd of followers in which he revealed his aspirations for an Islamist Turkey ruled by Sharia (Islamic law), as well as the specific methods that should be used to attain that goal. In the secret sermon, Gülen said,
You must move in the arteries of the system without anyone noticing your existence until you reach all the power centers . . . until the conditions are ripe, they [the followers] must continue like this. . . You must wait for the time when you are complete and conditions are ripe, until we can shoulder the entire world and carry it. . . You must wait until such time as you have gotten all the state power, until you have brought to your side all the power of the constitutional institutions in Turkey. . . Until that time, any step taken would be too early—like breaking an egg without waiting the full forty days for it to hatch. It would be like killing the chick inside. The work to be done is in confronting the world. Now, I have expressed my feelings and thoughts to you all—in confidence. . . trusting your loyalty and secrecy.[v]


Shortly after Gülen fled to Pennsylvania, Turkish prosecutors demanded a ten-year sentence against him for having “founded an organization that sought to destroy the secular apparatus of state and establish a theocratic state.”

Gülen never left the United States after that time, curiously enough, even though the Islamist Erdoğan courts later cleared him in 2006 of all charges.[vi] His refusal to return, even after being cleared by a then friendly Erdoğan Islamist AKP government, heightened the conviction among opponents in Turkey about his close CIA ties.

Gülen was charged in 2000 by the then secular Turkish courts of having committed treason. Claiming diabetes as a medical reason, Fethullah Gülen had managed to escape to a permanent exile in the United States, with the help of some very powerful CIA and State Department friends, before his indictment was handed down.[vii] Some suspected he was forewarned.

Outwardly, Gülen cultivated an appealing profile on his official website as a purveyor of a “modern,” peaceful Sufi form of Islam, one adapted to today’s world. It wasn’t the 16th century harsh Islam of the Wahhabite Bedouins of the Saudi Arabian desert. Under a benign-looking portrait of a pensive, almost philosophical Gülen stood the slogan, “Understanding and Respect.” Self-promoting articles with titles such as “Islamic scholar Gülen’s poems turned into songs for international album,” were typical, all praising the sublime wisdom of Gülen, giving an aura of Sufi tranquility, peace, and love.[viii]

In a 2008 profile, The New York Times described Gülen’s organization, by then firmly entrenched across the United States with more than one hundred state-financed Charter Schools: “The Gulen movement. . . does not seek to subvert modern secular states, but encourages practicing Muslims to use to the full the opportunities they offer. It is best understood as the Islamic equivalent of Christian movements appealing to business and the professions.”[ix] A better press promotion was hard to imagine. Similar articles or coverage of Gülen with uncritical praise emerged from the mainstream Western media ranging from the London Economist to CNN.

Gülen’s ultra-professional website claimed that the Gülen Movement, “funds all of its activities by donations from members of the community from the general public and does not accept any help support from governments in any form. This approach has helped the Movement stay away from corruption and politics.”[x]

Because of the movement’s large and extensive business holdings, Gülen’s Hizmet had been described as having “characteristics of a cult or of an Islamic Opus Dei.” The comparison was perhaps more than to the point, in many respects.[xi]

CIA Gives Wolf Sheep’s Clothing

Unlike the CIA’s Mujahideen Jihadists, like Hekmatyar in Afghanistan or Naser Orić in Bosnia, the CIA decided to give Fethullah Gülen a radically different image. No blood-curdling, head-severing, human-heart-eating Jihadist, Fethullah Gülen was presented to the world as a man of “peace, love and brotherhood,” even managing to grab a photo op with Pope John Paul II, which Gülen featured prominently on his website.​​​​​​​

Image
 Gülen and the late Pope John Paul II in Rome in 1998, posing as a man of peace and ecumenical harmony.
 
The Gülen organization in the US hired one of Washington’s highest-paid Public Relations image experts, George W. Bush’s former campaign director, Karen Hughes, to massage his “moderate” Islam image.[xii] “Why is this Imam different from all other Imams?” was the essential message.

In reality, he was no different in goals from Hassan al-Banna or the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem or Said Ramadan or other Muslim Brotherhood leaders of the past eighty or more years whose strategy was to establish a new Islamic Caliphate under strict Islamic Sharia law. But, unlike the projects of al-Banna and the Egyptian Brotherhood, the Gülen project centered on the creation of a New Ottoman Caliphate, retracing the vast Eurasian domain of the former Ottoman Turkic Caliphates. Gülen, the Turkish wolf, simply had a better tailor to cut and form the sheep’s clothing.

Notably, when Gülen fled Turkey to avoid prosecution for treason in 1998, he chose not to go to any of perhaps a dozen Islamic countries which could have offered him asylum. He chose, instead, the United States. He did so with the help of the CIA.

In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, and the ensuing climate of closer scrutiny of Islamic groups in the United States, the US Government’s Department of Homeland Security and the US State Department both opposed Gülen’s application for what was called a “preference visa as an alien of extraordinary ability in the field of education.”

They presented a detailed Court argument demonstrating that the fifth-grade dropout, Fethullah Gülen, should not be granted a preference visa. They argued that his background,

contains overwhelming evidence that plaintiff is not an expert in the field of education, is not an educator, and is certainly not one of a small percentage of experts in the field of education who have risen to the very top of that field. Further, the record contains overwhelming evidence that plaintiff is primarily the leader of a large and influential religious and political movement with immense commercial holdings. The record further showed that much of the acclaim that plaintiff claimed to have achieved had been sponsored and financed by plaintiff’s own movement.[xiii]
 
Image
Until an open clash in 2013, Fetullah Gülen (left) was the éminence grise behind Recep Erdoğan’s AK Party; Gülen is widely branded in Turkey as a CIA asset.
 
However, over the objections of the FBI, of the US State Department, and of the US Department of Homeland Security, three former CIA operatives intervened and managed to secure a Green Card and permanent US residency for Gülen. In their court argument opposing the Visa, US State Department attorneys had notably argued, “Because of the large amount of money that Gülen’s movement uses to finance his projects, there are claims that he has secret agreements with Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkic governments. There are suspicions that the CIA is a co-payer in financing these projects.”[xiv]

Gülen’s CIA “Friends”

The three CIA people supporting Gülen’s Green Card application were former US Ambassador to Turkey George Fidas, Morton Abramowitz, and Graham E. Fuller. They headed a list of twenty-nine persons who signed statements backing Gülen’s US Visa appeal.[xv]

George Fidas had worked thirty-one years at the CIA dealing, among other things, with the Balkans, and had held a very senior position under the CIA Deputy Director on retiring. When he left the CIA, he joined the highly secretive faculty of the US Joint Military Intelligence College.[xvi]

Morton Abramowitz was reportedly also with the CIA, if “informally.”[xvii] He had been named US Ambassador to Turkey in 1989 by President George H.W. Bush. Sibel Edmonds, former FBI Turkish translator and “whistleblower,” named Abramowitz, along with Graham E. Fuller, as part of a dark cabal within the US Government that she discovered were using networks out of Turkey to advance a criminal, “deep state” agenda across the Turkic world, from Istanbul into China. The network that she documented included significant involvement in heroin trafficking out of Afghanistan.[xviii]

On retiring from the State Department, Abramowitz served on the board of the US Congress-financed National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and was a cofounder, along with George Soros, of the International Crisis Group. Both the NED and International Crisis Group were implicated in various US “Color Revolutions” since the 1990s collapse of the Soviet Union, fromOtpor in Serbia to the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine, to the 2009 Green Revolution in Iran, to the 2011 Lotus Revolution in Tahrir Square in Egypt.[xix]

Journalist Diane Johnstone described Abramowitz’ International Crisis Group as, “a high-level think tank supported by financier George Soros. . .devised primarily to provide policy guidance to governments involved in the NATO-led reshaping of the Balkans.” Johnstone added, “its leading figures include top US policymaker Morton Abramowitz, the eminence grise of NATO’s new ‘humanitarian intervention’ policy and sponsor of Kosovo Albanian [KLA—F.W.E.] separatists.”[xx]

The Board members and “advisers” to Abramowitz’ International Crisis Group included the former US National Security Adviser and architect of the Afghan Mujahideen strategy of the 1980s, Zbigniew Brzezinski; Prince Turki al-Faisal, former head of Saudi Intelligence and former Ambassador of Saudi Arabia to the US; General Wesley Clark, former US NATO Supreme Allied Commander who ran the USA’s illegal bombing of Serbia in 1999; and former NATO Secretary-General, Javier Solana.[xxi]

As head of Saudi Intelligence in the early 1980s, Prince Turki al-Faisal had played a central role working with Pakistan’s ISI intelligence and the CIA to create the Afghan Mujahideen. It was Turki who personally sent Osama bin Laden, a Saudi from an extremely wealthy family close to the Saudi monarchy, into Pakistan near the Afghan border some weeks before the December 1979 Soviet invasion. Bin Laden’s mission was to establish the Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK) to help finance, recruit, and train Mujahideen fighters in Afghanistan to fight the Soviets. Prince Turki had been informed beforehand by US intelligence of the imminent Soviet invasion to come at the end of 1979.[xxii]

Abramowitz and his International Crisis Group cohorts were not really a group that could be accused of excessive love of democracy or human rights. Their name belied their actual intent—fostering international crises to advance a covert deep state Washington agenda.

Abramowitz and Graham E. Fuller, both with extensive experience and knowledge inside Turkish political Islam, were also well acquainted with each other. Abramowitz even wrote the forward to one of Fuller’s books on the Turkish Kurdish question.[xxiii]
Graham E. Fuller, the third CIA “friend” of Fethullah Gülen, was also no low-level CIA numbers analyst. He had been immersed in the CIA’s activities in steering Mujahideen and other political Islamic organizations since the 1980s. He spent 20 years as CIA operations officer stationed in Turkey, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Afghanistan and was one of the CIA’s early advocates of using the Muslim Brotherhood and similar Islamist organizations to advance US foreign policy.[xxiv]
In 1982, Graham Fuller had been appointed the National Intelligence Officer for Near East and South Asia at CIA. There he was responsible for Afghanistan, where he had served as CIA Station Chief, for Central Asia, and for Turkey. In 1986, under Ronald Reagan, Fuller became the Vice-Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, with overall responsibility for national level strategic forecasting.[xxv]
Fuller, author of The Future of Political Islam, was also the key CIA figure to convince the Reagan Administration to tip the balance in the eight-year long Iran-Iraq war by using Israel to illegally channel weapons to Iran in what became the Iran-Contra Affair.[xxvi]
In 1988, as the Afghan Mujahideen war was winding down, Fuller “retired” from the CIA with a last rank as a very senior Deputy Director of the CIA’s National Council on Intelligence, to go over to the RAND Corporation, presumably to avoid embarrassment around his role in the Iran-Contra scandal for then Presidential candidate George H.W. Bush, Fuller’s former boss at CIA.[xxvii]
RAND was a Pentagon- and CIA-linked neoconservative Washington think tank. Indications are that Fuller’s work at RAND was instrumental in developing the CIA strategy for building the Gülen Movement as a geopolitical force to penetrate former Soviet Central Asia. Among his RAND papers, Fuller wrote studies on Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey, Sudan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Algeria, the “survivability” of Iraq, and the “New Geopolitics of Central Asia” after the fall of the USSR, where Fethullah Gülen’s cadre were sent to establish Gülen schools and Madrassas.
In 1999, while at RAND, Fuller advocated using Muslim forces to further US interests in Central Asia against both China and Russia. He stated, “The policy of guiding the evolution of Islam and of helping them against our adversaries worked marvelously well in Afghanistan against the Russians. The same doctrines can still be used to destabilize what remains of Russian power, and especially to counter the Chinese influence in Central Asia.”[xxviii]
Clearly, by all evidence, Fuller and his associates in and around a certain faction in the US intelligence community intended their man, Fethullah Gülen, to play a major role, perhaps themajor role, in their operations to “destabilize what remains of Russian power, and especially to counter the Chinese influence in Central Asia.”[xxix]

Since the 1990s the Caucasus, including Chechnya, were a major preoccupation of CIA insurgency and terror operations using Jihadist Muslims.
​​​​​​​
Image
 CIA career man Graham E. Fuller was a key backer of Fetullah Gülen and architect of the CIA Islam strategy since Afghanistan’s Mujahideen.
 
Embarrassing ties between Graham Fuller and that network of CIA-backed Caucasus Jihadists came to light in the aftermath of the April 2013 “Boston bombers” attack. The two accused “bomber” brothers, Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, had an uncle born in Chechnya named Ruslan Tsarnaev. Ruslan was married in the 1990s until their divorce in 1999 to Samantha A. Fuller, the daughter of Graham E. Fuller.[xxx]

Fuller even admitted that “Uncle Ruslan” had lived in Fuller’s home in the suburban Washington area and that Fuller went several times to the Caucasus and Kyrgyzstan in Central Asia just as the CIA was heating up the Chechen Islamic terror against Moscow, allegedly to “visit” his daughter and son-in-law.[xxxi]

Ruslan Tsarnaev, who changed his name to Ruslan Tsarni, had worked in the past for companies tied to Dick Cheney’s Halliburton, as well as working as a “consultant” in Kazakhstan on the Caspian Sea in the 1990s with the State Department’s USAID, which has been widely identified as a CIA front.[xxxii]

Graham Fuller and Fethullah Gülen apparently enjoyed a kind of mutual admiration society. In 2008, just around the time he wrote a letter of recommendation to the US Government asking to give Gülen the special US residence visa, Fuller wrote a book titled The New Turkish Republic: Turkey as a Pivotal State in the Muslim World. At the center of the book was a paean of praise for Gülen and his “moderate” Islamic Gülen Movement in Turkey:
Gülen’s charismatic personality makes him the number one Islamic figure of Turkey. The Gülen Movement has the largest and most powerful infrastructure and financial resources of any movement in the country. . . . The movement has also become international by virtue of its far-flung system of schools. . . in more than a dozen countries including the Muslim countries of the former Soviet Union, Russia, France and the United States.[xxxiii]

CIA and Gülen in Central Asia

Once safely entrenched in his remote, guarded compound in rural Pennsylvania, Graham Fuller’s Turkish friend, Fethullah Gülen, and Gülen’s global political Islam Cemaat spread across the Caucasus and into the heart of Central Asia all the way to Xinjiang Province in western China, doing precisely what Fuller had called for in his 1999 statement: “destabilize what remains of Russian power, and especially to counter the Chinese influence in Central Asia.”[xxxiv]

Gülen’s organization had been active in that destabilizing with help from the CIA almost the moment the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, when the nominally Muslim Central Asian former Soviet republics declared their independence from Moscow.

Gülen was named by one former FBI authoritative source as “one of the main CIA operation figures in Central Asia and the Caucasus.”[xxxv]

By the mid-1990s, more than seventy-five Gülen schools had spread to Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and even to Dagestan and Tatarstan in Russia amid the chaos of the post-Soviet Boris Yeltsin era. The schools all followed the same “elite school” model, offering high-quality education in the native language, Russian, as well as Turkish and English, and selecting pupils only from “best” families, whose sons would clearly become future leaders of those countries.


[i] Guardian, Turkey up from the depths, The Guardian, 27 December 2013, accessed in

[ii] Cited in Fethullah Gulen v. Michael Chertoff, Secretary, U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security, et al., Case 2:07-cv-02148-SD, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

[iii] Wikipedia, Bank Asya, accessed in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bank_Asya.

[iv] Maximilian Popp, Islam: Der Pate 1.Teil, Der Spiegel, 06. August 2012, accessed in

[v] Rachel Sharon-Krespin, Fethullah Gülen's Grand Ambition-Turkey's Islamist Danger, Middle East Quarterly, Winter 2009, pp. 55–66.

[vi] AP, Gulen acquitted of trying to overthrow secular government, AP, May 6, 2006, accessed in http://wwrn.org/articles/21432/?&place=turkey&section=church-state.


[vii] Sibel Edmonds, Turkish Intel Chief Exposes CIA Operations via Islamic Group in Central Asia, January 6, 2011, accessed in http://www.boilingfrogspost.com/2011/01/06/turkish-intel-chief-exposes-cia-operations-via-islamic-group-in-central-asia/.

[viii] Official website, Fethullah Gülen, accessed in http://www.fethullah-gulen.org/.

[ix] TURKEY: Fethullah Gulen profile, The New York Times, January 8, 2008, accessed inhttp://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/18/world/europe/18iht-19oxan-Turkishpreacherprofile.9324128.html?_r=1&.

[x] Gülen Movement, accessed in http://www.fethullah-gulen.org/.

[xi] Guardian, Turkey: up from the depths, The Guardian, 27 December 2013, accessed inhttp://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/dec/27/turkey-murky-depths.

[xii] Sibel Edmonds, Turkish Imam Fethullah Gulen Nabs George Bush PR Queen, Boiling Frogs Post, April 5, 2011, accessed in http://www.boilingfrogspost.com/2011/04/05/turkish-imam-fethullah-gulen-nabs-george-bush-pr-queen/.

[xiii] Fethullah Gulen v. Michael Chertoff, op. cit.
[xiv] AnkerMizgîn, Gülen, the CIA and the American Deep State, Rastibini Blogspot, June 29, 2008, accessed in http://rastibini.blogspot.de/2008/06/glen-cia-and-american-deep-state.html.
[xv] Sibel Edmonds, Boston Terror CIAs Graham Fuller and NATO CIA Operation Gladio B Caucasus and Central Asia, Boiling Frogs Post, April 27, 2013, accessed inhttp://www.boilingfrogspost.com/2013/04/27/bfp-breaking-news-boston-terror-cias-graham-fuller-nato-cia-operation-gladio-b-caucasus-central-asia/.

[xvii] Sibel Edmonds, Boston Terror CIA’s Graham . . ., op. cit.

[xviii] Ibid.

[xix] Michael Barker, Taking the Risk Out of Civil Society: Harnessing Social movements and Regulating Revolutions, Australasian Political Studies Association Conference, University of Newcastle 25–27 September 2006, accessed in http://www.newcastle.edu.au/school/ept/politics/apsa/PapersFV/IntRel_IPE/Barker,%20Michael.pdf.

[xx] Diane Johnstone, How it is Done: Taking over the Trepca Mines, The Emperor’s New Clothes, February 28, 2000, accessed in http://emperors-clothes.com/articles/Johnstone/howitis2.htm.

[xxi] International Crisis Group website, accessed in http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/about/board.aspx.

[xxii] Craig Unger, House of Bush, House of Saud—The Secret Relationship between the World’s Two Most Powerful Dynasties, London, Scribner, 2004, p. 100.

[xxiii] Mizgîn, op. cit.

[xxiv] Center for Grassroots Oversight, Profile: Graham Fuller, The Center for Grassroots Oversight, accessed in http://www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=graham_fuller.

[xxv] Sibel Edmonds, Boston Terror, CIA’s Graham Fuller . . ., op. cit.

[xxvi] Center for Grassroots Oversight, op. cit.

[xxvii] Wikipedia, Graham E. Fuller.

[xxviii] Richard Labeviere, Dollars for Terror: The United States and Islam, Algora Publishing, 2000, p. 6.

[xxix] Sibel Edmonds, Graham Fuller: Edmonds’ State Secrets Privilege, FBI Gladio-B Target, Handler-Sponsor of Turkey’s Imam Gulen, Boiling Frogs Post, April 27, 2013, accessed inhttp://www.boilingfrogspost.com/2013/04/27/bfp-breaking-news-boston-terror-cias-graham-fuller-nato-cia-operation-gladio-b-caucasus-central-asia/#sthash.BVO1WENE.dpuf.

[xxx] F. William Engdahl, Graham Fuller, Uncle Ruslan, the CIA and the Boston Bombings: Part I,
Voltaire Network, 20 May 2013, accessed in http://www.voltairenet.org/article178524.html?var_mode=calcul.

[xxxi] Emine Dilek, The Tale of Uncle Tsarnaev CIA Chief Graham Fuller and a Turkish Islamist Who Lives in USA, April 27, 2013, accessed in http://www.progressivepress.net/the-tale-of-uncle-tsarnaev-cia-chief-graham-fuller-and-a-turkish-islamist-who-lives-in-usa/.

[xxxii] F. William Engdahl, Graham Fuller . . ., op. cit.

[xxxiii] Graham E. Fuller, The New Turkish Republic: Turkey as a Pivotal State in the Muslim World, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C., 2008, p. 56.

[xxxiv] Richard Labeviere, op. cit.

[xxxv] Sibel Edmonds, Boston Terror, CIA’s Graham Fuller . . ., op. cit.

686 Twintig 'aangeboren' denkfouten die men gemakkelijk maakt.




Doc> 1 Interessant> 20 fallacies

NB: Dit gaat over de bedrading van onze hersenen. Die heeft zwakheden. 
Je kunt in een discussie of redenering ook gebruik maken van die zwakheden en zo op misleidende manier een debat te winnen. Zulke misleidende trick noemt men Fallacies, ofwel drogredenen.  

ONDERSTAAND SCHEMA  komt van de Harvard universiteit, en heb ik door Google translate vertaald. Soms zet ik er in donker rood mijn eigen opmerkingen bij. 

HIER is een nog veel uitgebreider schema. U vind het ook onder dit artikel, maar daar is het te klein om te kunnen lezen.

20 denkfouten die een juiste analyse van de wereld bemoeilijken.

1         Anchoring bias
People are overreliant on the first piece of information they hear.
In a salary negotiation, for instance, whoever makes the first offer establishes a range of reasonable possibilities in each person's mind.
Any counteroffer will naturally be anchored by that opening offer.

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Verankering vooroordeel
Mensen zijn hechten te veel waarde aan het eerste stukje informatie dat ze horen, over een bepaald onderwerp.
Bij een salarisonderhandeling bijvoorbeeld plant degene die het eerste aanbod doet een reeks redelijke mogelijkheden in ieders gedachten.
Elke tegenbod zal door dat openingsaanbod worden beïnvloed. Als een anker trekt dat eerste bod de daarop volgende aanbiedingen zijn richting uit. 

Wie het eerst duidt, bepaalt in grote mate de interpretatie van de gebeurtenis
Daarom is de kop boven een kranten-artikel zo belangrijk. Het geeft aan vanuit welk standpunt de gebeurtenis moet worden geïnterpreteerd: Glas half vol of glas half leeg. Feitelijk is er geen verschil.

Een eigen voorbeeld dat lijkt op het voorbeeld hierboven over de salaris onderhandelingen: Ik kende een handelaar die op een veiling bewust als eerste een bod deed op iets, en dat was dan belachelijk laag.   Dan bepaalt hij toch dat de range van de biedingen aan de lage kant blijft. Zou hij juist een belachelijk hoog eerste bod hebben gedaan, dan was de range van biedingen hoger geweest.  Zou hij zijn belachelijke bod pas doen nadat drie redelijke boden waren geweest, dan had hij geen effect gehad.
Mechanisme: andere kopers worden onzeker, twijfelen aan hun eigen oordeel ( hebben zie iets gemist ?), en bieden aan de voorzichtige kant.  

************************************************************

2         Availability heuristic
When people overestimate the importance of information that is available to them.
For instance, a person might argue that smoking is not unhealthy on the basis that his grandfather lived to 100 and smoked three packs a day.

----------------------------------
Beschikbaarheid heuristiek
Wanneer mensen het belang van informatie overschatten die voor hen beschikbaar is.
Een persoon zou bijvoorbeeld kunnen beweren dat roken niet ongezond is op basis van het feit dat zijn grootvader 100 jaar oud was en drie packs per dag rookte.

Heuristiek =  
= Leer van het methodisch zoeken, gebruikmakend van een bepaald aantal vuistregels in een acceptabele rekentijd. 
= De kunst om door logisch redeneren stap voor stap tot een bepaalde waarheid te komen.
= 1) Uitvindingsleer 2) Wetenschap om methodisch iets te vinden. 

Er is een belangrijke vraag voor elk mens: Wie zijn de good guys, en wie de bad guys.
( Wie beschermt mij in geval van nood, en wie kan me gaan aanvallen eventueel, Wie is 'ingroup'en wie is 'outgroup'.)
Weinigen kunnen zelf die vraag onderzoeken, en dus moet men vertrouwen op 'wat de meeste mensen denken' en wat 'opinie-leiders' er van denken. Die werkwijze is evolutionair gezien het beste gebleken. Maar wat als een 'vijandige elite' de opinie-leiders heeft opgekocht en geselecteerd. En als daardoor 'de meeste mensen om ons heen' in leugens geloven?  

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3         Bandwagon effect
The probability of one person adopting a belief increases based on the number of people who hold that belief. This is a powerful form of groupthink — and it's a reason meetings are often unproductive.
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Bandwagon-effect
De waarschijnlijkheid dat een persoon een geloofsopvattingen aanvaardt, neemt toe op basis van het aantal mensen dat die overtuiging bezit. Dit is een krachtige vorm van groepsdenken - en het is een reden dat vergaderingen vaak niet productief zijn.

Evolutionair gezien is het logisch dat we er toe neigen om het standpunt van de meerderheid over te nemen. Een groep die intern verdeeld is heeft minder kans van overleven. Een indiviudu dat ànders denkt dan zijn medeburgers, kan op de brandstapel komen, of zal geen goede huwelijkspartner vinden en zich dus minder goed voortplanten.
Uit onderzoek blijkt dat een nieuw inzicht of een nieuwe ontdekking weinig volgers krijgt, ook al is het overtuigend, zolang minder dan 10% van het volk er in gelooft.  Komt het boven de 10%,dan wordt het daarna vrij snel door de hele groep overgenomen.
( Denk aan de proefjes waarbij proefpersonen vier strepen moeten rangschikken in volgorde van lengte: als de eerste “proefpersonen” het duidelijk fout doen, dan doet de echte proefpersoon het ook fout, want hij is onzeker van zichzelf. )

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4         Blind-spot bias
Failing to recognize your cognitive biases is a bias in itself.
Notably, Princeton psychologist Emily Pronin has found that "individuals see the existence and operation of cognitive and motivational biases much more in others than in themselves."
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Blind voor de eigen voor-ingenomenheid.
Het niet opmerken van uw cognitieve vooroordelen is een vooroordeel op zichzelf.
Met name Princeton-psycholoog Emily Pronin heeft geconstateerd dat "individuen het bestaan ​​en de werking van cognitieve en motivationele vooroordelen veel meer in anderen dan in zichzelf zien."

Dit is de ‘moeder van alle domheid’ want de aangeboren neiging om te denken dat je zelf gelijk hebt is heel sterk.  Blijkbaar is dat evolutionair gezien toch een voordeel.

Mijn strategie hiertegen is als volgt:  Ga actief op zoek naar bronnen die mijn eigen wereldbeeld falsifieren. ( Als ik denk dat alle zwanen wit zijn, moet ik heel erg zoeken of ik een zwaan vind die zwart is.)  Achterliggende gedachte hierbij is:  Ik ben geneigd om het eigen bestaande wereldbeeld te verdedigen. Maar àls dat fout is, dan is dat minder waardevol ( en minder machtig) dan wanneer het correct is.  Ik moet dus door de zure appel heen bijten en fouten van mezelf toegeven en daarmee mijn wereldbeeld verbeteren. Dat maakt mij 'beter' en sterker.
NB: een probleem hierbij is natuurlijk dat veel zaken tegelijkertijd waar en onwaar zijn. Trump is goed, en hij is slecht. Het wordt steeds beter in de wereld, en het wordt steeds slechter.
Bij dat falsifieren denk ik dus vooral aan de bouwstenen van het wereldbeeld: is het islam-terreur door Het Westen veroorzaakt, of is het uit zichzelf ontstaan. ( Ik denk het eerste. Zie volgende blog).
Dit is een van de belangrijke vragen in de huidige wereld. En de propaganda hierover is volgens mij een leugen.
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5         Choice-supportive bias
When you choose something, you tend to feel positive about it, even if the choice has flaws. You think that your dog is awesome — even if it bites people every once in a while — and that other dogs are stupid, since they're not yours.
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Keuze-ondersteunende vooringenomenheid
Wanneer je iets kiest, ben je geneigd je er positief over te voelen, zelfs als de keuze gebreken vertoont. Je denkt dat je hond geweldig is - zelfs als hij af en toe mensen bijt - en dat andere honden stom zijn, omdat ze niet van jou zijn.

Ja, men is geneigd over de eigen keuzes veel positiever te oordelen.
Maar het gaat nog verder: In groepen worden mensen soms tot bepaald gedrag gedwongen. 
Vb: mensen moeten applaudisseren voor een toespraak van  Saddam, of van Netanyahu in Het Congres. Ze weten dat er op hen gelet wordt ( door AIPAC) en dat het schade oplevert als ze niet uitbundig applaudisseren.
Er is dan een kloof tussen eigen gedrag en eigen mening.
Dat heet een Cognitieve Dissonantie. ( Een wanklank in jouw hoofd, iets wringt. iets klopt er niet.) 
Die wordt door de mens opgeheven door zijn mening in overeenstemming te brengen met zijn gedrag:  hij gaat zijn mening over Saddam en Netanyahu in positievere richting veranderen, om de dissonantie op te heffen. (Normaal is jouw gedrag in overeenstemming met jouw mening, maar als de buitenwereld ander gedrag afdwingt, dan moet er dus ergens iets worden aangepast.
Dus óók als je die hond niet zelf hebt gekozen, tòch ga je hem verdedigen, zijn gedrag goedpraten. Dit gaat dus nog een stapje verder dan deze Harvard lijst.

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6         Clustering illusion
This is the tendency to see patterns in random events. It is central to various gambling fallacies, like the idea that red is more or less likely to turn up on a roulette table after a string of reds.
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Clustering van illusie
Dit is de neiging om patronen in willekeurige gebeurtenissen te zien. Het staat centraal in verschillende denkfouten, zoals het idee dat rood na een reeks rode kleuren meer of minder op een roulettetafel verschijnt.

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7         Confirmation bias
We tend to listen only to the information that confirms our preconceptions — one of the many reasons it's so hard to have an intelligent conversation about climate change.
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Voorkeur voor bevestiging
We hebben de neiging om alleen naar de informatie te luisteren die onze vooroordelen bevestigt - een van de vele redenen waarom het zo moeilijk is om een ​​intelligent gesprek te hebben over klimaatverandering.

Als we in de wereld rondlopen of naar het nieuws kijken, dan zijn we geneigd om alle berichten die tegenspreken wat wij denken dat de realiteit is, niet tot ons te nemen. 
We switchen het tv kanaal, we vragen iets aan de huisgenoot of we gaan koffie halen in de keuken.  Het nieuws-feit krijgt geen eerlijke kans om ons wereldbeeld te nuanceren. 

Maar als we iets horen of zien dat ons wereldbeeld bevestigd - en zeker als dat niet zo vaak gezegd wordt - dan zijn we een en al oor en zullen we dat niet vergeten. Het maakt onze overtuiging sterker: Zie je wel!  mìjn wereldbeeld is juist ! 

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8         Conservatism bias
Where people believe prior evidence more than new evidence or information that has emerged. People were slow to accept the fact that the Earth was round because they maintained their earlier understanding that the planet was flat.

Conservatisme vooringenomenheid
Waar mensen eerder bewijs geloven dan nieuw bewijs of informatie die naar voren is gekomen. Mensen waren traag om het feit te accepteren dat de aarde rond was omdat ze hun eerdere begrip handhaafden dat de planeet plat was.

Dus: De neiging om de bestaande overtuiging in eigen hoofd, te handhaven.
De eerste verklaring voor een gebeurtenis wordt als waarheid aangenomen ( zeker als er bewijs schijnt te zijn) en latere informatie kan dat maar heel moeilijk veranderen.
Zeker als de gebeurtenis als potentieel levensbedreigend wordt gezien. In zulke situaties moeten we snel beslissen en handelen en is elke twijfel gevaarlijk.

Daarom is een goede False Flag aanslag er een die in principe ook òns zou kunnen treffen en doden.  Wie daarvoor ter plekke verantwoordelijk wordt gesteld, komt nooit meer van dat stigma af:  dat hij een  ‘gevaar!’ is wordt in onze hersenen gegraveerd.  
 Op 911 belde CNN journaliste naar haar man en zei dat haar vliegtuig was gekaapt door moslims met stanleymessen. Haar man was secretaris generaal van Justitie, Ted Olsen.  Binnen 2 uur wist de hele wereld met zekerheid dat moslims 911 hadden gepleegd. Het werd in de hersenen gegraveerd.
Later bleek uit onderzoek van de FBI dat dit telefoongesprek nooit heeft kunnen plaatsvinden: technisch onmogelijk.
Er is maar één mogelijke bron voor dit verhgaal: Het is tevoren door mensen in het Pentagon bedacht.
Leo Tolstoy begreep al hoe moeilijk het is om een sterke overtuiging om te buigen, ook al heb je harde bewijzen:
"The most difficult subjects can be explained to the most slow- witted man if he has not formed any idea of them already; but the simplest thing cannot be made clear to the most intelligent man if he is firmly persuaded that he knows already, without a shadow of doubt, what is laid before him."  Leo Tolstoy

"De moeilijkste onderwerpen kunnen worden uitgelegd aan de meest traag van begrip zijnde man als hij zich nog geen mening heeft gevormd over de zaak, maar het eenvoudigste voorval kan niet duidelijk worden gemaakt aan de meest intelligente man als die al  stevig ervan overtuigd is dat hij al weet, zonder een schaduw van twijfel, wat er gebeurd is."
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9         Information bias
The tendency to seek information when it does not affect action. More information is not always better. Indeed, with less information, people can often make more accurate predictions.
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Informatiebias
De neiging om informatie te zoeken wanneer deze geen invloed heeft op de actie. Meer informatie is niet altijd beter. Inderdaad, met minder informatie kunnen mensen vaak nauwkeurigere voorspellingen doen.

Kun je met minder info nauwkeuriger beter voorspellen?  Dat zie ik niet meteen. 
Wat hier in elk geval bedoeld wordt is dat het uitstellen van een beslissing ook een prijs heeft, terwijl nog meer info die beslissing meestal niet beter maakt. 
Het meest efficiënt is de wetenschappelijke methode zoals Karl Popper die voorschreef: Kijk rond, bedenk een theorie over de werkelijkheid en zoek dan naar feiten die de theorie ontkennen. 
Heel lang blijven rondkijken maakt de theorie niet beter. 
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10       Ostrich effect
The decision to ignore dangerous or negative information by "burying" one's head in the sand, like an ostrich. Research suggests that investors check the value of their holdings significantly less often during bad markets.

But there's an upside to acting like a big bird, at least for investors. When you have limited knowledge about your holdings, you're less likely to trade, which generally translates to higher returns in the long run.
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Struisvogel effect
De beslissing om gevaarlijke of negatieve informatie te negeren door je hoofd in het zand te "begraven", zoals een struisvogel. Onderzoek wijst uit dat beleggers de waarde van hun beleggingen significant minder vaak controleren tijdens slechte markten.

Deze denkfout is heel wijd verbreid.  Heel veel mensen voelen wel aan dat het niet goed gaat met deze multi-samenleving, en dat we qua immigratie een pas op de plaats zouden moeten maken. Maar ja... En dan komen de uitvluchten: Ik ben ook maar 1 persoon. Ik weet er te weinig van af. Ik heb het al moeilijk genoeg met mijn eigen zaken etc. etc.   Het hoofd in het zand is een laffe maar gemakkelijke oplossing. En zo zijn al heel veel volkeren verdwenen of in de diepste ellende geraakt: kop in het zand en denken dat je toch niks kan doen...

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11       Outcome bias
Judging a decision based on the outcome — rather than how exactly the decision was made in the moment. Just because you won a lot in Vegas doesn't mean gambling your money was a smart decision.
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Uitkomstbias
Een beslissing beoordelen op basis van de uitkomst - in plaats van hoe precies de beslissing in het moment werd genomen. Alleen al omdat je veel gewonnen hebt in Vegas, wil dat nog niet zeggen dat het gokken van je geld een slimme beslissing was.

Ander voorbeeld: Toen Nederlandse jongens met Hitler tegen Het Communisme gingen vechten, was dat niet zo slecht: priesters hadden  tegen de communisten gepredikt. In Engeland en in de VS waren veel aanhangers van Hitler. De duitsers gedroegen zich hier redelijk. Antisemitisme was toen nog geen taboe, zoals nu. Het kwam vrij algemeen voor.  Toen die mannen gingen vechten was dat niet omdat ze Hitler wilden helpen, maar omdat ze hadden gehoord hoe erg het communisme was. En ze wilden mee helpen te voorkomen dat het ons land zou bereiken.  
Naïeve mensen gaan er in hun oordeel over NSB-ers van uit dat die al in 1940 wisten dat er een holocaust zou komen en die NSB-ers dat steunden. Dat is uitermate unfair. Als dat toen bekend was geweest, dan zouden veel en veel meer joden zijn gevlucht en ondergedoken.   

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12       Overconfidence
Some of us are too confident about our abilities, and this causes us to take greater risks in our daily lives. Perhaps surprisingly, experts are more prone to this bias than laypeople. An expert might make the same inaccurate prediction as someone unfamiliar with the topic — but the expert will probably be convinced that he's right.
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Overmoedigheid
Sommigen van ons hebben te veel vertrouwen in onze capaciteiten en dit zorgt ervoor dat we grotere risico's nemen in ons dagelijks leven.
Misschien verrassend, experts zijn meer vatbaar voor dit vooroordeel dan leken. Een expert kan dezelfde onnauwkeurige voorspelling doen als iemand die onbekend is met het onderwerp, maar de expert zal waarschijnlijk ervan overtuigd zijn dat hij gelijk heeft.

Dit is de achilleshiel van alle succesvolle mensen (en landen).  Wie nog omhoog klimt is voorzichtig en weet dat hij geen fouten mag maken.  Wie de top bereikt heeft ziet wat de anderen om hem heen fout doen. Hij herinnert zich alle doemdenkers om hem heen wiens advies die hij destijds negeerde en verkiest zijn voorzichtigheid.  

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13       Placebo effect
When simply believing that something will have a certain impact on you causes it to have that effect.
This is a basic principle of stock market cycles, as well as a supporting feature of medical treatment in general. People given "fake" pills often experience the same physiological effects as people given the real thing.
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Placebo effect
Wanneer je gewoon gelooft dat iets een bepaalde impact op je heeft, heeft het dat effect.
Dit is een basisprincipe van beurscycli, evenals een ondersteunend kenmerk van medische behandelingen in het algemeen. Mensen die 'nep'-pillen krijgen, ervaren vaak dezelfde fysiologische effecten als mensen het echte gegeven geven.
Ik begrijp het voorbeeld van 'beurs-cycli' niet als 'placebo' effect. Als medicijn wel, maar als 'denkfout' in een betoog over 'de toestand in de wereld' zie ik geen placebo effect voor me.
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14       Pro-innovation bias
When a proponent of an innovation tends to overvalue its usefulness and undervalue its limitations. Sound familiar, Silicon Valley?
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Pro-innovatiebias
Wanneer een voorstander van een innovatie de bruikbaarheid ervan overwaardeert en de beperkingen ervan onderschat. Klinkt dat bekend, Silicon Valley?

Deze bias bestaat alleen in een samenleving waar verandering en vernieuwing hoog zijn aangeschreven. Maar in vroeger tijden waren juist tradities en niet-veranderen de waarden die hoog waren aangeschreven.  Tom Zwitser  heeft een afkeer van die voortdurende verandering en zegt dat dit met de Verlichting is begonnen. Maar dat is ook de periode dat de joden deel gingen nemen aan het openbare leven in de westerse staten. En dat Cultureel marxisme is niets anders dan het hypen van de ene na de andere verandering. De joden voelen  instinctmatig aan dat ze op die manier een volk veranderen in 16 miljoen verloren lopende individuen,waarmee je alles kan doen en die je alles kan wijsmaken. Naar wie zouden 'ze'nog moeten luisteren.   Dus deze bias is kunstmatig, niet aangeboren, denk ik.
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15       Recency
The tendency to weigh the latest information more heavily than older data.
As financial planner Carl Richards writes in The New York Times, investors often think the market will always look the way it looks today and therefore make unwise decisions: "When the market is down, we become convinced that it will never climb out so we cash out our portfolios and stick the money in a mattress."
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nieuwheid
De neiging om de laatste informatie zwaarder te wegen dan oudere gegevens.
Zoals financiële planner Carl Richards schrijft in The New York Times, denken beleggers vaak dat de markt er altijd uitziet zoals het er vandaag uitziet en maakt daarom onverstandige beslissingen: "Als de markt uitvalt, worden we ervan overtuigd dat deze nooit naar buiten zal klimmen, zodat we cash kunnen maken onze portefeuilles en plak het geld in een matras. "

Ik merk op dat deze denkfout in tegenspraak is met denkfout nr 8: conservatism bias. 
Nr 8 gaat over het geloof van de toedracht bij een bepaalde gebeurtenis. 
Nr 15 gaat over een in de tijd voort bestaand proces, met goede tijden en slechte tijden. De geschiedenis leert ons dat oorlogen van alle tijden zijn. Maar omdat we in West Europa al 70 jaar geen oorlog meer hebben gehad, kan bijna niemand zich voorstellen dat die toch weer kan komen. 
Ja, deze denkfout bestaat wel degelijk. 

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16       Salience
Our tendency to focus on the most easily recognizable features of a person or concept.
When you think about dying, for example, you might worry about being mauled by a lion, even though dying in a car accident is statistically more likely, because the lion attacks you've heard about are more dramatic and stand out in your mind.
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            Saillante aspecten.
Onze neiging om ons te concentreren op de gemakkelijkst herkenbare kenmerken van een persoon of een concept.

Wanneer je bijvoorbeeld denkt aan sterven, maak je je misschien zorgen dat je wordt verscheurd door een leeuw, ook al is sterven aan een auto-ongeluk statistisch gezien waarschijnlijker, omdat de leeuw-aanvallen waar je over gehoord hebt dramatischer zijn en opvallen in je gedachten.

Ik vind het voorbeeld van de leeuw onzin.
In dit verband denk ik aan het gemak waarmee de media er in slagen om een uitspraak (jongens onder elkaar) van Trump over 'pussy' een hoofdrol toe te kennen. Het is een saillant gegeven, en blijkbaar denken mensen dat dit van enig belang is voor de kwaliteit van een president.  Een grote denkfout. 
Maar wel een menselijke zwakheid: met 'sex en spelen' worden de mensen afgeleid van wat belangrijk is in hun leven.
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            17       Selective perception

Allowing our expectations to influence how we perceive the world.
In a classic experiment on selective perception, researchers showed a video clip of a football game between Princeton and Dartmouth Universities to students from both schools. Results showed that Princeton students saw Dartmouth players commit more infractions than Dartmouth students saw. The researchers wrote: "The 'game' exists for a person and is experienced by him only in so far as certain happenings have significances in terms of his purpose."
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Selectieve perceptie
Onze verwachtingen laten beïnvloeden hoe we de wereld waarnemen.
In een klassiek experiment over selectieve perceptie, toonden onderzoekers een videoclip van een voetbalwedstrijd tussen Princeton en Dartmouth Universities aan studenten van beide scholen. De resultaten toonden aan dat Princeton-studenten Dartmouth-spelers zagen die meer overtredingen begaan dan Dartmouth-studenten zagen. De onderzoekers schreven: "Het 'spel' bestaat voor een persoon en wordt alleen door hem ervaren voor zover bepaalde gebeurtenissen betekenis hebben in termen van zijn doel. '

Dit is alweer een manier van selectieve waarneming. Nu is onze wens de vader van de waarneming. 
Eerder zagen we dat onze aanwezige overtuiging, en onze eerder verkregen informatie (911-boxcutters) van invloed waren. Nu dus de wens om onze eigen groep te zien winnen. We zien elke overtreding van de tegenstanders, maar niet van onze eigen spelers.
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18       Stereotyping
Expecting a group or person to have certain qualities without having real information about the individual.
There may be some value to stereotyping because it allows us to quickly identify strangers as friends or enemies. But people tend to overuse it — for example, thinking low-income individuals aren't as competent as higher-income people.
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stereotypering
Verwachten dat een groep of persoon bepaalde kwaliteiten heeft zonder echte informatie over het individu.
Het stereotypering kan enige waarde hebben omdat het ons in staat stelt om vreemden snel als vrienden of vijanden te identificeren. Maar mensen hebben de neiging om het te veel te gebruiken - bijvoorbeeld, denken dat individuen met een laag inkomen niet zo competent zijn als mensen met hogere inkomens.
Zonder stereotypering zouden we moeilijk kunnen leven, omdat je in no time redelijk bruikbare  voorspellingen kunt doen over het gedrag van de mens of het dier dat je tegenover je ziet. Maar daar blind op varen is een denkfout.
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19       Survivorship bias
An error that comes from focusing only on surviving examples, causing us to misjudge a situation.
For instance, we might think that being an entrepreneur is easy because we haven't heard of all of the entrepreneurs who have failed.
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Overlevende vooringenomenheid
Een fout die ontstaat als je je alleen concentreert op overlevende voorbeelden, waardoor we een situatie verkeerd inschatten.
We kunnen bijvoorbeeld denken dat een ondernemer zijn gemakkelijk is, omdat we niet hebben gehoord van alle ondernemers die gefaald hebben.


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20       Zero-risk bias
Sociologists have found that we love certainty — even if it's counter productive.
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Geen risico's
Sociologen hebben ontdekt dat we van zekerheid houden - zelfs als het contraproductief is.
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Thus the zero-risk bias.

"Zero-risk bias occurs because individuals worry about risk, and eliminating it entirely means that there is no chance of harm being caused," says decision science blogger Steve Spaulding. "What is economically efficient and possibly more relevant, however, is not bringing risk from 1% to 0%, but from 50% to 5%."
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Dus de nulrisico-bias.

"Nul-risico vooroordeel treedt op omdat mensen zich zorgen maken over het risico, en elimineren volledig betekent dat er geen kans op schade wordt veroorzaakt", zegt decision science blogger Steve Spaulding. "Wat economisch efficiënt en mogelijk relevanter is, brengt echter geen risico van 1% tot 0%, maar van 50% naar 5%."


===================================================


Cognitive bias cheat sheet

Because thinking is hard.

http://chainsawsuit.com/comic/2014/09/16/on-research/
I’ve spent many years referencing Wikipedia’s list of cognitive biaseswhenever I have a hunch that a certain type of thinking is an official bias but I can’t recall the name or details. It’s been an invaluable reference for helping me identify the hidden flaws in my own thinking. Nothing else I’ve come across seems to be both as comprehensive and as succinct.
However, honestly, the Wikipedia page is a bit of a tangled mess. Despite trying to absorb the information of this page many times over the years, very little of it seems to stick. I often scan it and feel like I’m not able to find the bias I’m looking for, and then quickly forget what I’ve learned. I think this has to do with how the page has organically evolved over the years. Today, it groups 175 biases into vague categories (decision-making biases, social biases, memory errors, etc) that don’t really feel mutually exclusive to me, and then lists them alphabetically within categories. There are duplicates a-plenty, and many similar biases with different names, scattered willy-nilly.
I’ve taken some time over the last four weeks (I’m on paternity leave) to try to more deeply absorb and understand this list, and to try to come up with a simpler, clearer organizing structure to hang these biases off of. Reading deeply about various biases has given my brain something to chew on while I bounce little Louie to sleep.
I started with the raw list of the 175 biases and added them all to a spreadsheet, then took another pass removing duplicates, and grouping similar biases (like bizarreness effect and humor effect) or complementary biases (like optimism bias and pessimism bias). The list came down to about 20 unique biased mental strategies that we use for very specific reasons.
I made several different attempts to try to group these 20 or so at a higher level, and eventually landed on grouping them by the general mental problem that they were attempting to address. Every cognitive bias is there for a reason — primarily to save our brains time or energy. If you look at them by the problem they’re trying to solve, it becomes a lot easier to understand why they exist, how they’re useful, and the trade-offs (and resulting mental errors) that they introduce.

Four problems that biases help us address:

Information overload, lack of meaning, the need to act fast, and how to know what needs to be remembered for later.

Problem 1: Too much information.

There is just too much information in the world, we have no choice but to filter almost all of it out. Our brain uses a few simple tricks to pick out the bits of information that are most likely going to be useful in some way.

Problem 2: Not enough meaning.

The world is very confusing, and we end up only seeing a tiny sliver of it, but we need to make some sense of it in order to survive. Once the reduced stream of information comes in, we connect the dots, fill in the gaps with stuff we already think we know, and update our mental models of the world.

Problem 3: Need to act fast.

We’re constrained by time and information, and yet we can’t let that paralyze us. Without the ability to act fast in the face of uncertainty, we surely would have perished as a species long ago. With every piece of new information, we need to do our best to assess our ability to affect the situation, apply it to decisions, simulate the future to predict what might happen next, and otherwise act on our new insight.

Problem 4: What should we remember?

There’s too much information in the universe. We can only afford to keep around the bits that are most likely to prove useful in the future. We need to make constant bets and trade-offs around what we try to remember and what we forget. For example, we prefer generalizations over specifics because they take up less space. When there are lots of irreducible details, we pick out a few standout items to save and discard the rest. What we save here is what is most likely to inform our filters related to problem 1’s information overload, as well as inform what comes to mind during the processes mentioned in problem 2 around filling in incomplete information. It’s all self-reinforcing.

Great, how am I supposed to remember all of this?

You don’t have to. But you can start by remembering these four giant problems our brains have evolved to deal with over the last few million years (and maybe bookmark this page if you want to occasionally reference it for the exact bias you’re looking for):
  1. Information overload sucks, so we aggressively filter. Noise becomes signal.
  2. Lack of meaning is confusing, so we fill in the gaps. Signal becomes a story.
  3. Need to act fast lest we lose our chance, so we jump to conclusions. Stories become decisions.
  4. This isn’t getting easier, so we try to remember the important bits. Decisions inform our mental models of the world.
In order to avoid drowning in information overload, our brains need to skim and filter insane amounts of information and quickly, almost effortlessly, decide which few things in that firehose are actually important and call those out.
In order to construct meaning out of the bits and pieces of information that come to our attention, we need to fill in the gaps, and map it all to our existing mental models. In the meantime we also need to make sure that it all stays relatively stable and as accurate as possible.
In order to act fast, our brains need to make split-second decisions that could impact our chances for survival, security, or success, and feel confident that we can make things happen.
And in order to keep doing all of this as efficiently as possible, our brains need to remember the most important and useful bits of new information and inform the other systems so they can adapt and improve over time, but no more than that.

Sounds pretty useful! So what’s the downside?

In addition to the four problems, it would be useful to remember these four truths about how our solutions to these problems have problems of their own:
  1. We don’t see everything. Some of the information we filter out is actually useful and important.
  2. Our search for meaning can conjure illusions. We sometimes imagine details that were filled in by our assumptions, and construct meaning and stories that aren’t really there.
  3. Quick decisions can be seriously flawed. Some of the quick reactions and decisions we jump to are unfair, self-serving, and counter-productive.
  4. Our memory reinforces errors. Some of the stuff we remember for later just makes all of the above systems more biased, and more damaging to our thought processes.
By keeping the four problems with the world and the four consequences of our brain’s strategy to solve them, the availability heuristic (and, specifically, the Baader-Meinhof phenomenon) will insure that we notice our own biases more often. If you visit this page to refresh your mind every once in a while, the spacing effect will help underline some of these thought patterns so that our bias blind spot and naïve realism is kept in check.
Nothing we do can make the 4 problems go away (until we have a way to expand our minds’ computational power and memory storage to match that of the universe) but if we accept that we are permanently biased, but that there’s room for improvement, confirmation bias will continue to help us find evidence that supports this, which will ultimately lead us to better understanding ourselves.
"Since learning about confirmation bias, I keep seeing it everywhere!”
Cognitive biases are just tools, useful in the right contexts, harmful in others. They’re the only tools we’ve got, and they’re even pretty good at what they’re meant to do. We might as well get familiar with them and even appreciate that we at least have some ability to process the universe with our mysterious brains.
Update: A couple days after posting this, John Manoogian III asked if it would be okay to do a “diagrammatic poster remix” of it, to which I of course said YES to. Here’s what he came up with: